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SUMMARY 
The issue of medical errors and patient safety has been a central concern to health systems 
around the world since alarming statistics relating to the frequency, harm, and costs of 
medical errors were published in the United States in 2000. Subsequent research has made it 
clear that this is a worldwide issue, with available data suggests that medical errors cause 
disabling injuries or death to nearly one in ten patients. In recent decades there has been a 
dramatic change internationally in the approach to medical errors, with a new ethic of 
transparency replacing the traditional customs of secrecy and denial. It is seen as important 
that medical errors are reported within the hospital so that opportunities for systems 
improvements can be identified and addressed. Clinicians are also now widely considered 
internationally to have an ethical, professional and legal obligation to disclose medical errors 
to patients. There remains, however, a large communication ‘gap’ between expected practice 
and what is actually being done, with research indicating that errors are often not reported 
within hospitals or disclosed to patients. There currently exist a number of important research 
gaps concerning medical error communication, particularly regarding the disclosure of errors 
to patients, in Switzerland and internationally.  
 
Medical Error Communication in Switzerland 
There is currently a shortage of empirical data regarding error communication in Switzerland. 
The primary aim of this research project was to therefore empirically examine current policy 
and practice in Switzerland in relation to error communication, with a particular focus on the 
disclosure of medical errors to patients. This was chiefly achieved through conducting three 
empirical studies: a quantitative survey of Swiss hospitals, a quantitative survey of Swiss 
anaesthesiologists, and qualitative interviews with key stakeholders in Switzerland. In 
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addition, data from qualitative interviews conducted with Swiss nurses by a medical master 
student were used. 
 
Quantitative Survey of Swiss Hospitals1 
There is currently no data published on how many Swiss hospitals currently have 
implemented an internal error disclosure standard. Given that a lack of institutional support 
can be a significant barrier to error communication, and that organizational standards have 
been shown internationally to be an important factor in encouraging error disclosure, a 
quantitative survey of Swiss hospitals was therefore conducted to establish what stage Swiss 
hospitals are currently at in implementing an internal standard concerning error 
communication. Responses from a total of 205 hospitals were received, a response rate of 
54%. Less than half (46%) of responding hospitals reported currently having an error 
disclosure standard, 16% reported that they are planning to implement one in the next 12 
months, and more than a third (38%) had not implemented an error disclosure standard and 
had no plans to do so. The majority of responding University and Acute Care (75%) hospitals 
reported that they had introduced a disclosure standard or were planning to do so. In contrast, 
the majority of responding Psychiatric, Rehabilitation and Specialty (53%) clinics reported 
that they had not introduced a standard. The finding that a majority of hospitals were aware of 
the issue of communicating medical errors and had already taken active steps to establish a 
culture of dealing with them was promising. Furthermore, the implementation of standards 
across cultures and languages in Switzerland, a country with an emphasis on decentralisation, 
shows that changes in the medical system towards more transparency and open 
communication with patients are being recognised as universally needed. However, Swiss 
                                               
1 Article 1: McLennan, S., Engel, S., Ruhe, K., Leu, A., Schwappach, S., Elger, B. (2013). Implementation 
Status of Error Disclosure Standards Reported by Swiss Hospitals. Swiss Medical Weekly, 143: w13820. 
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hospitals need to take further actions regarding this issue. The fact that more than one third of 
the hospitals reported not having an internal standard should be examined further in order to 
find explanations and identify obstacles that keep those institutions from implementing one.  
 
Quantitative Survey of Swiss Anaesthesiologists 
Clinicians’ attitudes and experiences in relation to error communication remain poorly 
understood in Switzerland and little is known about the impact of error involvement on 
clinicians outside the North America. A quantitative survey of clinically active 
anaesthesiologists working in Switzerland’s five university hospitals’ departments of 
anaesthesia was therefore conducted to further knowledge regarding these issues. Responses 
from a total of 281 anaesthesiologists were received, a response rate of 52%.  
 
In relation to error communication,2 virtually all respondents agreed that serious errors should 
be reported to the hospital, but agreement rates were lower for minor errors (74%) and near 
misses (59%). Only 63% agreed that current reporting systems are adequate. Strong 
agreement that serious errors should be reported was more likely if they also thought reports 
would be used to improve patient safety. While all respondents agreed that serious errors 
should be disclosed to patients, 23% of respondents disagreed that minor errors should be 
disclosed. Only 12% had received disclosure training, although 93% wanted training. 
Willingness to report or disclose medical errors varied strongly between hospitals. Heads of 
department and hospital chiefs thus need to be aware of how important local culture seems to 
be when it comes to error communication. Improving feedback on how error reports are being 
                                               
2 Article 2: McLennan, S., Engel-Glatter, S., Meyer, A.H., Scheidegger, D.H., Elger, B. (2015). Disclosing and 
Reporting Medical Errors: Cross-sectional survey of Swiss Anaesthesiologists. European Journal of 
Anaesthesiology, 32(7), 471-476 
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used to improve patient safety and increasing error disclosure training may also be important 
steps in increasing anaesthesiologists’ communication of errors. 
 
Regarding the impact of errors,3 respondents commonly experienced distress following an 
error, even after a minor error or near miss, with 90% reporting that at least one of the five 
areas of their lives were negatively affected. Ninety percent disagreed that hospitals 
adequately support after an error. Nearly all (92%) reported being interested in psychological 
counselling after a serious error, but many identified barriers to seeking counselling. 
However, there were significant differences between departments regarding error-related 
stress levels and attitudes about error-related support. Respondents were more likely to 
experience certain distress if they were female, older, had previously been involved in a 
serious error, and were dissatisfied with their last error disclosure. Medical errors, even minor 
errors and near misses, can have a serious effect on clinicians and healthcare organisations 
need to do more to support clinicians in coping with the stress associated with medical errors. 
 
Qualitative Interviews with Key Stakeholders  
This was the first time that key stakeholders have been interviewed in Switzerland to explore 
their attitudes about medical errors and error communication and their views about what 
measures could lead to improvements in Switzerland. A total of 23 Swiss key stakeholders 
were interviewed. Two important themes to emerge from these interviews were the issue of 
criminal liability and liability insurance.  
 
                                               
3 Article 3: McLennan, S., Engel-Glatter, S., Meyer, A.H., Schwappach, D., Scheidegger, D.H., Elger, D. 
(2015). The Impact of Medical Errors on Swiss Anaesthesiologists: A Cross-Sectional Survey. Acta 
Anaesthesiologica Scandinavica, 59, 990-8. 
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Concerning criminal liability in Switzerland,4 many participants expressed concerns that 
Switzerland currently has the threshold for criminal liability set too low, and thought that 
clinicians’ fears about criminal liability were a major barrier to error communication and 
quality improvement. Participants thought that the option of criminal liability needed to be 
there for “extreme cases”, but many felt it was inappropriate to be treating clinicians as 
criminals for making unintentional slips or mistakes that result in harm. A strong case can be 
made that Switzerland currently has the bar for criminal liability in relation to patient harm set 
too low. Empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that the use of the criminal law for 
any medical error, regardless of its outcome, is inappropriate and likely to do more harm than 
good. The growing international calls for the focus of the criminal law in the context of 
patient harm to be upgraded and narrowed to wilful and reckless conduct is endorsed. While 
major changes to Swiss criminal law in the foreseeable future are unlikely, further discussion 
and research is needed on this issue. 
 
In relation to liability insurance in Switzerland,5 participants, particularly those with a legal or 
quality background, reported that concerns relating to liability insurance are often inhibited 
communication with patients after a medical error. Healthcare providers were reported to be 
particularly concerned about losing their liability insurance cover for apologising to harmed 
patients. It was reported that the attempt to limit the exchange of information and 
communication could lead to a conflict with patient rights law. Finally, participants reported 
that hospitals could, and in some case are, moving towards self-insurance approaches, which 
could increase flexibility regarding error communication. The reported current practice of at 
                                               
4 Article 4: McLennan, S., Elger, B. (2014). Criminal Liability and Medical Errors in Switzerland: An Unjust 
System? Jusletter 27 January 2014: http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/article/en/_11937.  
5 Article 5: McLennan, S., Shaw, D., Elger, B. (2015). Professional Liability Insurance and Medical Error 
Disclosure. Swiss Medical Weekly, 145: w14173. 
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least some liability insurance companies in Switzerland of inhibiting communication with 
harmed patients after an error is concerning and requires further investigation. With a new 
ethic of transparency regarding medical errors now prevailing internationally, this approach is 
increasingly being perceived to be misguided. A move away from hospitals relying solely on 
liability insurance may allow greater transparency after errors. Legalisation that prevents the 
loss of liability insurance coverage for apologising to harmed patients should also be 
considered. 
 
Qualitative Interviews with Swiss Nurses6  
Nurses are another group of clinicians whose views concerning disclosing errors to patients 
remain poorly understood in Switzerland and Continental Europe in general. Qualitative 
interviews were therefore conducted by a medical master student with a total of 18 Swiss 
nurses. While nurses recognised patients’ right to be informed errors, the majority thought 
that many errors were concealed from patients in practice. Nurses identified a number of 
barriers to error disclosure that have already been reported in the literature, such as legal 
consequences and the fear of losing patients’ trust. However, nurses more frequently reported 
personal characteristics and a lack of guidance from the organisation as barriers to disclosure. 
Both of these issues point to a lack of a systematic institutional approach to error disclosure in 
which the decision to inform the patient should stem from within the organisation and not be 
shouldered by individual nurses alone. 
 
                                               
6 Article 6: McLennan, S., Diebold, M., Rich, L.E., Elger, B. (2016). Nurses’ Perspectives Regarding the 
Disclosure of Errors to Patients: A Qualitative Study. International Journal of Nursing Studies, DOI: 
10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2014.10.001. 
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Medical Error Communication Internationally 
This research project also includes theoretical research on error communication 
internationally, due to this author’s background and international collaborations.  
 
Error Disclosure in Continental Europe7  
Very little is known about error disclosure practice and policies in Continental Europe. The 
regulation of error disclosure in Germany was therefore examined. The issue of error 
disclosure was found to currently play no significant role in German health policy. However, 
a number of aspects of the wider regulatory framework appear to be supportive and a recent 
brochure published by the German Coalition for Patient Safety’s appear to be a positive step 
forward. However, without legal certainty and a broad consistent framework that is supportive 
of error disclosure, it was argued that it seems unlikely that the attitude and behaviour of 
clinicians will change towards more transparency and openness. Findings from Germany are 
also potentially useful for neighbouring civil law countries such as Switzerland and Austria. 
 
Apologies and the Law  
The law has been used in a number of countries internationally in an attempt to make sure an 
apology is given to patients after a harming causing error, including “apology laws” which 
protect apologies from being used a proof of negligence in legal action, and authorities 
requiring clinicians to apologise to patients after things go wrong. The ethical and legal 
appropriateness of these uses of the law were examined.  
 
In relation to apology laws in Australia,8 the new Australian Open Disclosure Framework 
now specifies that the words ‘I am sorry’ or ‘we are sorry’ should be included in an apology 
                                               
7 Article 7: McLennan, S., Beitat, K., Lauterberg, J., Vollman, J. (2012). Regulating Open Disclosure: A 
German Perspective. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 24(1): 23-27. 
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or expression of regret. All Australian states and territories have apology laws however 
commentators have recently argued that law reform is needed to provide stronger protections 
for the contents of open disclosure conversations. It was argued that laws that make 
compassion inadmissible or that protect truthful expressions of responsibility are unnecessary 
and operate on ethically shaky ground. Hospitals supporting clinicians through the disclosure 
process is likely to have a far greater impact.  
 
Regarding to apology laws in Canada,9 such laws are now enacted in 8 out of 10 provinces 
and 2 out of 3 territories in Canada. It remains to be seen whether these laws will achieve their 
goals of encouraging apologies and open communication and reducing litigation. However, it 
was argued that they will unlikely lead to substantial improvements in patients’ experiences 
following an adverse event. Disclosing, and apologizing for, an adverse event is one of the 
most complex and difficult conversations to have in healthcare. Therefore, without good 
training and support in this process, apology legislation is unlikely to have much of an impact 
on the behaviour of health care staff.  
 
Concerning forced apologies New Zealand,10 clinicians are commonly required to provide an 
apology to a complainant by the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC) in New Zealand. 
Even though other jurisdictions may not have an authority like the HDC that requires 
apologies, coercion may be exerted by many parties. Although apology serves several 
important social roles, it was argued that apologies that stem from external authorities’ edicts 
rather than an offender’s own self-criticism and moral reflection are inauthentic and 
                                                                                                                                                   
8 Article 8: McLennan, S.R., Truog, R.D. (2013). Apology laws and open disclosure. Medical Journal of 
Australia, 198, 411-412.  
9 Article 9: McLennan, S., Rich, L.E., Truog, R.D. (2015). The Legal Protection of Apologies – training would 
help more. Published: Canadian Medical Association Journal 2015, 187, E156-159.  
10 Article 10: McLennan, S., Walker, S., Rich, L.E. (2014). Should Health Care Providers Be Forced to 
Apologise After Things Go Wrong? Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 11, 431-435. 
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contribute to a “moral flabbiness” that stunts the moral development of both individual 
clinicians and the medical profession. Rather than requiring clinicians to apologise, authorities 
should instead train, foster, and support the capacity of providers to apologise voluntarily. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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1.1. Medical Errors: An International Issue 
Healthcare embraces a full range of services “whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or 
maintain health” (World Health Organization, 2000, p. 5), and as fragile embodied beings, 
healthcare is something that all of us are likely to require at various points in our lives. 
Healthcare, however, is not an exact science and errors inevitably and regularly occur. Indeed, 
Marianne Paget argued in her landmark book “The Unity of Mistakes: A Phenomenological 
Interpretation of Medical Work” that mistakes are an intrinsic feature of medical work which 
she calls an “error-ridden activity” precisely because it is inexact, uncertain and practised on 
the human body (Paget, 2004).  
 
The issue of medical errors and patient safety has been a central concern to health systems 
around the world particularly since the Institute of Medicine published its first report, “To Err 
Is Human” (Institute of Medicine, 2000). Indeed, it was partly as a result of this report that the 
Swiss Patient Safety Foundation was founded by the Ministries of Health and Social Security, 
several professional associations and the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences in 2003. 
 
The Institute of Medicine’s report included some alarming statistics. For instance, it estimated 
that between 44,000 to 98,000 persons die from medical errors in United State hospitals every 
year, implying that medical errors at least the 8th leading cause of death in the United States. 
New York Times compared this as equivalent of three jumbo jets crashing every two days. As 
the reporter noted, “If the airlines killed that many people annually, public outrage would 
close them overnight” (cited in Banja, 2005, p. 2).While there was initial resistance to the 
report’s statistics on the number of deaths associated with medical errors, as Sharpe has noted 
“…these challenges have been effectively silenced by the preponderance of evidence that the 
rate of harmful medical error – with its enormous human and financial consequences in death, 
18 
 
disability, lost income, lost household production, and health care costs – is unacceptable 
(Sharpe, 2004, p. 2).  
 
Research in Australia (Wilson et al., 1995), the United Kingdom (Vincent et al., 2001; Sari et 
al., 2007), Denmark (Schiøler et al., 2001), New Zealand (Davis et al., 2002), Canada (Baker 
et al. 2004), France (Michel et al., 2007), Spain (Aranaz-Andrés et al., 2008), the Netherlands 
(Zegers et al., 2009), and Sweden (Soop et al., 2009) has made it clear that this is a worldwide 
issue. Available international data suggests that medical errors cause disabling injuries or 
death to nearly one in ten patients and that the economic cost of errors is substantial, with 
prolonged hospitalisation, loss of income, disability and litigation costing some countries 
many billions of dollars a year (World Health Organization, 2009). 
 
The Institute of Medicine’s report, and other reports like such as the UK Department of 
Health’s “An organisation with a memory”, set goals of cutting error and harm by 50% within 
5 years (Institute of Medicine, 2000; Department of Health, 2000). However, despite the 
increased focus on patient safety, longitudinal studies suggest that there has been little 
improvement in the rates of adverse events (Landrigan et al., 2010).  
 
1.2. The Problem: Medical Error Concealment 
It has been stated that, “…it is altogether safe to think that for the most of the twentieth 
century, medical errors were usually concealed from the parties who were harmed, or they 
were discussed in such a way that no attention was called to the error or to the professional 
who committed” (Banja, 2005, p. 2). In recent decades, however, there has been a dramatic 
change internationally in the approach to medical errors, with a new ethic of transparency 
replacing the traditional customs of secrecy and denial.  
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At the core of the patient safety movement is the open communication about medical errors. 
With a new “systems” concept of error causation emerging and increasingly accepted in 
patient safety, one that posits that most errors in fact have their origins in wider organizational 
factors that may lay dormant within the system before combining with individual failures to 
breach the system’s defences (Reason, 1990), it is seen as important to foster an environment 
where people feel supported and are encouraged to identify and report errors so that 
opportunities for systems improvements can be identified and addressed (Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2008). Swiss anaesthesiologists in 
particular have been at the forefront of this movement, with the Department of Anaesthesia at 
the University of Basel setting up one of the first error reporting systems internationally in 
1996 (Staender, Kaufmann & Scheidegger, 2000). 
 
There has also been an important shift towards openness regarding medical errors and their 
communication to patients. Clinicians are now widely considered internationally to have an 
ethical, professional and legal obligation to disclose medical errors to patients (Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors, 2006; Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2008; 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2008; New Zealand Ministry of 
Health, 2008; UK National Patient Safety Agency 2009). Recent research has indicated that a 
full and sincere apology following an error is also a key element of successful disclosure 
practice (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2012). Disclosure and 
apology practice is thought to potentially have a number of positive benefits, including 
assisting the recovery of harmed patients, promoting forgiveness and the early resolution of 
disputes, and reducing litigation and legal costs (Australian Commission on Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, 2012; Lazare, 2006).  
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There remains, however, a large communication ‘gap’ internationally between expected 
practice and what is actually being done, with research indicating that errors are often not 
reported within hospitals or disclosed to patients (Classen et al., 2011; Gallagher et al., 
2006a). A number of barriers to open and honest communication about medical errors have 
been identified, and these are similar for both reporting errors to within the hospital and 
disclosing errors to patients. These barriers include a professional and organisational culture 
of secrecy and blame, clinicians lacking confidence in their communication skills, high 
workload, the belief that the circumstances or outcome of a particular case did not warrant 
communicating, and medicine’s traditional focus on professional autonomy and individual 
accountability for patient outcomes. However, the most pervasive barrier identified is 
clinicians’ legal fears (Iedema et al., 2011; Hartnell et al., 2012). However, while legal fears 
are undoubtedly a factor in some clinicians’ reluctance to communicate errors, research 
published in 2006 involving US and Canadian physicians suggest that the legal environment 
may have a more limited impact on physicians’ communication attitudes and practices 
regarding medical errors than often believed, and that the culture of medicine itself may be a 
more important barrier (Gallagher et al., 2006b).  
 
Various measures have been put in place in a number of countries internationally in an 
attempt to mitigate these barriers and create a more supportive environment for clinicians to 
communicate errors. These have included including governmental, organisational and 
professional standards to promote a clear and consistent approach to error communication, 
specific laws which mandate the reporting or disclosure of errors in certain circumstances, 
and laws that protect apologies given to patients and documents created for quality 
improvement activities from being used in a legal action (Mastroianni et al., 2010; Studdert & 
Richardson, 2010).  
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1.3. Research Gaps and Needs 
There currently exist a number of important research gaps concerning medical error 
communication, particularly regarding the disclosure of errors to patients, in Switzerland and 
internationally.  
 
1.3.1. Medical Error Communication in Switzerland 
 
Error Disclosure Guidance  
In Switzerland, medical error communication, particularly error disclosure, currently plays no 
significant role in Swiss health policy. At the national level, the Swiss Patient Safety 
Foundation led the way in brining awareness to this issue when it translated the Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors’ “When Things Go Wrong” into German 
“Wenn etwas schief geht” in December 2006. However, the Swiss Academy of Medical 
Sciences (SAMW) had not issued any comprehensive guidance regarding disclosing medical 
errors to patients. In 2007, the SAMW supported educational efforts in relation to the issue in 
its recommendations “Aus- und Weiterbildung in Patientensicherheit und Fehlerkultur”, 
which states that clinicians must openly debate medical errors and obtain the skills required 
for communicating errors with patients and peers (SAMW, 2007). The SAMW published a 
new “Leitfaden für die Praxis” entitled “Kommunikation im medizinischen Alltag” in 2013 
which included a subchapter on “Gespräch über Behandlungsfehler”. However, the advice 
provided regarding error disclosure was rather general in nature. There does not appear to 
have been any research to date that has examined how current measures at the national level, 
such as the Patient Safety Foundation’s brochure, has been received by key stakeholders and 
what other measures could help promote error disclosure in Switzerland.  
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At the organisational level, internal hospital standards on error disclosure are not yet part of 
quality improvement efforts in Switzerland. While such standards are part of accreditation 
requirements for hospitals in countries like the United States, Swiss hospitals are under no 
such obligation. There is currently no data published on how many Swiss hospitals currently 
have implemented an internal error disclosure standard. Given that a lack of institutional 
support can be a significant barrier to error communication, and that organizational standards 
have been shown internationally to be an important factor in encouraging error disclosure 
(Iedema et al., 2008a), it is important to establish what stage Swiss hospitals are currently at 
in implementing an internal standard concerning error communication to assist efforts to 
advance the issue of error disclosure. 
 
Attitudes and Experiences Regarding Errors Communication  
Ground-breaking work on patients’ and clinicians’ attitudes and experiences of regarding 
medical error communication, and error disclosure in particular, have been conducted by Dr 
Thomas Gallagher and colleagues via qualitative and quantitative surveys, in North American 
(Gallagher, et al., 2003; Gallagher, et al., 2006a; Gallagher, et al., 2006b; Garbutt et al., 
2007). In relation to patients, a number of other studies (for instance, Iedema et al., 2008b) 
also indicate that patients’ attitudes are very similar internationally. Patients define errors 
broadly and are virtually unanimous in wanting all harmful errors disclosed. However, 
concerning clinicians, there has been more variation, but general themes have included 
clinicians’ defining errors narrowly, endorsing error communication in principle but a wide 
variation existing regarding what information they would actually communicate in practice, 
being concerned that such communication might create legal liability, and feeling that there is 
a lack of institutional support. 
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A Swiss study published in 2011, which examined patients’ experiences and perceptions of 
safety in eight Swiss hospitals, found that only 25.3% of patients’ who had experienced an 
‘safety-related event’ (e.g. infection or medication error) talked to health care staff about this 
event (Schwappach, Frank & Hochreutener, 2011). However, clinicians’ attitudes and 
experiences in relation to error communication, and error disclosure in particular, remain 
poorly understood in Switzerland and continental Europe in general. The current shortage of 
information about clinicians’ attitudes and experiences presents an obstacle to efforts to 
increase open communication following medical errors. 
 
The Impact of Medical Errors  
The phrase “second victims” was introduced in 2000 to highlight the significant emotional 
impact that physicians involved in errors can experience (Wu, 2000). Distress following error 
involvement is not only a tragedy for the individual clinician, but also poses risks for future 
patients. Empirical evidence from North America suggests that individuals involved in errors 
and experience significant distress (Waterman et al., 2007), and without sufficient support, 
often suffer burn-out and depressive symptoms, which may increase the risk for future errors 
and loss of empathy (Schwappach and Boluarte, 2008; Shanafelt et al., 2005; West et al., 
2006; West et al., 2009). Furthermore, while physicians often desire support in coping with 
the stress associated with medical errors many feel that hospitals fail to adequately them 
(Waterman et al., 2007). 
 
In Switzerland, the Swiss Patient Safety Foundation was the first organization in Europe the 
systematically examine the issue of "second victims.” (von Laue, Schwappach & 
Hochreutener, 2012). However, little is known about the impact of error involvement on 
clinicians outside the North America and empirical data from Switzerland, and Europe in 
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general, remains limited. The Patient Safety Foundation’s 2011 brochure “Täter als Opfer” 
(Wrongdoer as Victim) included the results of three focus groups conducted in Switzerland 
with physicians and nurses (von Laue, Schwappach, Hochreutener & Frank, 2011). Similar to 
international research, Swiss professionals reported significant emotional distress following 
involvement in an error. Participates also criticised the lack of emotional support following an 
error, especially from colleagues and superiors and called for a change of culture, particularly 
regarding the handling of the emotional side of an error, wishing for an independent 
counselling and more support. However, further quantitative data is needed to gain an 
understanding of the prevalence of the negative consequences following medical errors and 
thus the potential need for supportive measures.  
 
1.3.2. Medical Error Communication Internationally 
 
Error Disclosure in Continental Europe  
The issue of error disclosure has received growing attention from policy makers, legal experts 
and academic researchers, predominantly in a number of English speaking countries 
(Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors, 2006; Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute, 2008; Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2008; New 
Zealand Ministry of Health, 2008; UK National Patient Safety Agency 2009). Disclosure now 
forms an integral part of health legislation and policy in these countries, with various 
measures having been put in place to encourage disclosure and mitigate some of the barriers 
to such communication. In contrast, the issue of error disclosure currently plays no significant 
role in most Continental European countries. While the importance of reporting incidents as 
part of quality improvement programmes has been recognised in many countries, lacking 
from the ongoing discussion has been the emphasis of the needs of patients in such situations.  
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This author is unaware of any empirical data relating to clinicians’ attitudes and experiences 
regarding error disclosure, and very little is known about current practice and policies, in 
Continental Europe. There is therefore a need to understand these issues better. 
 
Apologies and the Law  
The act of apologising carries great meaning in wider society as a means of “responding to 
harmed persons’ need for recognition, offering the individual or organisation the opportunity 
to make amends, [and] laying the foundation for a better relationship between both parties” 
(Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2012, p. 42). A full apology is 
typically considered in the literature to include an acknowledgement of the harm caused, an 
expression of remorse or regret, and an acceptance of responsibility (Truesdale, 2012).With 
the development of error disclosure internationally, the role of apologies to patients harmed 
by medical errors has become an increasingly important consideration, with research 
indicating that a full and sincere apology following an adverse event is a key element of 
successful disclosure practice (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 
2012). Clinicians and healthcare organisations, however, have traditionally been reluctant to 
offer apologies in healthcare settings after things go wrong and, in many cases, lawyers advise 
against making an apology. This is due to the risk that an apology would be seen as an 
admission of fault or liability, and in some jurisdictions, the risk that an apology would void 
liability insurance coverage (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2006).  
 
This situation has led the law to be used in a number of countries in an attempt to make sure 
an apology is given after a harming causing error. The first way the law has been used is to 
protect apologies given to patients from being used a proof of negligence in legal action. Such 
“apology laws” have been widely enacted in the United States (36 states and the District of 
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Columbia), Australia (all 8 states and territories), and Canada (8 out of 10 provinces and 2 out 
of 3 territories) (American Medical Association, 2012; Studdert & Richardson, 2010; 
Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2013). Meanwhile, other common law jurisdictions 
have also considered enacting such laws. For example, an apologies bill was proposed in 
Scotland in 2012 by Margaret Mitchell MSP (The Scottish Parliament, 2012). It has been 
argued in the United States and Australia, however, that the majority of apology laws in these 
countries, which provide only protect expressions of sympathy, are flawed and unlikely to 
achieve their goals as they do little to reduce clinicians’ fear. Law reform providing more 
expansive protections specifically directed at the contents of error disclosure has been 
recommended (Mastroianni et al., 2010; Studdert & Richardson, 2010). However, there has 
been very little research (Bailey, Robertson & Hegedus, 2007) that has actually examined the 
ethical and legal appropriateness of governments enacting legislation that protects apologies 
and whether these laws and in fact necessary. With these laws continuing to be enacted in the 
United States and Canadian, calls for current laws to be strengthened in the United States and 
Australia, and other countries such as Scotland considering going down this path, there is a 
need to examine these issues.  
 
The second way the law has been used is to require clinicians to apologise to patients after 
things go wrong. In New Zealand, for instance, Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC) 
regularly recommends that an apology be provided in investigation reports. HDC 
“recommendations” are more than simple suggestions that clinicians can freely choose not to 
follow. Such recommendations effectively amount to a requirement, given the HDC’s policy 
of publicly naming providers who fail to comply with the Commissioner’s recommendations 
(Health and Disability Commissioner 2008). This practice has not been examined to date. 
Even though other jurisdictions may not have an authority like the HDC that requires 
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apologies, coercion may be exerted by many parties and there is a need to reflect on how 
apologies can be ethically promoted after things go wrong in health care. 
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CHAPTER 2: AIMS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
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2.1. Medical Error Communication in Switzerland 
There is currently a shortage of empirical data regarding error communication in Switzerland. 
The primary aim of this research project was to therefore empirically examine current policy 
and practice in Switzerland in relation to error communication, which a particular focus on the 
disclosure of medical errors to patients. This was chiefly achieved through conducting three 
empirical studies: a quantitative survey of Swiss hospitals, a quantitative survey of Swiss 
anaesthesiologists, and qualitative interviews with key stakeholders in Switzerland. In 
addition, data from qualitative interviews conducted with Swiss nurses by a medical master 
student were used. 
 
Quantitative Survey of Swiss Hospitals  
There is currently no data published on how many Swiss hospitals currently have an error 
disclosure policy. A quantitative survey of Swiss hospitals was therefore conducted with the 
aim of establishing what stage Swiss hospitals are at in implementing an internal standard 
concerning communication with patients and families following an error that has resulted in 
harm.  
 
Quantitative Survey of Swiss Anaesthesiologists  
Clinicians’ attitudes and experiences regarding error communication remain poorly 
understood in Switzerland and little is known about the impact of error involvement on 
clinicians outside the North America. A quantitative survey of anaesthesiologists working in 
Switzerland’s five university hospitals’ departments of anaesthesia was therefore conducted 
with the aim of furthering knowledge regarding these issues. Anaesthesiologists were 
surveyed because of their frequent involvement in errors and long standing interest in patient 
safety, and due to the personal contacts of my second supervisor Prof. Scheidegger. The initial 
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research plan had intended to also survey visceral surgeons to allow a comparison of 
disciplines; however, this was abandoned in the early stages due to the limited participation of 
the first department and general lack of interest of the other departments. In relation to error 
communication, the aim was to characterise anaesthesiologists’ attitudes and experiences 
regarding communicating medical errors within the hospital and to patients, and to examine 
factors influencing their willingness to communicate errors. Regarding the impact of errors, 
the aim was to examine how medical errors impact Swiss anaesthesiologists in five key work 
and life domains, anaesthesiologists’ attitudes regarding support after errors, and which 
anaesthesiologists are most affected by errors.  
 
Qualitative Interviews with Key Swiss Stakeholders  
There is currently no research in Switzerland on key stakeholders’ general attitudes towards 
medical errors, perceived barriers to error communication and potential ways of improving 
the situation. Qualitative interviews were therefore conducted with informants in key 
positions in the Swiss healthcare system to address this. Two important themes to emerge 
from these interviews were the issue of criminal liability and liability insurance. Concerning 
to criminal liability in Switzerland, the aim was to examine key medico-legal informants’ 
views regarding criminal liability in Switzerland for to medical errors, and to explore whether 
the current system in Switzerland is a morally meaningful and just system of culpability in 
light of theoretical and ethical considerations. Regarding to liability insurance, the aim was to 
examine key medico-legal informants’ views regarding liability insurance in Switzerland in 
relation to medical error communication, and to evaluate the reported impact that liability 
insurance companies are having on error communication in Switzerland in light of 
international trends and ethical considerations. 
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Qualitative Interviews with Swiss Nurses  
Nurses are another group of clinicians whose views concerning errors and error 
communication remain poorly understood in Switzerland and Continental Europe in general. 
Qualitative interviews with Swiss nurses were therefore conducted by a medical master 
student, Martin Diebold. This author co-supervised the study (with Prof. Elger) and was 
significantly responsible for developing this empirical project with Martin Diebold. Part of the 
data collected and transcribed by Martin Diebold were able to be used as part of this research 
project to explore Swiss nurses’ attitudes and experiences concerning disclosing errors to 
patients.  
 
2.2. Medical Error Communication Internationally 
This research project also includes theoretical research on error communication 
internationally due to this author’s background and international collaborations. This author is 
a New Zealand citizen and previously worked at the Health and Disability Commissioner’s 
Office from 2008 to 2009 as a Complaints Assessor. Issues of communication were a 
common feature of the complaints received by the Office, either as one of the causes of the 
failure of care or in the manner the patient was treated subsequent to the harm. It was this 
experience that primarily sparked this author’s interest in medical errors and their 
communication. This author is also very knowledgeable and interested in international 
medico-legal issues, particularly in common law jurisdictions, and has pre-existing 
collaborations with international researchers in their field.  
 
Error Disclosure in Continental Europe  
In Continental Europe, empirical data relating to clinicians’ attitudes and experiences 
regarding error disclosure is limited and very little is known about current practice and 
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policies. The current regulation of error disclosure in Germany was therefore examined with 
the aim of making a contribution to the international literature and to consider possible 
additional measures that could be implemented to further promote error disclosure in 
Germany. Germany was examined due to the knowledge and contacts that this author had 
gained from his previous experiences working in Germany. A similar article examining this 
issue in Austria was also planned with Assist.-Prof. Magdalena Flatscher-Thöni from UMIT. 
However, this was never completed due to Assist.-Prof. Flatscher-Thöni having a child. 
Attempts were also made to conduct the quantitative survey with Austrian anaesthesiologists. 
However, the Austrian Society of Anesthesiology, Resuscitation and Intensive Care (ÖGARI) 
felt that the survey could theoretically have a negative consequence for the participant. The 
board therefore concluded that according to Austrian rules, the “Betriebsrat” (work council) 
of all included hospitals would need to be asked for permission. This was beyond the time and 
resources available for this project and was therefore not pursued any further. It does, 
however, highlight the sensitivities and difficulties of conducting research on this topic.  
 
Apologies and the Law  
Very little research has been conducted on the ethically and legally appropriate role of the law 
regarding promoting apologies to patients after a medical error. Apology laws and the practice 
of requiring clinicians to apologise were therefore examined. In relation to apology laws in 
Australia, the aim was to examine recent developments in Australia regarding error disclosure 
and to consider whether Australian apology laws are a necessary or appropriate strategy to 
promote error disclosure. Regarding apology laws in Canada, the aim was to examine the 
development of Canadian apology laws and to consider whether these laws will achieve their 
aims or whether other measures are required to promote disclosing, and apologising for, 
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adverse events. Concerning to forced apologies in New Zealand, the aim was to examine 
whether it is ethically appropriate to require clinicians to apologise after an adverse event.  
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Summary 
Question under study: To establish what stage Swiss hospitals are at in implementing an 
internal standard concerning communication with patients and families following an error that 
has resulted in harm.  
Methods: Hospitals were identified via the Swiss Hospital Association’s website. An 
anonymous questionnaire was sent during September and October 2011 to 379 hospitals in 
German, French or Italian. Hospitals were asked to specify their hospital type and the 
implementation status of an internal hospital standard that provides patients or their relatives 
are to be promptly informed about medical errors that result in harm. 
Results: Responses from a total of 205 hospitals were received, a response rate of 54%. Most 
responding hospitals (62%) had an error disclosure standard or planned to implement one 
within 12 months. The majority of responding University and Acute Care (75%) hospitals had 
introduced a disclosure standard or were planning to do so. In contrast, the majority of 
responding Psychiatric, Rehabilitation and Specialty (53%) clinics have not introduced a 
standard. 
Conclusion: It appears that Swiss hospitals are in a promising state in providing institutional 
support for practitioners disclosing medical errors to patients. This has been shown 
internationally to be one important factor in encouraging the disclosure of medical errors. 
However, many hospitals, in particular Psychiatric, Rehabilitation and Specialty clinics, have 
not implemented an error disclosure policy. Further research is needed to explore the 
underlying reasons. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, there has been a dramatic change in the approach to medical errors 
internationally, with a new ethic of transparency replacing the traditional customs of secrecy 
and denial. The requirement to disclose errors is increasingly incorporated into national and 
state laws, accreditation requirements and consensus statements in various countries, 
including Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.[1-5]  
 
The disclosure of errors has evolved internationally from a strategic response to rising legal 
costs focusing on organisational risk minimisation, to an ethical practice seeking to re-
establish trust by meeting patients’ needs and expectations following an incident. Studies 
conducted internationally have indicated that patients are virtually unanimous in wanting all 
harmful errors disclosed and seek information about what happened, why the error happened, 
how the error’s consequences will be addressed, and how recurrences will be prevented.[6-7] 
Patients often consider that error disclosure “would enhance their trust in their physicians’ 
honesty and would reassure them that they were receiving complete information about their 
overall care.”[6] While empirical data relating to error disclosure in Switzerland is limited, a 
2006 study examining patient assessments of hypothetical medical errors supported 
international findings; patients wanted medical errors disclosed and perceived the non-
disclosure of errors negatively.[8]  
 
There remains, however, a large ‘disclosure gap’ between expected practice and what is 
actually being done.[9] While health professionals typically endorse disclosure in principle, 
they often do not share information in practice, with international studies suggesting that as 
few as 30% of harmful errors are disclosed to patients.[10] A Swiss study published in 2011, 
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which examined patients’ experiences and perceptions of safety in eight Swiss hospitals, 
found that only 25.3% of patients’ who had experienced an ‘safety-related event’ (e.g. 
infection or medication error) talked to health care staff about this event.[11] 
 
International studies examining professionals’ views regarding error disclosure have 
consistently found a number of barriers that contribute to nondisclosure.[12] The most 
pervasive barrier identified is professionals legal fears, this is the case even in very different 
legal settings.[13] Other barriers identified include a professional and organisational culture 
of secrecy and blame, practitioners lacking confidence in their communication skills, 
practitioners fearing that patients will experience distress, and doubt about the efficacy and 
effectiveness of disclosure.[12] In Switzerland, a recent study confirmed that professionals 
expressed psychological issues when being involved in an error and a common blame culture 
among colleagues.[14] 
 
Various measures have been put in place in a number of countries internationally to mitigate 
these barriers and create a more supportive environment for practitioners to disclosure errors, 
including governmental and organisational standards to promote a clear and consistent 
approach to error communication, specific “disclosure laws” which mandate disclosure in 
certain circumstances, “apology laws” to protect the contents of disclosure from being used in 
a legal action as proof of a professional’s negligence, and professional organisations’ ethics 
standards explicitly endorsing error disclosure.[15] International research suggests that some 
of these measures are having a positive impact. Rick Iedema and his team, for instance, have 
found that the disclosure of incidents is becoming more frequent in Australia and that one of 
the driving forces behind this change has been state and health organisations error disclosure 
policies, along with the increase of specially trained staff.[16] 
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In Switzerland, patient safety has become a central issue ever since the year 2000 when 
alarming international statistics on medical errors and associated deaths were published.[17] 
As a result, the Swiss Patient Safety Foundation (http://www.patientensicherheit.ch) was 
founded by the Ministries of Health and Social Security, several professional associations and 
the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences in 2003. All of the Foundation’s activities are 
designed to help improve patient safety and reduce errors in health care and it has led the way 
in drawing attention to the issue of error communication in Switzerland. In December 2006, 
the Foundation translated the Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors’ 
‘When Things Go Wrong’ into German ‘Wenn etwas schief geht’. This has been widely 
distributed and has helped bring awareness to this issue in Switzerland. The Patient Safety 
Foundation also offers interactive and practical oriented workshops for practitioners 
concerning error communication; this has also been supported by University hospitals 
increasingly offering courses regarding error communication. The issue of error disclosure in 
Switzerland has also been recently pushed forward by the Institute of Communication and 
Health at the University of Lugano (http://www.ich.com.usi.ch/), founded in 2007.  
 
The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMW) has not issued any guidelines specifically 
on error communication, but supports educational efforts in relation to the issue. For instance, 
in its recommendations ‘Aus- und Weiterbildung in Patientensicherheit und Fehlerkultur’ the 
SAMW specifically state that practitioners must openly debate medical errors and obtain the 
skills required for communicating errors with patients and peers.[18] The SAMW’s guidelines 
on medical ethics also state practitioners should be honest and transparent.[19]  
 
Quality improvement efforts have also found their way into federal law with the recent 
revision of the health insurance law (KVG-Revision 2007) and the introduction of the DRG-
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system on 1 January 2012. The so called transparency regulations in Article 49(8) of the KVG 
require hospitals to not only specify medical costs, but also to publish data on certain quality 
criteria.[20] Quality measure include infection rates associated with certain interventions, 
potentially preventable reoperations and rehospitalisation, falls and pressure sores as well as 
patient surveys performed by the National Association for Quality Development in Hospitals 
and Clinics (ANQ). In many cantons, the hospitals which are on the cantonal hospital list are 
obliged under their contracts to perform these ANQ measurements. 
 
Internal hospital standards on error communication are not yet part of the federal quality 
improvement efforts in Switzerland. In a number of countries, however, they are part of an 
accreditation requirement for hospitals. For instance, in the US through the Joint Commission 
of the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAHO). As Swiss hospitals are under no such obligation, 
no data is available on how many Swiss hospitals currently have implemented an internal 
error communication standard. Given that a lack of institutional support can be a significant 
barrier to error communication, and that organizational standards have been shown 
internationally to be an important factor in encouraging error disclosure, this study seeks to 
establish what stage Swiss hospitals are currently at in implementing an internal standard 
concerning error communication. This overview will contribute to our understanding of error 
communication in Switzerland and will assist efforts to advance the issue of error disclosure. 
 
3.2. Methods 
To get an overview of the implementation status of error disclosure standards, a short survey 
was sent to Swiss hospitals asking the hospitals’ implementation status of an internal standard 
that provides patients or their relatives are to be promptly informed about medical errors that 
result in harm. To assess the maturity of disclosure policies at Swiss hospitals, three different 
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stages were defined. In stage 1, hospitals have not yet examined the possibility of disclosure 
policies or do not have plans to implement one, in stage 2, implementation has been examined 
and is planned in the next 12 months, and in stage 3 a policy has already been implemented 
(adapted from Briner et al [21]). Thus, the survey question asked “Does there exist an internal 
hospital standard which provides that patients or their relatives are to be promptly informed 
about medical errors that result in harm.” offering the the following answering options: “yes; 
no; implementation planned within the next 12 months”. This was a slightly modified version 
of a question included the University of Bonn’s Institute for Patient Safety 2010 national 
survey concerning the implementation status of clinical risk management in German 
hospitals.[9] The question used in Germany had in addition: “Does there exist an internal 
hospital standard which provides that patients or their relatives are to be promptly informed 
about medical errors that result in harm and receive an offer of support.” The survey also 
required the specification of hospital type according to the following categories: University 
hospital, Acute Care hospital, Psychiatric clinic, Rehabilitation clinic, and Specialty clinic.  
 
Hospitals were identified in August 2011 via the Swiss Hospital Association’s website 
(www.hplus.ch/) where hospital members are listed by cantons. There were 383 listings in 
total. After deleting one invalid address and duplicates (3), 379 valid addresses were included. 
The anonymous questionnaire was sent to hospitals in German, French or Italian, depending 
on the language used in the hospital. The questionnaires were translated by native speakers. 
The questionnaire was addressed to the hospital director and included a postage paid return 
envelope. The majority of hospitals were located in the German-speaking part of Switzerland 
(273), 84 were located in the French-speaking part and 22 were located in the Italian-speaking 
part. 
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Results from returned questionnaires were entered into and analysed with SPSS v20. Data 
was compared using chi-square statistics. For the comparison between hospital types, 
hospitals who indicated more than one or no type were excluded (n = 22). For the contrast 
regarding differences between hospital types, two groups were built: University and Acute 
Care hospitals versus all others (Psychiatric, Rehabilitation, and Specialty Clinics).  
 
3.3. Results 
Responses were received from a total of 205 hospitals, translating into a response rate of 54%. 
Almost half (46%) of the responding Swiss hospitals reported an implemented error 
disclosure standard. While 16% of the hospitals reported that they are planning to implement 
one in the next 12 months. Thus, 62% of all Swiss hospitals were using an error disclosure 
standard or were planning a timely implementation at the time of the survey. More than a 
third (38%) had not implemented an error disclosure standard and were not planning to do so.  
 
When split into language region, significant differences existed between the German speaking 
and Latin (French and Italian speaking) regions (see Table 1). While in all regions the largest 
group were hospitals which had reported the implementation of an error disclosure standard 
(German 48%,Latin 42%), hospitals in the different language regions varied concerning the 
answers “no implementation” versus “planned implementation in the next 12 months”. A total 
of 41% of German speaking, compared to 30% of hospitals from Latin regions answered no, 
while the percentage of hospitals that reported to plan implementation in the next 12 months 
was higher in the Latin region (28%) than in the German speaking region (11%); 2 (2, N = 
205) = 9.7, p = 0.008. 
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The results were also analysed according to hospital type (Table 2). There was a significant 
association between hospital type and the implementation of an error disclosure standard or 
planned implementation of a standard within the next 12 months. Most University and Acute 
Care (75%) hospitals that returned the survey had introduced an error disclosure standard or 
were planning to do so in the next 12 months. In contrast, Psychiatric, Rehabilitation and 
Specialty clinics had significantly more often no error disclosure standard (53%) than 
University and Acute Care hospitals (25%); 2 (1, N = 183) = 15.55, p < 0.001. 
 
The results were also compared to the results of a similar survey conducted in Germany by 
the University of Bonn’s Institute for Patient Safety in 2010 (Table 3). While the Swiss 
survey only asked about the implementation status of an error disclosure standard requiring to 
promptly inform patients and their relatives about medical errors that result in harm, the 
German survey question also asked whether they also receive an offer of support. The 
response rate of German survey was lower (26%) than the Swiss survey (54%). The 
comparison shows that while a majority of responding Swiss hospitals (62%) have 
implemented an error disclosure standard or planned to, only 43% of responding German 
hospitals had implemented or were planning to. 
 
Due to rounding, total percentages in all tables can exceed or fall below 100%. 
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* Hospitals were asked regarding the implementation status of an internal hospital standard 
that provides patients or their relatives are to be promptly informed about medical errors that 
result in harm.† The survey was sent to a total of 379 hospitals. 205 responses were received 
(54% response rate).  
 
 
 
  
Table 1. Swiss Hospital Survey Results by Language Type* 
 N (%) 
Hospital language  Yes Planned No 
205 (100)† 94 (46) 
 
33 (16) 78 (38) 
 
German  
145 (71) 
69 (48) 16 (11) 60 (41) 
Latin: French/Italian  
60 (29) 
25 (42)  
 
17 (28) 
 
18 (30) 
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*Hospitals were asked regarding the implementation status of an internal hospital standard 
that provides patients or their relatives are to be promptly informed about medical errors that 
result in harm.  
†The survey was sent to a total of 379 hospitals. 205 responses were received. Hospitals who 
indicated more than one or no type were excluded (n = 22).  
‡No implementation vs. implementation or planned implementation:2 (1, N = 183) = 15.55, 
p < 0.001 (University and acute care hospitals vs. all other hospitals).  
 
  
Table 2. Swiss Hospital Survey Results by Hospital Type* 
 N (%) 
Hospital type  
 
Yes  Planned No‡ 
183 (100)† 83 (45) 
 
30 (16) 70 (38) 
 
University & Acute Care  
94 (52) 
53 (56) 
  
18(19) 
 
23 (25) 
 
Psychiatric, Rehabilitation, & 
Specialty 
89 (48) 
30 (34) 12 (14) 47 (53) 
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*Comparison of the overall results of the hospital survey conducted in Germany in 2010 by 
the University of Bonn’s Institute for Patient Safety. The question used in Germany had in 
addition to the question used in Switzerland: “Does there exist an internal hospital standard 
which provides that patients or their relatives are to be promptly informed about medical 
errors that result in harm and receive an offer of support.” The Swiss survey achieved a 54% 
response rate (205/379), while the German survey achieved a 26% response rate (476/1820).  
 
 
  
Table 3. Comparison of Switzerland and Germany Survey Results* 
N (%) 
 Yes Planned  No 
Switzerland  
205 (100) 
94 (46) 33 (16) 78 (38) 
Germany 
476 (100) 
103 (22) 100 (21) 273 (57) 
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3.4. Discussion 
It appears that Swiss hospitals are in a promising state in providing institutional support for 
practitioners disclosing medical errors to patients as the majority of hospitals already have 
standards regarding medical error disclosure or are intending to implement one in the near 
future. Several explanations may exist why hospitals from German speaking regions reported 
significantly more often no implementation than hospitals from Latin regions. Instead of 
answering “no” a higher percentage of the latter than the former indicated they planned 
implementation within the next 12 months. The results could indicate that hospitals from the 
German speaking regions are more adamant not to implement standards than Latin hospitals 
or, alternatively, be influenced by a culturally varying interpretation of the certainty with 
which the implementation had to be planned within the next 12 months.  
 
Certain types of hospitals in Switzerland seem to be somewhat less advanced in dealing with 
this issue. In particular, Psychiatric and Rehabilitation clinics appear to be less likely to have 
error disclosure standards than University and Acute Care hospitals. The differences among 
hospital types in Switzerland may reflect the variable visibility of patients asking for 
investigation of suspected errors. Indeed, the number of requested FMH expert evaluations 
varied according to medical disciplines.[23] Our results may also reflect differences in both 
the type of care provided and the amount of attention medical errors have received in these 
settings in the media and in the international literature. Since the Institute of Medicine’s 
landmark report ‘To err is human’ was published in 2000,[17] important research has been 
conducted on the nature, impact and causes of medical errors.[24-29] However, the majority 
of research has been conducted in hospitals settings and have consistently excluded patients 
with mental disorders.[30] Indeed, psychiatry has had a “late arrival on the medical error 
scene” and very little empirical research has been conducted regarding medical errors in this 
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field, possibly due to psychiatric practice being intensely private, psychiatric patient 
characteristics and psychiatry not involving the types of invasive procedures that have gained 
so much attention in the media when they go wrong.[30] We are also not aware of any study 
that has examined medical errors in rehabilitation clinics. Consequently, further research is 
needed to explore the unique aspects of psychiatric and rehabilitation clinics regarding 
medical errors and the reasons why these hospitals do not have error disclosure standards. 
 
Further research is also needed to explore how the disclosure standards are actually 
implemented in Swiss hospitals and whether hospital staff adhere to the established standard. 
In the U.S. for instance, where patient safety standards from the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) have required hospitals to disclose to 
patients all unexpected outcomes of care since 1 July 2001,[31] a 2005 study of hospital 
CEOs found that 85% had a written policy that recommended disclosure of unanticipated 
outcomes to patients [32]. However, although most hospitals have a disclosure standard, a 
2006 national survey of risk managers in the U.S. found that risk managers estimated that 25 
percent of serious errors are not disclosed to patients, and for minor errors 38 percent 
disagreed that they are disclosed effectively.[33]  
 
In 2007/2008 and in 2010 Swiss hospitals were asked to take part in a voluntary national 
survey intended to assess the maturity of hospital’s implementation of critical risk 
management (CRM) strategies.[34] While the survey contained a section on “Communication 
and information”, which included the question “There are guidelines to ensure that patients 
are openly and pro-actively informed of critical incidents or errors that occurred during their 
treatment.”, the communication of errors has not been a focus of any of the resulting articles 
nor have the results of this particular question been published. In contrast, all of the results of 
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the study conducted in Germany in 2010 have been published.[22] When comparing the error 
disclosure standards results of our 2011 survey to the study conducted in Germany in 2010, 
we observed that a higher percentage of Swiss hospitals had introduced or planned to 
introduce error disclosure standards. However, whether the observed differences in 
percentages between the results of this study and the study conducted in Germany are 
statistically meaningful and reflect real differences in the prevalence of hospital error 
disclosure standards in the two countries, or are due to differences in the wording the 
question, is unclear. While the process of error disclosure consists of more than just the 
provision of information, it was felt that the formation used in the German survey combined 
two distinct elements that should be separated, as some hospitals may offer one element but 
not the other. What constitutes ‘support’ is also rather ambiguous. Therefore, it was decided 
to drop the second part of the question used in Germany to keep the questionnaire simply and 
clear. Given the question used in Germany combined two different elements, error disclosure 
and an offer of support, it might be expected that the Swiss results would be higher compared 
to the German results as the question used only included the first element.  
 
Information on error communication with patients is not yet part of the transparency 
regulation in Switzerland although we believe it should be regarded as an equally important 
part of patient safety improvement efforts. Whether errors have been communicated to 
patients is an important quality indicator of medical outcomes and thus should be introduced 
into the quality measure of the ANQ as part of the patient surveys. Publicly available 
information of the frequency of disclosure to patients may provide hospitals with an 
advantage in the new regulatory environment. The introduction of free Swiss wide treatment 
for patients with basic health care in 2012 in combination with the new ANQ-measurements 
will in the future most likely lead to patients evaluating different hospitals before choosing 
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where to undergo treatment. Communication about safety and disclosure practices in a certain 
hospital could be a valuable decision criterion.  
 
Patients come to hospital specifically for help in staying or getting well and trust that the 
health care setting is one in which their health and well-being will be promoted, not be 
endangered by the very people that they trust to help them. For those affected, a harm causing 
error can be a violation of trust and can cause a loss of confidence in health professionals and 
hospitals. This situation is exacerbated when errors are not acknowledged or are intentionally 
concealed, or when only partial or ‘edited’ explanations are provided.[35] Patients want to be 
informed of any medical error immediately and have full disclosure of the error’s 
extent.[36]Studies have also found that disclosure of adverse events to patients, even when 
patients had suffered harm, doubled the odds for allocating high ratings regarding the quality 
of care received.[37] 
 
Furthermore, there is an ethical responsibility to maintain honest communication with patients 
and their families, even when things go wrong.[3] Truth telling is central to the healthcare 
relationship, where evident and ineradicable imbalances of power, knowledge, and 
vulnerability are found. The provision of full and accurate information not only allows 
patients to make informed choices about their healthcare and other aspects of their lives, but is 
also important in establishing, maintaining and restoring trust in the healthcare relationship; 
this is particularly important after a harm causing error.[35]  
 
The finding that a majority of hospitals was aware of the issue of communicating medical 
errors and had already taken active steps to establish a culture of dealing with them is 
promising. Furthermore, the implementation of standards across cultures and languages in 
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Switzerland, a country with an emphasis on decentralisation, shows that changes in the 
medical system towards more transparency and open communication with patients are being 
recognised as universally needed. However, Swiss hospitals need to take further actions 
regarding this issue. The fact that more than one third of the hospitals reported not having an 
internal standard should be examined further in order to find explanations and identify 
obstacles that keep those institutions from implementing one.  
 
While error disclosure is a complex issue requiring a number of different measures to change 
practice, the implementation of error disclosure standards has been shown internationally to 
be one important factor in encouraging the disclosure of medical errors. Such standards are, of 
course, no panacea; there remains a challenge of translating statements of principle into 
practice. However, such measures can play an important role in influencing professional, 
national and organisational cultures, which have a significant effect on the practice, values 
and individual attitudes in a workplace. While these cultures are dynamic, they also have 
considerable inertia which requires both strong interventions and time to change.[38] External 
pressure from regulation, such as the addition of error disclosure frequencies to the ANQ-
measurements, could provide the necessary force to induce the required change of practice. 
However, as international examples also show, other factors such as the training of staff also 
need to be considered.   
 
Less than 50% of respondents reported having an internal standard concerning error 
disclosure. As respondents are likely to be those more interested in the topic, this fact should 
be taken seriously. Since results are self-reported, the over-reporting of socially desirable 
activities can also not be excluded. Thus it is possible that the percentage of hospitals without 
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error disclosure policy is even higher than indicated. Both limitations point in the same 
direction and underline the importance of our findings in Switzerland. 
 
The study has some limitations. We can only refer to answers reported by hospitals. Perceived 
social desirability of answers might have caused a bias towards over-reporting of 
implementation of planned implementation. Since the questionnaire was anonymous, 
hospitals would not fear to be tracked down and asked to actually prove the existence of their 
standards. However, we believe that the answers “no implementation” should be taken 
seriously because they are likely to indicate honest reporting that error disclosure standards 
are neither existing nor planned within the foreseeable future of the next 12 months. It is also 
noteworthy that this bias is not likely to affect the comparison between Germany and 
Switzerland, because results in both countries rely on self-reporting and would be subject to a 
similar reporting bias. 
 
With the response rate being less than 60% (205/379 – 54%) a generalization of the results for 
all hospitals in Switzerland is not possible. However, it could be argued that this study’s 
response rate was above average. A study in 2008 which analysed 1607 studies published in 
the years 2000 and 2005 in 17 refereed academic journals found that the average response rate 
for studies that utilized data collected from organizations was 35.7 percent.[39] Furthermore, 
we do not know what hospital error disclosure standards look like in detail and if they are 
comparable between hospitals. We received 11 questionnaires where more than one hospital 
type was indicated. While in some cases overlap in the categories was evident (a university 
psychiatric hospital or university acute hospital), we cannot exclude that in other cases one 
answers was sent that referred in fact to more than one hospital. One of the 11 responses 
provided contact details and we were able to find out that in this case the questionnaire was 
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filled out for 7 hospitals of 3 different types. However, we do not have reasons to believe that 
this type of filling out the questionnaires was of significant frequency to have caused a bias. 
First of all, we have contacted single hospitals so that it seems unlikely that many should have 
felt inclined to answer for more than their own hospital. Moreover, the large majority of 
respondents indicated one single hospital type and results do not change if we include all 205 
or only the 183 hospitals that indicated a single hospital type. Indeed, if in a few 
questionnaires the answers might refer to more than one hospital this is likely to have 
occurred independently of different language regions and independently of implementation of 
error disclosure standards. On the contrary, this indicated that we might have slightly 
underestimated the number of hospitals that responded and therefore our study might even 
extend to a slightly higher number of responding hospitals than the calculated 54% response 
rate. 
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Abstract 
Context: There has been limited research on anaesthesiologists’ attitudes and experiences 
regarding medical errors communication, particularly concerning disclosing errors to patients. 
The current shortage of information presents an obstacle to efforts to increase open 
communication following anaesthetic errors. 
Objective: To characterise anaesthesiologists’ attitudes and experiences regarding 
communicating medical errors with the hospital and to patients, and to examine factors 
influencing their willingness to communicate errors.  
Design: Cross-sectional survey. 
Setting and Participants: Clinically active anaesthesiologists working in Switzerland’s 5 
university hospitals’ departments of anaesthesia in 2012/2013. 
Main Outcome Measures: Anaesthesiologists’ attitudes and experiences regarding medical 
error communication.  
Results: Significant differences in attitudes between departments regarding error 
communication were found. Overall, 97% of respondents agreed that serious errors should be 
reported to the hospital, but willingness to report minor errors (74%) and near misses (59%) 
was lower. Respondents were more likely to strongly agree that serious errors should be 
reported if they also thought that their hospital implements systematic changes after errors 
were reported (OR, 2.097 95% CI, 1.16-3.81). Respondents also widely endorsed disclosing 
harmful errors to patients (100% serious, 77% minor errors, 19% near misses), but reported 
factors that might make them less likely to actually disclose. Only 12% of respondents had 
previously received training on how to disclose errors to patients, although 93% were 
interested in receiving training.  
Conclusion: Willingness to disclose or report errors varied strongly between hospitals. Heads 
of department and hospital chiefs thus need to be aware of how important local culture seems 
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to be when it comes to error communication. Improving feedback on how error reports are 
being used to improve patient safety and increasing error disclosure training may also be 
important steps in increasing anaesthesiologists’ communication of errors. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
At the core of the patient safety movement is the open communication about medical errors. 
With research highlighting how many errors have their roots in systematic failures,[1] it is 
seen as important that errors are reported so that opportunities for system improvements can 
be identified and addressed.[2] Disclosing errors to patients is also widely seen as an ethical, 
professional and legal duty internationally.[3-7] However, there remains a large ‘gap’ 
between expected communication practice and what is actually being done, with research 
indicating that errors are often not reported within hospitals or disclosed to patients.[8-9] A 
number of barriers to open and honest communication about medical errors have been 
identified, however, the most pervasive barrier identified is professionals’ legal fears.[10-11] 
 
In Switzerland, patient safety has received greater attention ever since the Swiss Patient 
Safety Foundation was founded in 2003. In 2010, the second national monitoring for clinical 
risk management in Swiss hospitals found that 65% of responding hospitals had a central 
coordination for clinical risk management (although many with only minimal personal 
resources).[12] It was also found that while 71% of responding hospitals have a hospital-wide 
critical incident reporting system (14% had a non-anonymized system), 78% saw a need for 
standardization of critical incident reporting processes.[12] Indeed, while the University of 
Basel’s Department of Anaesthesia set up one of the first critical incident reporting systems 
internationally in 1996,[13] implementation progress of reporting systems is mixed in 
Switzerland. For example, some hospitals operate many reporting systems at the department 
61 
 
level, while other have one hospital-wide system in place, most systems are voluntary and 
anonymous but some hospitals mandate the reporting of certain errors. The Swiss Patient 
Safety Foundation has established a network of local incident reporting systems where reports 
are merged in a central database. Regarding the disclosure of errors to patients, the Swiss 
Patient Safety Foundation translated the Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of 
Medical Errors’ “When Things Go Wrong”  into German (“Wenn etwas schief geht”) in 
December 2006,[4] which has been widely distributed and has helped bring awareness to this 
issue in Switzerland. However, adaption has been slow. A recent study found that only 46% 
of the responding Swiss hospitals currently have an error disclosure policy.[14] 
 
Although anaesthesiology has long been considered as “the leading medical specialty in 
addressing issues of patient safety”,[15] there has been limited research on anaesthesiologists’ 
attitudes and experiences regarding medical errors communication, particularly the disclosure 
of errors to patients.[16-20] This study therefore aims to characterise anaesthesiologists’ 
attitudes and experiences regarding disclosing errors to patient and reporting errors within the 
hospital, and to examine factors influencing their willingness to communicate errors. We 
expect that attitudes towards error communication are connected to hospital culture and 
policies, and hence we will compare differences in attitudes and experiences between 
departments. 
 
4.2. Methods 
The study was approved by Prof A Perruchoud, Chairperson of the Ethics Committee of 
Basel, on 6 January 2012. Informed consent was implied by returning the survey. 
Survey Implementation 
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This anonymous survey was conducted between July 2012 and April 2013. Surveys were not 
sent to departments at the same time due to logistic considerations and availability of 
departments. Surveys were mailed to a total of 542 clinically active anaesthesiologists 
working in Switzerland’s five university hospitals’ departments of anaesthesia: department A 
(n=77), department B (n=145), department C (n=115), department D (n=85) and department E 
(n=120). Participation was encouraged through repeated email reminders via the Chiefs of 
Departments.  
 
Survey Contents 
The survey was a modified version of a survey conducted in the North American setting,[21] 
which was kindly provided by Thomas H. Gallagher from the University of Washington. The 
survey was translated into German and French and was pilot tested with a total of 11 medical 
doctors (five German speaking, six French speaking) to ensure clarity and item 
comprehension. Questions explored respondents’ experiences and attitudes relating to medical 
errors, disclosing errors to patients and reporting errors within the hospital. Definitions for 
key terms (medical error, serious error, minor error, near miss) that have been well established 
in the literature, were provided at the beginning of the questionnaire.[21-22] Agreement was 
measured on a 4-point Likert scale (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). 
Demographic questions asked for respondents’ age, sex, religion, level of training, position, 
and the percentage of time they spent in direct patients contact. The survey took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
 
Statistical Analysis  
Descriptive statistics included medians, means and standard deviations for continuous 
variables and percentages for categorical variables. Questions that used 4-point Likert 
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response scales were dichotomized at the midpoint (agree vs disagree) because sample sizes 
for some cells were often too small to be analysed. However, the question “serious errors 
should be disclosed to patients” was dichotomized at strongly agree vs all others because we 
expected that disclosure of serious errors would be endorsed by virtually all anaesthesiologists 
based on previous research.[21-22] To analyse characteristics of respondents, and attitudes 
and experiences regarding error communication, we used chi-squared tests for categorical 
data and t-tests for continuously distributed data. To assess predictors of strong agreement 
that serious errors should be reported to the hospital or disclosed to patients, we used logistic 
regression models. For each predictor we set up two models. The first model contained the 
respective predictor and department as sole covariate, whereas the second model was in 
addition adjusted for the following covariates: sex, age, years in practice, religion, and 
position. Since the results based on both models were always comparable for each model we 
only report those based on the first and more parsimonious model. Departments were always 
included in the model as they were considered an integrated part of the study design. Odds 
ratios reported are conditional, i.e. adjusted for the covariate(s) in the model. The test for 
significance of a predictive effect was based on the logarithm of the ratio between the 
likelihoods of the model containing the predictor and the covariate(s) and the model 
containing only the covariate(s). All analyses were performed with a significance level alpha 
set to 0.05 and two-tailed tests, using SPSS v21. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Characteristics of Respondents 
Overall respondent characteristics are present in Table 1 (see also Table, Supplemental Digital 
Content 1, which presents characteristics by department). 
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General Experiences and Attitudes Regarding Medical Errors  
Nearly all of the anaesthesiologists reported having been involved in an error (98%)  (see 
Table 2). Most anaesthesiologists (78%) agreed that medical errors are “one of the most 
serious problems in healthcare”. Overall, 59% of anaesthesiologists thought that it was 
somewhat likely or likely that they would receive a malpractice complaint within the next 
year, however, this also strongly depended on the department (see Table, Supplemental 
Digital Content 2, which presents general error experiences and attitudes by department). 
 
Disclosing Errors to Patients  
Anaesthesiologists’ agreement that errors should be disclosed to patients increased with the 
error’s harm (see Table 3). However, agreement that serious errors and minor errors should be 
disclosed strongly varied among departments. Anaesthesiologists thought that disclosing a 
serious error to a patient would be very difficult (63%), would damage a patient’s trust in their 
competence (28%), and would make it less likely that a patient would sue them (71%), but all 
three percentages varied among departments. While anaesthesiologists agreed that serious 
errors should be disclosed to patients, many reported certain factors might make them less 
likely to actually disclose (see Table, Supplemental Digital Content 3, which presents 
respondents’ attitudes to error disclosure by department). 
 
Of all the anaesthesiologists, only a third (34%) reported having previously disclosed a 
serious error to a patient, while 75% reported having previously disclosed a minor error to a 
patient. Of those who had disclosed an error, most reported being satisfied with the 
conversation, that the conversation had no change or a positive impact on their relationship 
with the patient, and that they experienced relief after. A minority of anaesthesiologists (12%) 
had received any training on how to disclose errors to patients. However, almost all (93%) 
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respondents were either somewhat or very interested in receiving general training on how to 
disclose errors to patients, and (95%) either somewhat or very interested in receiving support 
from an expert on patient communication after a serious error  (see Table, Supplemental 
Digital Content 4, which presents respondents’ experiences with error disclosure by 
department). 
 
Only two factors were found to independently predict strong agreement that serious errors 
should be disclosed to patients. First, anaesthesiologists who had been personally involved in 
a serious error were less likely to strongly agree. Second, anaesthesiologists who had 
experienced relief after disclosing their last serious error were more likely to strongly agree 
compared to those who had not experienced relief or who had never disclosed a serious error 
before (see Table, Supplemental Digital Content 5, which presents all factors tested). 
 
Reporting Errors within the Hospital  
Anaesthesiologists’ agreement that they should report errors to their hospital increased with 
the error’s harm (see Table 4). However, agreement that near misses and minor errors should 
be reported strongly varied among departments. The majority of all anaesthesiologists (93%) 
knew that their hospital has an error reporting system to improve patient safety. Of those who 
knew that there was an error reporting system, most had reported an error, and most also 
agreed that system changes to improve patient safety occur after errors are reported at their 
hospital. However, only 63% of all anaesthesiologists agreed that current systems for doctors 
to report errors are adequate. All these percentages strongly varied among departments except 
for the reporting of serious errors (see Table, Supplemental Digital Content 6, which presents 
respondents’ attitudes and experiences with error reporting by department).   
 
66 
 
Three factors were found to independently predict strong agreement that serious errors should 
be reported to the hospital: anaesthesiologists were more likely to strongly agree that serious 
errors should be reported if they also thought that near misses should be reported to improve 
patient safety, if they thought that their hospital implements systematic changes to improve 
patient safety after errors are reported, and if they thought that current systems for reporting 
errors are adequate (see Table, Supplemental Digital Content 7, which presents all factors 
tested).  
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Respondents 
Characteristic Total Statistics a 
 N=281 
(%) 
 
Response rate b 52% 2(4)=33.4, p<.001 
Age c 38.4 
(8.62) 
F(4, 274) = 3.49, p=.008 
Sex  2(4)=9.69, p=.046 
Male 
Female 
158 (56) 
123 (44) 
 
Years in practice d 11.7 
(8.89), 9.0 
F(4,274)=5.07, p<.001 
Position e  2(12)=84.9, p<.001 
Chief  
Senior  
Chief Resident 
Assistant  
12 (4) 
100 (36) 
35 (13) 
134 (48) 
 
%Time in direct 
patient contacte f 
 2(8)=8.77, p=.36 
0 
1-25 
26-50 
51-75 
76-100 
1 (<1) 
2 (1) 
20 (7)  
76 (27) 
182 (65) 
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a Statistics report the differences between the five departments.  
b Response rate is based on 281 respondents of 542 total possible.  
c Data is given as mean (SD). 
d Data is given as mean (SD), and median. 
e Due to rounding, total percentages can exceed or fall below 100%. 
f For the test, groups 1–3 were combined due to small cell sizes.  
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Table 2. General Experience and Attitudes Regarding Medical Errors 
Statement Total Statistics a 
 N=281 
(%) 
 
Error involvement: b 
Serious Error 
Minor Error  
Near Miss 
None c 
 
116 (41) 
220 (78) 
240 (85) 
5 (1.8) 
 
2(4)=8.97, p=.062 
2(4)=3.00, p=.555 
2(4)=3.55, p=.471 
 
Medical errors are a serious 
problem 
219 (78) 2(4)=3.91, p=.418
Medical errors are usually caused 
by system failures d e 
160 (57)  2(4)=31.1, p<.001 
Likely to receive a malpractice 
complaint within the next year f 
166 (59) 2(4)=24.1, p<.001 
 
a Statistics report the differences between the five departments.  
b Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement. 
c Cell sizes too small to be analysed 
d Data are given as proportion of each group that agrees with the statement. “Agree” includes 
those who agree plus those who strongly agree. e  
f Data are given as proportion of each group that it was somewhat likely or likely that they 
will receive a malpractice complaint within the next year.
Table 3. Disclosing Errors Disclosure to Patients 
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Statement Total Statistics a 
 N=281 
(%) b 
 
Patients should be informed 
about: 
Serious Errors c 
Minor Errors d 
Near Misses d 
 
 
228 (81) 
215(77)  
53 (19) 
 
 
2(4)=24.3, p<.001 
2(4)=34.8, p<.001 
2(4)=2.28, p=.684 
Disclosing a serious error 
would: d 
Be very difficult 
Damage patient’s trust in 
my competence 
Make it less likely that a 
patient would sue me 
 
 
175(63)  
79 (28)  
 
197(71)  
 
 
 
2(4)=14.1, p=.007 
2(4)=12.8, p=.012 
 
2(4)=17.1, p=.002 
Previous disclosure training e 33 (12) 
 
2(4)=10.6 p=.031 
 
Interest in receiving 
disclosure training f 
Not at all interested 
Somewhat interested 
Very interested  
 
 
18 (6) 
144(51) 
118(42) 
 
 
 
a Statistics report the differences between the five departments.  
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b Due to missing data, total responses range from 281 to 277. Missing data for a department 
did not exceed 2 responses for any question.  
c Data are given as proportion of each group that strongly agrees with the statement. 100% of 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.  
d Data are given as proportion of each group that agrees with the statement. “Agree” includes 
those who agree plus those who strongly agree.  
e Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement. 
f Due to rounding, total percentages can exceed or fall below 100%. Cell sizes were too small 
to be analysed.  
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Table 4. Reporting Errors within the Hospital 
Statement Total Statistics a 
 N=281 (%) b  
Doctors should report to their 
hospital: c 
Serious errors d  
Minor Errors 
Near Misses  
 
 
269 (97)  
206 (74)  
163 (59)  
 
 
 
2(4)=40.7, p<.001 
2(4)=31.5, p<.001 
My hospital has an error 
reporting system (Yes) d e  
 
Errors personally reported f 
Serious Error 
Minor Error 
Near Misses  
None  
 
System changes occur in 
hospital after errors are 
reported c f 
258 (93) 
 
 
 
82 (32) 
147 (57) 
166 (65) 
45 (18) 
 
189 (74) 
 
 
 
 
2(4)=6.00, p=.200 
2(4)=14.7, p=.005 
2(4)=33.2, p<.001 
2(4)=22.0, p<.001 
 
2(4)=15.7, p=.002 
Current reporting systems are 
adequate. c 
173 (63) 2(4)=15.7, p=.003 
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a Statistics report the differences between the five departments.  
b Due to missing data, total responses range from 281 to 276. Missing data for a department 
did not exceed 2 responses for any question.  
c Data are given as proportion of each group that agrees with the statement. “Agree” includes 
those who agree plus those who strongly agree.  
dCell sizes were too small to be analysed.e Data are given as proportion of each group that 
responded “yes” to the statement.f Data are given as proportion of each group that responded 
“yes” to the statement “Does your hospital have an error reporting system to improve patient 
safety?” Due to missing data, sample size was 257. 
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Supplemental Digital Content 1. Characteristics of the Respondents by Department 
Characteristic Total Departments Statistics 
 N=281 
(%) 
A 
n=61  
(%) 
B 
n=56  
(%) 
C 
n=58  
(%) 
D 
n=45  
(%) 
E 
n=61  
(%) 
 
Response rate a 52% 79% 39% 50% 53% 51% 2(4)=33.4, 
p<.001 
Age b 38.4 
(8.62) 
37.3 
(9.39) 
35.9 
(5.97) 
39.2 
(8.09) 
38.1 
(7.90) 
41.4 
(10.10) 
F(4, 274) = 
3.49, p=.008 
Sex       2(4)=9.69, 
p=.046 
Male 
 
Female 
158 
(56) 
123 
(44) 
26  
(43) 
35  
(57) 
32 
(57) 
24 
(43) 
41 
(71) 
17 
(29) 
26 
(58) 
19 
(42) 
33  
(54) 
28  
(46) 
 
Years in practice c 11.7 
(8.89), 
9.0 
10.7 
(10.45), 
6.0 
8.5 
(5.91), 
7.0 
11.8 
(7.93), 
10.5 
11.7 
(7.37), 
9.0 
15.5 
(10.11), 
12.0 
F(4,274)=5.07, 
p<.001 
Position d       2(12)=84.9, 
p<.001 
Chief  
Senior  
Chief Resident 
Assistant  
12 (4) 
100(36) 
35 (13) 
134(48) 
6 (10) 
15 (25) 
0 (0) 
40 (66) 
2 (4) 
24(43) 
0 (0) 
30(54) 
2 (3) 
31(53) 
0 (0) 
25(43) 
1 (2) 
8 (18) 
15(33) 
21(47) 
1 (2) 
22 (36) 
20 (33) 
18 (30) 
 
%Time in direct       2(8)=8.77, 
p=.36 
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patient contactd e 
0 
1-25 
26-50 
51-75 
76-100 
1 (<1) 
2 (1) 
20 (7)  
76 (27) 
182(65) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
7 (12) 
21 (34) 
33 (54) 
1 (2) 
0 (0) 
5 (9) 
10(18) 
40(71) 
0 (0) 
1 (2) 
2 (3) 
19(33) 
36(62) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
3 (7) 
9 (20) 
33(73) 
0 (0) 
1 (2) 
3 (5) 
17 (28) 
40 (66) 
 
 
a For the total, the rate is based on 281 respondents of 542 total possible. For A, 61 
respondents of 77 total possible. For B, 56 respondents of 145 total possible. For C, 58 
respondents of 115 total possible. For D, 45 respondents of 85 total possible. For E, 61 of 120 
total possible. 
b Data are given as mean (SD). 
c Data are given as mean (SD), and median 
d Due to rounding, total percentages can exceed or fall below 100%. 
e For the test, groups 1–3 were combined due to small cell sizes. 
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Supplemental Digital Content 2. General Experience and Attitudes Regarding Medical Errors 
Statement Total Departments Statistics 
 N=281 
(%) 
A 
n=61 
(%) 
B 
n=56 
(%) 
C 
n=58 
(%) 
D 
n=45 
(%) 
E 
n=61  
(%) 
 
Error 
involvement: a 
Serious Error 
Minor Error  
Near Miss 
None b 
 
 
116(41) 
220(78) 
240(85) 
5 (1.8) 
 
 
17(28) 
43(71) 
56(92) 
1 (1.6) 
 
 
27(48) 
44(79) 
45(80) 
1 (1.8) 
 
 
28(48) 
47(81) 
50(86) 
1 (1.7) 
 
 
15(33) 
37(82) 
37(82) 
1 (2.2) 
 
 
29 (48) 
49 (80) 
52 (85) 
1 (1.6) 
 
 
2(4)=8.97, p=.062 
2(4)=3.00, p=.555 
2(4)=3.55, p=.471 
 
Medical errors 
are a serious 
problem c 
219 
(78) 
52 
(85)  
40 
(71)  
46 
(79)  
33 
(73) 
48 (79)  2(4)=3.91, p=.418 
Medical errors 
are usually 
caused by 
system failures c 
d 
160 
(57)  
50 
(82)  
18 
(33)  
32 
(55)  
21 
(47)  
39 (64) 2(4)=31.1, p<.001 
Likely to receive 
a malpractice 
complaint within 
the next year e 
166 
(59) 
48 
(79) 
22 
(39) 
28 
(48) 
31 
(69) 
37(61%) 2(4)=24.1, p<.001 
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a Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement. 
b Cell sizes too small to be analysed 
cData are given as proportion of each group that agrees with the statement. “Agree” includes 
those who agree plus those who strongly agree. d  
e Data are given as proportion of each group that it was somewhat likely or likely that they 
will receive a malpractice complaint within the next year. 
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Supplemental Digital Content 3. Attitudes to Disclosing Errors to Patients 
Statement Total Departments Statistics 
 N=281 
(%) a 
A 
n=61  
(%) 
B 
n=56  
(%) 
C 
n=58 
(%) 
D 
n=45  
(%) 
E 
n=61  
(%) 
 
Patients should be 
informed about: 
Serious Errors b 
Minor Errors c 
Near Misses c 
 
 
228(81) 
215(77)  
53 (19) 
 
 
37(61) 
30(49)  
8 (13)  
 
 
48(86) 
46(82)  
13(23)  
 
 
54(93) 
53(91)  
11(19)  
 
 
36(80) 
37(82)  
8 (18) 
 
 
53(87) 
49(80)  
13(21)  
 
 
2(4)=24.3, p<.001 
2(4)=34.8, p<.001 
2(4)=2.28, p=.684 
Disclosing a serious 
error would: c 
Be very difficult 
Damage 
patient’s trust in 
competence 
Make it less 
likely that a 
patient would 
sue me 
 
 
175(63)  
79 (28)  
 
 
197(71)  
 
 
 
47(77)  
25(41)  
 
 
32(53)  
 
 
 
34(62)  
20(36)  
 
 
37(67)  
 
 
 
40(69)  
14(24)  
 
 
45(79)  
 
 
 
19(43)  
6 (13)  
 
 
38(84)  
 
 
35(58)  
14(23)  
 
 
45(76)  
 
 
2(4)=14.1, p=.007 
2(4)=12.8, p=.012 
 
 
 
2(4)=17.1, p=.002 
Factors which 
might make you 
less likely to 
disclose a serious 
errord 
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If patient is 
unaware of error 
If I think patient 
wouldn’t want 
to know 
If I think patient 
would become 
angry with me e 
If I don’t know 
the patient well.e 
If I think I might 
get sued 
If I think the 
patient wouldn’t 
understand what 
I was telling 
them  
25 (9) 
 
68 (24) 
 
 
10 (4) 
 
 
8 (3) 
 
41 (15) 
 
121(43) 
3 (5) 
 
8 (13) 
 
 
2 (3) 
 
 
1 (2) 
 
12(20) 
 
14(23) 
6 (11) 
 
15(27) 
 
 
3 (5) 
 
 
2 (4) 
 
11(20) 
 
26(46) 
5 (9) 
 
18(31) 
 
 
3 (5) 
 
 
2 (3) 
 
10(17) 
 
34(59) 
3 (7) 
 
14(31) 
 
 
0 (0) 
 
 
1 (2) 
 
2 (4) 
 
23(51) 
8 (13) 
 
13(21) 
 
 
2 (3) 
 
 
2 (3) 
 
6 (10) 
 
24(39) 
2(4)=3.04, p=.551 
 
2(4)=7.22, p=.125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2(4)=7.56 p=.109 
 
2(4)=17.6 p=.001 
a Due to missing data, total responses range from 281 to 277. Missing data for a department 
did not exceed 2 responses for any question.  
b Data are given as proportion of each group that strongly agrees with the statement. 100% of 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.  
c Data are given as proportion of each group that agrees with the statement. “Agree” includes 
those who agree plus those who strongly agree. 
d Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement. 
e Cell sizes were too small to be analysed.  
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Supplemental Digital Content 4. Experiences with Disclosing Errors to Patients 
Statement Total Department Statistics 
 N=281 
(%) a  
A 
n=61 
(%) 
B 
n=56 
(%) 
C 
n=58 
(%) 
D 
n=45 
(%) 
E 
n=61 
(%) 
 
Previously 
disclosed serious 
error b 
Satisfied with 
disclosure (% 
somewhat or 
very satisfied) 
c 
Impact on 
relationship 
with patient? 
(% no change, 
somewhat or 
very positive)c 
Experienced 
relief after 
disclosure (% 
agree and 
strongly 
agree) c 
94(34) 
 
 
74 (80) 
 
 
 
 
83 (88) 
 
 
 
 
 
77 (83) 
 
15(25) 
 
 
10(67) 
 
 
 
 
13(87) 
 
 
 
 
 
12(80) 
 
23(41) 
 
 
19 (83) 
 
 
 
 
19 (83) 
 
 
 
 
 
17 (74) 
 
20(35) 
 
 
17(85) 
 
 
 
 
19(95) 
 
 
 
 
 
18(90) 
 
15 (33) 
 
 
14(93) 
 
 
 
 
15(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
13 (87) 
 
21(34) 
 
 
14(70) 
 
 
 
 
17(81) 
 
 
 
 
 
17(85) 
 
2(4)=3.67 p=.453 
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Previously 
disclosed  minor 
error b 
Satisfied with 
disclosure (% 
somewhat or 
very 
satisfied)d 
Impact on 
relationship 
with patient? 
(% no change, 
somewhat or 
very 
positive)d 
Experienced 
relief after 
disclosure (% 
agree and 
strongly 
agree) d  
211(75) 
 
 
183(87) 
 
 
 
 
196(92) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184(88) 
 
 
36(59) 
 
 
30(83) 
 
 
 
 
29(81) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32(89) 
 
 
38 (68) 
 
 
34 (90) 
 
 
 
 
38(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 (95) 
 
 
51(88) 
 
 
45(88) 
 
 
 
 
48(94) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46(90) 
 
 
40 (89) 
 
 
38 (95) 
 
 
 
 
39 (98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 (80) 
 
 
46(75) 
 
 
36(80) 
 
 
 
 
42(91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38(86) 
 
 
2(4)=19.7 p<.001 

 
 
Previous 
disclosure 
training b  
 
33 (12) 
 
14(23) 
 
6 (11) 
 
6 (10) 
 
2 (4) 
 
5 (8) 
 
2(4)=10.6 p=.031 
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Interest in 
receiving 
disclosure 
training e 
Not at all 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Very 
interested  
 
 
 
 
18 (6) 
 
144(51) 
 
118(42) 
 
 
 
 
10(16) 
 
42(69) 
 
9 (15) 
 
 
 
 
0 (0) 
 
26 (46) 
 
30 (54) 
 
 
 
 
3 (5) 
 
28(48) 
 
27(47) 
 
 
 
 
3 (7) 
 
28 (62) 
 
14 (31) 
 
 
 
 
2 (3) 
 
20(33) 
 
38(63) 

Interest in 
communication 
expert support 
after serious 
errore  
Not at all 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Very 
interested  
Already 
receive  
 
 
 
 
 
10 (4) 
 
67 (24) 
 
199(71) 
 
4 (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
1 (2) 
 
14(23) 
 
45(74) 
 
1 (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
2 (4) 
 
13 (23) 
 
41 (73) 
 
0 (0) 
 
 
 
 
 
4 (7) 
 
8 (14) 
 
44(77) 
 
1 (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
1 (2) 
 
20 (44) 
 
24 (53) 
 
0 (0) 
 
 
 
 
 
2 (3) 
 
12(20) 
 
45(74) 
 
2 (3) 
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a Due to missing data, total responses range from 281 to 279. Missing data for a department 
did not exceed 2 responses for any question. 
b Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement. 
c Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement “Have you 
ever disclosed a serious error to a patient?” Cell sizes were too small to be analysed.  
d Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement “Have you 
ever disclosed a minor error to a patient?” Cell sizes were too small to be analysed. 
e Due to rounding, total percentages can exceed or fall below 100%. Cell sizes were too small 
to be analysed. 
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Supplemental Digital Content 5. Factors Associated with Strong Agreement That Serious 
Errors Should Be Disclosed to Patients 
Variable OR (95% CI) p- 
value 
Demographic characteristics 
Years in practice 
>75% of time in direct patient contact 
Age 
Sex 
Language (German vs French) 
Religion a 
 
0.984 (0.591-1.019) 
1.00 (.519–1.937) 
0.994 (0.958-1.030) 
0.984 (0.521-1.858) 
1.356 (0.718-2.559) 
 
 
.370 
.993 
.729 
.960 
.342 
.235 
Attitudes about malpractice 
Somewhat likely or likely that they would receive a 
malpractice complaint within the next year (vs somewhat 
or very unlikely) 
Disclosing a serious error would make it less likely that a 
patient would sue me (agree) 
It might make me less likely to disclose a serious error to 
a patient if I think I might get sued (yes) 
 
0.690 (0.342-1.390) 
 
 
1.589 (0.813-3.109) 
 
1.718 (0.749-3.937) 
 
.294 
 
 
.180 
 
.210 
Attitudes about patient safety 
Medical errors are one of the most serious problems in 
health care (agree) 
Medical errors are usually caused by the failure of care 
delivery systems, not the failure of individuals (agree) 
 
1.397 (0.665-2.934) 
 
0.763 (0.379-1.538) 
 
.384 
 
.448 
Attitudes about disclosure   
85 
 
Disclosing a serious error to a patient would be very 
difficult (agree) 
Disclosing a serious error would damage a patient’s trust 
in my competence (agree) 
Endorsement of potential factors that might decrease 
willingness to disclose b 
0.920 (0.464-1.825) 
 
0.858 (0.431-1.709) 
 
0.871 (0.642-1.180) 
 
.812 
 
.664 
 
.379 
Prior experience 
Personally involved in a near miss or minor error (yes) 
Personally involved in a serious error (yes)  
Experienced relief after disclosing last serious error (vs 
disagree plus never disclosed a serious error) 
 
0.813 (0.255-2.596) 
0.474 (0.234-0.959) 
4.950 (1.227-19.965) 
 
 
.722 
.032 
.028 
 
 
Abbreviations: OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval. 
a Variable consisted of four levels, the three corresponding odds ratios are not reported due to 
space constraints 
b Composite variable representing number of “yes” responses to the following question: 
“Which of the following factors might make it less likely that you would disclose a serious 
error to a patient: (a) if the patient is unaware that the error happened, (b) if I think the patient 
would not want to know about the error, (c) if I think the patient would become angry with me 
(d ) if I didn’t know the patient very well, (e) if I think I might get sued, or (f) if I think the 
patient would not understand what I was telling them.” 
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Supplemental Digital Content 6. Reporting Errors within the Hospital 
Statement Total Department Statistics 
 N=281 
(%) a 
A 
n=61  
(%) 
B 
n=56 
(%) 
C 
n=58 
(%) 
D 
n=45 
(%) 
E 
n=61 
(%) 
 
Doctors should 
report to their 
hospital: b 
Serious 
errorsc  
Minor 
Errors 
Near Misses  
 
 
 
269(97)  
 
206(74)  
 
163(59)  
 
 
 
60 (98) 
 
27 (44) 
 
20 (33)  
 
 
 
52 (96)  
 
43 (78)  
 
39 (71)  
 
 
 
57 (98)  
 
48 (83)  
 
45 (78)  
 
 
 
40(91)  
 
33(75)  
 
21(48)  
 
 
 
60(100)  
 
55 (92)  
 
38 (63)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2(4)=40.7, p<.001 

2(4)=31.5, p<.001 
My hospital 
has an error 
reporting 
system (Yes) c d  
 
Errors 
personally 
reportede 
Serious 
Error 
Minor Error 
Near Misses  
258(93) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 (32) 
 
147(57) 
166(65) 
61(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 (25) 
 
38 (62) 
55 (90) 
55(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 (35) 
 
22 (40) 
28 (51) 
58(100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 (60) 
 
30 (53) 
14 (25) 
26(59) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 (35) 
 
14(54) 
10(39) 
58 (95) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 (69) 
 
43 (74) 
24 (41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2(4)=6.00, p=.200 

2(4)=14.7, p=.005 
2(4)=33.2, p<.001 
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None  
 
System 
changes occur 
in hospital after 
errors are 
reportedb e 
45 (18) 
 
189(74) 
4 (7) 
 
50 (82) 
15 (27) 
 
27 (52)  
14 (25) 
 
44 (79)  
9 (35) 
 
20(74)  
3 (5) 
 
48 (81)  
2(4)=22.0, p<.001 
 
2(4)=15.7, p=.002 
Current 
reporting 
systems are 
adequate. b 
173(63) 43 (71)  26 (48)  39 (67)  20(47)  45 (75)  2(4)=15.7, p=.003 
 
 
a Due to missing data, total responses range from 281 to 276. Missing data for a department 
did not exceed 2 responses for any question.  
b Data are given as proportion of each group that agrees with the statement. “Agree” includes 
those who agree plus those who strongly agree.  
cCell sizes were too small to be analysed.d Data are given as proportion of each group that 
responded “yes” to the statement.e Data are given as proportion of each group that responded 
“yes” to the statement “Does your hospital have an error reporting system to improve patient 
safety?” Due to missing data, sample size was 257. 
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Supplemental Digital Content 7. Factors Associated with Strong Agreement That Serious 
Errors Should Be Reporting to Hospital 
Variable OR (95% CI) p- value 
Demographic characteristics 
Years in practice 
>75% of time in direct patient contact 
Age 
Sex  
Language (German vs French) 
Religion a 
 
0.943 (0.914-0.973) 
1.19 (.713–1.985) 
0.951 (0.923-0.980) 
0.970 (0.613-1.662) 
1.141 (0.694-1.876) 
 
 
<.001 
.507 
.001 
.970 
.604 
.848 
Attitudes about patient safety (agree/disagree)  
Doctors should report near misses to improve patient 
safety 
Medical Errors are one of the most serious problems in 
healthcare 
Medical Errors are usually caused by failure of care 
delivery systems, not failures of individuals 
At my hospital, system changes to improve patient 
safety occur after errors are reported 
Current systems for doctors to report errors are 
adequate 
 
2.930 (1.712-5.017) 
 
0.921 (0.509-1.666) 
 
0.897 (0.531-1.517) 
 
2.097 (1.155-3.807) 
 
1.782 (1.062-2.991) 
 
<.001 
 
.784 
 
.686 
 
.015 
 
.029 
Malpractice risk 
Somewhat likely or likely that they would receive a 
malpractice complaint within the next year (vs 
somewhat or very unlikely) 
 
1.389 (0.826-2.335) 
 
 
 
.215 
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Prior Experience 
Personal involvement in a serious error (vs other error 
involvement or none)  
Previously reported a serious error (vs reporting other 
errors or none)  
 
1.006 (0.608-1.663) 
 
0.939 (0.537-1.643) 
 
.982 
 
.826 
 
a Variable consisted of four levels, the three corresponding odds ratios are not reported due to 
space constraints 
 
 
  
90 
 
4.4. Discussion 
This study has resulted in a number of key findings. First, very few respondents had received 
any disclosure training despite great interest in such training. Second, respondent showed a 
low willingness to report minor errors and near misses. Third, our data points towards an 
important influence of local culture on the willingness to report and disclose errors, and that 
legal fears may not be the most important barrier to error disclosure and reporting. 
 
Respondents’ widely endorsed disclosing harmful errors to patients, and their willingness to 
disclose serious errors and minor errors is comparable to the findings of the largest study 
conducted to date on error disclosure involving physicians from multiple specialties in the 
United States and Canada.[22] However, while all respondents agreed that they should 
disclose serious errors to patients, many reported certain factors might make them less likely 
to actually disclose. Anaesthesiologists who had been personally involved in a serious error 
were also less likely to strongly agree that serious errors should be disclosed to patients, 
despite the majority of respondents who had previously disclosed a serious error reporting 
positive experiences. This is somewhat concerning and may reflect the significant emotional 
impact that serious errors can have on physicians. Furthermore, a number of respondents 
disagreed that they should disclosure minor errors to patients. There is an ethical 
responsibility to maintain honest communication with patients and their families even in cases 
of less harmful errors, and studies conducted internationally have indicated that patients are 
virtually unanimous in wanting all harmful errors disclosed.[23-24] Disclosing an error is one 
of the most complex and difficult conversations that occur in healthcare, and provides some 
unique challenges to medical specialties such as anaesthesiology given the limited contact 
with the patient, the absence of an ongoing professional relationship, and the complex teams 
in which anaesthesiologists typically work.[25-26] The complexity of these situations calls for 
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a strategy of training and supporting clinicians in relation to this process. However, very few 
of the respondents in our study had received any education or training regarding disclosure, 
although nearly all of the respondents were interested in receiving such education. Increasing 
anaesthesiologists’ training (in medical school and during postgraduate training) to equip 
them with the skills to conduct these difficult discussions may be an important step in 
increasing error disclosure.  
 
The vast majority of respondents were aware that their hospital has an error reporting system 
and agreed that serious errors should be reported to their hospital to improve patient safety. 
However, compared to other international studies in other specialities, we found much lower 
agreement rates for reporting minor errors and near misses. For instance, a 2007 U.S. study 
found that a majority of paediatricians agreed that they should report not only serious errors, 
but also minor errors (90%) and near misses (82%) to their hospital.[21] While there were 
significant differences between departments regarding this issue, this overall low willingness 
to report minor errors and near misses to the hospital is surprising given the leadership Swiss 
anaesthesiologists have previously shown in relation to error reporting. The low willingness to 
report near misses is particularly concerning as there has been a growing emphasis in 
medicine, following the example of other high risk industries, to report near misses as they 
occur more frequently and provide valuable lessons without the harm to patients.[27] This 
low willingness may reflect a lack of confidence among Swiss anaesthesiologists that their 
hospitals will treat these reports in a reasonable way. Respondents may also find reporting 
systems cumbersome and time consuming, think the incident is too trivial, and be receiving 
insufficient encouragement and feedback on the lessons learnt from reports.[18-19], 28 
Indeed, respondents in this study were more likely to strongly agree that serious errors should 
be reported if they believed that reports are being used to improve patient safety. Anticipated 
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ineffectiveness of reporting has been identified as major barrier to error reporting.[28] In a 
recent Swiss study, the most important influence on the willingness to report was the 
transparency of the incident reporting system procedures to potential users; perceived 
effectiveness of reporting was a relevant antecedent at the individual level.[29]  
 
The risk of malpractice complaints is an issue that is well known among 
anaesthesiologists,[30] and over half of all respondents thought that it was likely that they 
would receive a malpractice complaint within the next year. International studies examining 
clinicians’ views regarding error communication have consistently found legal fears to be one 
of the most pervasive barriers to open communication.[10,17] However, our study found that 
respondents’ attitudes about malpractice did not affect their willingness to disclosure or report 
serious errors. Indeed, the majority of respondents thought that disclosing a serious error to a 
patient would make it less likely that the patient would complain about them. These findings 
support previous research that suggests that the legal environment may have a more limited 
impact on physicians’ error communication attitudes and practices than often believed.[22] 
 
Instead, the culture of medicine itself may be a more important barrier to error communication 
than the malpractice environment as has been suggested by Gallagher in 2006.[22] Our results 
support this conclusion as we found significant differences in attitudes between departments 
regarding error communication. Given that this study only included clinically active 
anaesthesiologists working in university hospitals, and that Switzerland is a reasonably small 
and dense country, these large differences are remarkable. While differences between the 
French and German speaking parts of Switzerland are often expected, this was not confirmed 
(data not shown as locations have been anonymised). Previous research has found that 
physician attitudes generally vary more by specialty than by country, which points to the role 
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of medical culture, particularly that of the physicians’ specialty, in shaping these views.[22] 
However, partly due to their sampling technique, these studies did not report on subgroup 
analysis such as department. In contrast, our study’s design has allowed for the comparison of 
all university hospitals’ anaesthesia departments in one country, and our findings suggest that 
individual department/hospital culture towards error communication differs strongly. As these 
differences are likely due to issues concerning leadership and the prevailing ethos in the 
broader organisation, heads of department and hospital chiefs need to be aware of how 
important local culture seems to be when it comes to error communication. However, further 
research is required to examine the reasons behind these department/hospital differences and 
the action needs to address these.   
 
This study has some limitations. With the response rate being less than 60% (281/542; 52%) a 
generalisation of the results to all anaesthesiologists working in Switzerland’s five university 
hospitals is not possible. However, as those who responded to our survey are likely to be 
generally more motivated and more interested in error communication than the non-
respondents, the low willingness to communicate minor errors and near misses should be 
taken seriously. Our study has the usual limitations of a self-reported questionnaire: we do not 
know how often anaesthesiologists actually communicated errors with the hospital or to 
patients. Social desirability may have resulted in an over-reporting of error communication. 
However, this only reinforces the main result of our study that error communication remains 
clearly incomplete and problematic even among the more motivated and interested 
anaesthesiologists. There may be hospital-specific and country-specific differences in 
anaesthesiologists’ attitudes that might limit the ability to generalise the results to 
anaesthesiologists in other countries. However, the significant differences in attitudes found 
between departments regarding error communication suggests that these issues need to be 
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dealt with regionally. Furthermore, the percentage of physicians who come from adjacent 
European countries is known to be considerable in Switzerland. Finally, while we used 
definitions for medical errors that have been well established in the literature, there can be 
wide disagreement in practice about whether a certain event constitutes an error. 
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Abstract  
Background: Clinicians involved in medical errors can experience significant distress. This 
study aims to examine (1) how medical errors impact anaesthesiologists in key work and life 
domains, (2) anaesthesiologists’ attitudes regarding support after errors, (3) and which 
anaesthesiologists are most affected by errors.  
Methods: A mailed cross sectional survey completed by 281 of the 542 clinically active 
anaesthesiologists (52% response rate) working at Switzerland’s five university hospitals 
between July 2012 and April 2013.  
Results: Respondents reported that errors had negatively affected anxiety about future errors 
(51%), confidence in their ability as a doctor (45%), ability to sleep (36%), job satisfaction 
(32%), and professional reputation (9%). Respondents’ lives were more likely to be affected 
as error severity increased. Ninety percent of respondents disagreed that hospitals adequately 
support them in coping with the stress associated with medical errors. Nearly all of the 
respondents (92%) reported being interested in psychological counselling after a serious error, 
but many identified barriers to seeking counselling. However, there were significant 
differences between departments regarding error-related stress levels and attitudes about 
error-related support. Respondents were more likely to experience certain distress if they were 
female, older, had previously been involved in a serious error, and were dissatisfied with their 
last error disclosure. 
Conclusion: Medical errors, even minor errors and near misses, can have a serious effect on 
clinicians. Healthcare organisations need to do more to support clinicians in coping with the 
stress associated with medical errors.  
  
100 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The phrase “second victims” was introduced in 2000 to highlight the significant emotional 
impact that physicians involved in errors can experience.[1] Distress following error 
involvement is not only a tragedy for the individual clinician, but also poses risks for future 
patients. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals involved in major errors - without 
sufficient support – often suffer burn-out and depressive symptoms, which may increase the 
risk for future errors and loss of empathy.[2-5] Furthermore, while physicians often desire 
support in coping with the stress associated with medical errors many feel that hospitals fail to 
adequately support them,[6] although research suggests that established services are 
underused.[7] 
 
While there has been research involving anaesthesiologists examining the impact of 
perioperative catastrophes and stress in general,[8-10] there has been limited research on the 
impact of errors on anaesthesiologists.[11-13]  Furthermore, little is known about the impact 
of error involvement on clinicians outside the United States and empirical data from Europe 
remains limited. Quantitative data is needed to gain an understanding of the prevalence of the 
negative consequences following medical errors and thus the potential need for supportive 
measures.  
 
In Europe, the Swiss Patient Safety Foundation was the first organization to systematically 
examine the issue of "second victims.”[14-15] However, the handling of medical errors in 
general is varied in Switzerland. While the University of Basel’s Department of Anaesthesia 
set up one of the first critical incident reporting systems internationally in 1996,[16] 
implementation of reporting systems remains mixed.[17] While most systems are voluntary 
and anonymous, some hospitals mandate the reporting of certain errors.[18] There can also be 
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multiple reporting systems within the same hospitals, with some departments operating 
reporting systems in addition to the hospital-wide system in place.[18] A recent study also 
found that less than half of the responding Swiss hospitals currently have an error disclosure 
policy.[19] In cases of harm causing errors, Swiss liability law differentiates between self-
employed and employed clinicians. While it is mandatory for self-employed clinicians to have 
professional liability insurance to cover any damage caused, public hospitals are typically 
liable in cases of damage involving hospital employed physicians.  
 
As a part of a broader study into medical error communication in Switzerland,[18] clinically 
active anaesthesiologists working in Switzerland’s five university hospitals’ departments of 
anaesthesia were surveyed due to anaesthesiologists frequent involvement in errors and long 
standing interest in patient safety.[20-21]  The aim was to examine how medical errors impact 
Swiss anaesthesiologists in key work and life domains, anaesthesiologists’ attitudes regarding 
support after errors, and which anaesthesiologists are most affected by errors. We 
hypothesized that attitudes towards support after errors are connected to hospital culture and 
policies, and hence we will compare differences in attitudes between departments. The 
primary outcome measure is the emotional and professional impact of errors, attitudes 
towards support following errors, and factors predicting increased distress. 
 
5.2. Methods 
The study was approved by Prof A Perruchoud, Chairperson of the Ethics Committee of 
Basel, on 6 January 2012. Informed consent was implied by returning the survey. 
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Survey Implementation 
This anonymous survey was conducted between July 2012 and April 2013. Surveys were not 
sent to departments at the same time due to logistic considerations and availability of 
departments. Surveys were mailed to a total of 542 clinically active anaesthesiologists 
working in Switzerland’s five university hospitals’ departments of anaesthesia: department A 
(n=77), department B (n=145), department C (n=115), department D (n=85) and department E 
(n=120). Participation was encouraged through repeated email reminders via the Chiefs of 
Departments. 
 
Survey Contents 
The survey was a modified version of a survey conducted in the North American setting,[6] 
which was kindly provided by Thomas H. Gallagher from the University of Washington. 
Questions were translated into German and French and were pilot tested with a total of 11 
medical doctors (five German speaking, six French speaking) to ensure clarity and item 
comprehension. Respondents were asked to indicate types of medical errors they had 
personally been involved in. Definitions established in previous studies were provided at the 
beginning of the questionnaire: medical error (the failure of a planned action to be completed 
as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim), serious error (error that causes 
permanent injury or transient but potentially life-threatening harm), minor error (error that 
causes harm which is neither permanent nor potentially life threatening) and near miss (an 
error that could have caused harm but did not, either by chance or timely intervention).[22-23] 
The impact of errors was assessed by asking if errors affected five work and life domains 
(Yes/No). The issue of support after errors was assessed by asking respondents if hospitals 
adequately support them in coping with the stress associated with medical errors (4-point 
Likert scale “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”), how interested they would be in 
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psychological counselling after a serious error (“not at all interested” to “very interested”), 
and whether certain factors would be barriers to seeking counselling (Yes/No). Demographic 
questions asked for respondents’ age, sex, religion, level of training, position, and the 
percentage of time they spent in direct patients contact. The survey took approximately 10 
minutes to complete. 
 
Statistical Analysis  
Descriptive statistics included means and standard deviations for continuous variables and 
percentages for categorical variables. Questions that used 4-point Likert response scales were 
dichotomized at the midpoint (agree vs disagree) because sample sizes for some cells were 
often too small to be analysed. To analyse characteristics of respondents, the impact of errors 
and support after an error, we used chi-squared tests for categorical data and t-tests for 
continuously distributed data. To assess potential predictors of increased distress following 
errors we first preselected 17 candidate predictors, including demographic characteristics, 
prior error involvement, attitudes about errors, and prior experience with error disclosure 
based on theoretical considerations and previous findings.[6] The predictor years in practice 
was removed from all analyses as it was highly correlated with age (r=.95) and position 
(r=.76). We then used three different models to test the impact of these predictors. First we 
ran univariate regression analyses for each predictor in a separate model, providing regression 
coefficients unadjusted for all other predictors. Second we used multiple regression models to 
test all predictors simultaneously, providing regression coefficients adjusted for all other 
predictors. Multiple regression models often suffer from overfitting, especially if the number 
of predictors is high relative to the number of cases,[24] leading to models having low 
predictive accuracy when predicting new samples. In order to avoid overfitting we used a 
variable selection procedure, penalized regression, as a third model. In penalized regression, 
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model coefficients are deliberately shrunk by implying a penalty term to the estimated sum of 
squares of the residuals when fitting the model. As a consequence these models are somewhat 
more biased than those obtained from multiple regression, but instead exhibit strongly 
increased predictive accuracy.[25] For penalized regression we used the grouped exponential 
lasso (GEL) technique as implemented in the R package grpreg (Breheny & Huang, 
submitted). The GEL is a regularization technique that basically eliminates unimportant 
predictors from the model by setting their coefficients to zero. Relevant predictor variables in 
contrast remain in the model, their coefficients being usually shrunk towards (but not to) zero. 
Thus predictors whose coefficients from penalized regression have not been shrunk to zero 
are likely to be predictive when replicating the study under consideration. The predictive 
accuracy of the model is determined by cross validation. Thus predictors are considered as 
relevant if their coefficients turn out to be non-zero in the best fitting model based on cross 
validation. The term „group“ in GEL refers to the fact that predictors denoting factors with 
more than two levels are not decomposed into dummy variables and tested individually, but 
tested as a whole. Since for the GEL no tests of significance are yet available we refrain from 
reporting p-values.[26] Since the outcome variable was dichotomous the penalized regression 
model was based on a logistic regression model. Significance level alpha was set to 0.05, 
assuming two-tailed tests. 
 
5.3. Results 
 
Characteristics of Respondents 
The response rate of the survey was 52% (281/542). Overall, 56% of respondents were male, 
respondents had been in practice for a median of 9.0years and 92% of respondents spent more 
than half of their time in direct patient contact. Response rate, mean age, sex ratio, mean years 
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in practice, and position all significantly varied among departments, whereas percentage of 
time in direct contact with patients did not 
 
Impact of Errors 
Distress following errors was reported by many anaesthesiologists (see Table 1). Respondents 
reported that errors that they had been involved in particularly negatively affected their 
anxiety about future errors (51%) and their confidence in their ability as a doctor (45%), both 
of these percentages strongly varied among departments. Ninety per cent of anaesthesiologists 
reported that at least one of the five areas of their lives was negatively affected. 
Anaesthesiologists who had experienced an error were divided into three groups depending on 
the most severe type of error in which they had been involved: a serious error, a minor error, 
or a near miss. Anaesthesiologists’ lives were consistently more likely to be affected as error 
severity increased though the impact was still considerable even for minor errors and near 
misses (see Figure 1).  
 
Support After An Error  
Ninety per cent of anaesthesiologists disagreed that hospitals adequately support them in 
coping with the stress associated with medical errors (30% strongly), these percentages 
strongly varied among departments. Ninety-two per cent of anaesthesiologists reported that 
they were somewhat or very interested in psychological counselling after a serious error. 
However, anaesthesiologists identified a number of barriers to seeking psychological 
counselling. For instance, 34% of respondents felt that they did not have time to take time off 
work, 17% were concerned that the use of psychological support would be noted in their 
personnel file, 17% did not believe that counselling would be helpful, although these 
percentages strongly varied among departments (see Table 2).  
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Factors Predicting Increased Distress 
Factors that were found to be predictive for the outcomes “increased anxiety about future 
errors” and “loss of confidence in ability as a doctor” are shown in Table 3. Increased anxiety 
of future errors and losing confidence in their ability as a doctor both varied depending on the 
department anaesthesiologists came from. Female’s anxiety of future errors was higher than 
that of males, whereas for confidence in ability as a doctor differences between sexes were 
either absent (multiple regression) or present but of small magnitude (univariate and penalized 
regression). Anaesthesiologist who had previously been involved in a serious error reported 
increased anxiety of future errors and decreased confidence in their ability as a doctor relative 
to those who had not been involved. In addition, anxiety of future errors was increased in 
anaesthesiologists who were dissatisfied with how both their last minor and their last serious 
error disclosure went. Finally loss of confidence in their ability as a doctor increased with 
increasing age. For outcomes “ability to sleep” and “job satisfaction” neither the multiple nor 
the penalized regression model returned any significant predictive factors, respectively. Only 
the univariate models lead to significant results in two or one cases, respectively, but 
correcting for multiple testing rendered these results non-significant. For the outcome 
“professional reputation” cell sizes were too small to be analysed. Results based on these 
three outcomes are therefore not shown in Table 3.  
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Fig. 1 Impact of errors by level of severity. Serious error  minor error   and near miss 
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Table 1. Impact of Errors   
Statement Total Department p-
value 
 N=281 
(%) 
A 
n=61  
(%) 
B 
n=56  
(%) 
C 
n=58  
(%) 
D 
n=45  
(%) 
E 
n=61  
(%) 
 
Error involvement has 
negatively impacted: a 
Job satisfaction 
Confidence in ability  
Professional 
reputation  
Anxiety about future 
errors  
Ability to sleep  
No impact  
 
 
91 (32) 
127(45) 
26 (9) 
 
143(51) 
 
100(36) 
29 (10) 
 
 
20 (33) 
16 (26) 
4 (7) 
 
16 (26) 
 
23 (38) 
8 (13) 
 
 
13 (23) 
25 (45) 
6 (11) 
 
30 (54) 
 
16 (29) 
9 (16) 
 
 
22 (38) 
30 (52) 
4 (7) 
 
31 (53) 
 
23 (40) 
8 (14) 
 
 
15 (33) 
20 (44) 
4 (9) 
 
31 (69) 
 
16 (36) 
1 (2) 
 
 
21 (34) 
36 (59) 
8 (13) 
 
35 (57) 
 
22 (36) 
3 (5) 
 
 
.540 
.006 
.709 
 
<.001 
 
.782 
.078 
 
a Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement. 
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Table 2. Support Following Errors   
Statement Total Department p- 
value 
 N=281 
(%)a 
A 
n=61  
(%) 
B 
n=56  
(%) 
C 
n=58  
(%) 
D 
n=45  
(%) 
E 
n=61  
(%) 
 
Hospitals adequately 
support doctors after 
medical errors 
(disagree). b  
248 (90) 57 (93)  
 
51 (94)  
 
55 (97)  
 
40 (89)  
 
45 (75)  
 
.001 
 
Interested in 
psychological 
counselling after a 
SERIOUS error c  
258 (92) 
 
58 (95) 50 (91) 54 (93) 41 (90) 55 (90) .609 
 
Reasons for not 
seeking psychological 
counselling: d 
Unable to take time 
off work. 
Concerned not 
confidential in case 
of lawsuit. 
Concerned it would 
be noted in my 
personnel file. 
 
 
 
95 (34) 
 
31 (11) 
 
 
49 (17) 
 
 
 
 
 
11 (18) 
 
5 (8) 
 
 
4 (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
24 (43) 
 
5 (9) 
 
 
19 (34) 
 
 
 
 
 
23 (40) 
 
8 (14) 
 
 
10 (17) 
 
 
 
 
 
13 (29) 
 
6 (13) 
 
 
7 (16) 
 
 
 
 
 
24 (39) 
 
7 (12) 
 
 
9 (15) 
 
 
 
 
 
.026 
 
.834 
 
 
.003 
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Concerned it would 
affect liability 
insurance. 
Concerned 
colleagues would 
judge negatively. 
Belief it would not 
be helpful. 
16 (6) 
 
 
46 (16) 
 
 
49 (17) 
 
3 (5) 
 
 
6 (10) 
 
 
5 (8) 
 
5 (9) 
 
 
11 (20) 
 
 
6 (11) 
 
3 (5) 
 
 
12 (21) 
 
 
12 (21) 
 
1 (2) 
 
 
3 (7) 
 
 
16 (36) 
 
4 (7) 
 
 
14 (23) 
 
 
10 (16) 
 
.684 
 
 
.086 
 
 
.003 
 
 
a Due to missing data, total responses range from 281 to 277. Missing data for a department 
did not exceed 2 responses for any question. 
b Data are given as proportion of each group that disagrees with the statement. “Disagree” 
includes those who disagree plus those who strongly disagree.  
c  Data are given as proportion of each group that were somewhat or very interested in having 
access to psychological counselling after a serious error. 
d Data are given as proportion of each group that responded “yes” to the statement.  
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Table 3. Factors Predicting Increased Distress 
Predictor Anxiety about future errors Confidence in ability as a doctor 
Univariate 
Model 
Multivariate 
Model 
Penalized 
Modela 
Univariate 
Model 
Multivariate 
Model 
Penalized 
Modela 
Departmentb 
Demographic characteristics  
Positionb 
>75% of time in direct patient contact 
Age 
Sex  
Religionb 
– *** 
 
– ns 
0.917ns 
1.043 ns 
0.513** 
– ns 
– *** 
 
– ns 
0.867 ns 
1.331 ns 
0.274*** 
– ns 
diff 
 
no diff 
1 
1 
0.364 
no diff 
– ** 
 
– ns 
0.954 
1.232 
0.688 
– ns 
– ** 
 
– ns 
1.163 
1.529 
0.597 
– ns 
diff 
 
no diff 
1 
1.446 
.776 
no diff 
Prior Error Involvement By Severity  
Near Miss  
Minor Error  
Serious Error 
 
1.389 ns 
1.187 ns 
2.304*** 
 
2.040 ns 
0.634 ns 
4.714*** 
 
1 
1 
2.321 
 
1.195 
1.357 
1.876* 
 
1.257 
1.350 
3.123** 
 
1 
1 
2.173 
Attitudes About Error       
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Hospitals support physicians 
adequately in coping with stress related 
to errors (disagree) 
Somewhat likely or likely that they 
would receive a malpractice complaint 
within the next year (vs somewhat or 
very unlikely) 
Medical Errors are usually caused by 
failure of care delivery systems, not 
failures of individuals (disagree) 
1.041 ns 
 
 
1.028 ns 
 
 
 
1.296 ns 
 
0.870 ns 
 
 
0.932 ns 
 
 
 
0.952 ns 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
0.694 ns 
 
 
0.944 ns 
 
 
 
1.282 ns 
 
0.716 ns 
 
 
0.806 ns 
 
 
 
1.113 ns 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
Prior Experience with Errors Disclosure 
Dissatisfied/satisfied with how their 
last serious error disclosure went/not 
disclosingc 
Dissatisfied/Satisfied with how their 
last minor error disclosure went / not 
 
– ns 
 
 
– * 
 
– ns 
 
 
– * 
 
0.701d 
 
 
0.473d 
 
 
– ns 
 
 
– ns 
 
 
– ns 
 
 
– ns 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
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disclosingc  
 
a In penalized regression models, coefficients on the logit scale are shrunk toward 0 relative to the multiple regression model and uninformative 
coefficients are actually set to 0. Since odds ratios are reported, these are accordingly shrunk toward 1, or set to 1 if uninformative. 
b Predictors department, religion, position, and prior experience with errors disclosure (last two rows) had more than two levels and no coefficients 
are reported. Significances shown refer to the omnibus test of differences among the different levels. For the penalized model, since no significances 
are reported “diff” means that at least one of the levels was not shrunk to 0 and “no diff ” means that all levels were shrunk to 0. 
c Satisfied versus not satisfied or not available. 
d Coefficient denotes odds ratio of level one relative to the mean of the other two levels. 
Note. Coefficients are all standardized.  
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5.4. Discussion 
The two key findings to emerge from this study were that anaesthesiologists’ commonly 
experienced distress, even after a minor error or near miss, and that the vast majority of 
anaesthesiologists disagreed that hospitals adequately support them in coping with the stress 
associated with medical errors. These results are consistent with the largest study conducted 
internationally to date on medical errors involving 3171 physicians from multiple specialties 
in the United States and Canada published in 2007 by Waterman and colleagues,[6] despite 
the physicians involved coming from different health systems and specialities. 
 
There were, however, significant differences between departments regarding error-related 
stress levels and attitudes about error-related support. Increased anxiety of future errors and 
losing confidence in their ability as a doctor significantly varied depending on the department 
anaesthesiologists came from, and while the vast majority of anaesthesiologists disagreed that 
hospitals adequately support them in coping with the stress associated with medical errors, 
there was significant variation between departments. The differences likely have their root in 
the heterogeneous clinical landscape in Switzerland, which is a result of the large degree of 
political autonomy of cantons and local communities. It is not clear, however, whether the 
differences in attitudes regarding error-related support are due to department/hospital culture, 
or reflect actual differences of support provided by hospitals. Further research is required to 
establish the root of these differences. 
 
In contrast, Waterman and colleagues found that respondents from the United States and 
Canada did not differ significantly in their error-related stress levels and attitudes about error-
related support.[6] However, partly due to their sampling technique, this study did not report 
on subgroup analysis such as department. Our study’s design has allowed for the comparison 
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of all university hospitals’ anaesthesia departments in one country, and our findings suggest 
that individual department/hospital culture influences certain error-related stress levels.  
 
Certain anaesthesiologists were also found to be more likely to experience increased distress, 
which support systems will need to take into consideration. Similar to previous research,[6] 
those dissatisfied with their last error disclosure were much more likely to report increased 
anxiety about future errors. This highlights the long-term importance of a “good error 
disclosure experience”, not only for affected patients and families but also for the involved 
clinicians. Indeed, providing support for error disclosure towards patients may also mitigate 
emotional distress associated with future errors. 
 
Support systems will also need to address the barriers anaesthesiologists identified in relation 
to seeking support. ‘That colleagues would judge negatively’ was named as a barrier to 
seeking support by 16% of respondents. While many physicians find it difficult to talk to 
colleagues about mistakes,[27-28] many wish to receive support from colleagues in the 
aftermath of an error.[4,28] It has been suggested that supporting a culture of constructive 
criticism amongst colleagues may be an important step to increase physicians’ resiliance 
against stress following medical error involvement.[13] Furthermore, a third of respondents 
thought that they did not have time to take time off work, which is also similar to Waterman 
and colleagues’ North American study findings.[6] The inability to take time off work to 
receive support has also been an issue of concern in studies examining the impact of 
perioperative catastrophes. For instance, White and Akerele surveyed 251 English 
anaesthesiologists. While the majority agreed that it was reasonable for medical staff not to 
take part in operations for 24 hours after an intraoperative death, “given the significant 
financial, logistical and personnel implications involved in employing secondary operating 
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teams and cancelling elective operating lists, this notion was rejected by the majority as 
impractical.”[11] White and Akerele’s recommendation, that all departments should 
nevertheless provide for time off if the circumstances require it, is equally applicable to cases 
of errors.  
 
Our response rate was 52%, which is lower than that achieved by Waterman and colleagues 
(64%),[6] but is comparable to previously published survey studies of physicians.[12,29] This 
study has the typical limitations of survey studies. Recall bias may have affected results due 
to the length of time since the event, degree of detail remembered, and significance of event. 
However, in the case of our study it is likely that recall in the event of emotionally important 
events such as errors remains high although we cannot fully exclude that individual sensitivity 
and age related factors have influenced recall.[13] Responder bias may have also influenced 
the results as those who responded to survey are more likely to be generally more interested in 
medical errors and more willing to be open about their distress. Social desirability may have 
resulted in an under-reporting of error distress. Participants in our sample were clinically 
active anaesthesiologists from the five university hospitals in Switzerland which may limit 
generalizability. However, in favour of wider generalizability is the fact that the percentage of 
physicians who come from adjacent European countries is known to be considerable in 
Switzerland. Furthermore, the significant differences found between departments in error-
related stress levels and attitudes about error-related support suggests that regional studies are 
crucial to understand the impact of errors.  
 
It is clear that healthcare organisations need to do more to support clinicians in coping with 
the stress associated with medical errors. Clinicians often “suffer in silence” following a 
medical error as they are not offered the support that they need.[30] For example, Joesten et 
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al. report that only 10% to 30% of respondents to their survey reported that various support 
services or interventions were actively offered to them after an incident.[31] This may 
potentially occur more often after minor errors and near misses because the incident is not 
considered serious enough. It is therefore important that heads of departments and hospitals 
chiefs are aware that even minor errors and near misses can have a serious effect on 
clinicians. 
 
Scott and colleagues have reported a post-event trajectory involving the six stages (1) chaos 
and accident response, (2) intrusive reflections, (3) restoring personal integrity, (4) enduring 
the inquisition, (5) obtaining emotional first aid and (6) moving on.[32] Given this trajectory, 
they note that “Institutional programs could be developed to successfully screen at-risk 
professionals immediately after an event, and appropriate support could be deployed to 
expedite recovery and mitigate adverse career outcomes.”[32] Indeed, there have been a 
number of institutional interventions and experiences regarding supporting clinicians 
following errors reported in the literature.[31, 33-36] It has been suggested that “one of the 
reasons that health care organizations do not routinely offer emotional support might be that 
their leaders do not know how to develop and successfully implement a support system.”[33] 
Scott and colleagues found that in the absence of another structure to imitate, it took the 
University of Missouri Health Care system nearly four years to develop and implement a 
second victim support process.[36] To assist healthcare organisations in developing and 
implementing a second victim support system, Pratt and colleagues have designed a toolkit 
which can be requested free of charge in exchange for feedback.[33] More research is needed 
in Europe on local support systems, however, European organisation may be able to use the 
experiences of these U.S: organisations reported in the literature as a guide to developing and 
implementing their own support systems.  
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Conclusion 
Medical errors, even minor errors and near misses, can have a serious effect on clinicians. 
Healthcare organisations need to do more to support clinicians in coping with the stress 
associated with medical errors. 
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Summary  
As a part of a broader study into medical error communication in Switzerland, 23 key 
medicolegal informants in Switzerland were interviewed. A major theme to emerge from 
these discussions was the issue of criminal liability. This article presents these findings and 
considers whether the current system in Switzerland is a morally meaningful and just system 
of culpability in light of theoretical and ethical considerations. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Marianne Paget argues in her landmark book “The Unity of Mistakes: A Phenomenological 
Interpretation of Medical Work” that mistakes are an intrinsic feature of medical work which 
she calls an ‘error-ridden activity’ precisely because it is inexact, uncertain and practised on 
the human body.[1] The consequences of such medical errors can be immense, causing 
disabling injuries or death to hundreds of thousands of patients worldwide each year.[2]  
 
When things go wrong “the usual human response is to apportion blame, demand retribution 
and compensation, and seek assurance that the error will not occur again.”[3] The law has an 
important role in meeting society’s need for accountability in such circumstances. One way 
this may be achieved is via the criminal law, which “is the strongest mechanism through 
which the state can hold an individual to account for actions that are contrary to the public 
interest.”[4] However, with harm causing events in medicine involving conduct ranging from 
the blatantly reckless to a momentary slip, the difficulty is to find a morally meaningful and 
just system of culpability.  
 
There currently exists significant variation in the ambit of the criminal law in relation to 
patient harm in different jurisdictions. For example, English law require more than simple 
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negligence to justify criminal prosecution in cases of patient harm and is generally limited 
instances of death: “A doctor who makes a “bad enough” medical error to cause the death of a 
patient can be prosecuted for criminal negligence manslaughter…Negligent acts, however 
reckless, that have non-fatal consequences, are not crimes in English law.”[5] In contrast, 
criminal proceedings can be initiated in Switzerland for negligent acts that cause non-fatal 
bodily injury and death (involuntary manslaughter), pursuant to Articles 125 and 117 of the 
Swiss Penal Code. 
 
As a part of a broader study into medical error communication in Switzerland, key medico-
legal informants were interviewed to explore their general attitudes towards medical errors, 
perceived barriers to error communication and potential ways of improving the situation. A 
major theme to emerge from these discussions was the issue of criminal liability. The aim of 
this paper is twofold. First, it will present the major themes that were expressed by the key 
informants’ in the interviews regarding criminal liability in Switzerland in relation to medical 
errors. Second, it will evaluate whether the current system in Switzerland is a morally 
meaningful and just system of culpability in light of theoretical and ethical considerations. 
 
6.2. Methods 
Possible interview partners were identified through discussions with collaborators and wider 
contacts. Key medico-legal informants were contacted by email and suitable dates for an 
interview were found with those willing to participate. As the interviewer [S.M.] was a non-
native German and French speaker, all interviewees were given the option to have a translator 
present. This offer was not taken up and all interviews were conducted in English. 
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A total of 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted between October 2012 and February 
2013. One interview was conducted via a Skype video call; all others were conducted in 
person at a venue of the interviewee’s choosing. Key medico-legal informants included the 
quality heads at large public teaching hospitals, a quality practitioner from a private 
federation, law professors specialising in medical law and criminal law, a university hospital 
lawyer, a chief of surgery, chiefs of anaesthesia, a university hospital medical director, a 
former Dean of Medicine, representative, representatives of a liability insurer, a private 
sickness fund, a physician association, and a patient safety organisation. Questions used to 
prompt discussion included: Are errors a serious problem in healthcare? What do you see as 
the main barriers to the communication of medical errors (to patients/colleagues/hospitals) in 
Switzerland? What measures could promote medical error communication in Switzerland? 
 
Interviews were recorded and lasted an average of 52 minutes. All recordings were 
transcribed verbatim and anonymised. Open coding qualitative analysis was performed by the 
investigator who conducted the interviews [S.M.]. Another investigator [B.E.] then reviewed 
to clarify and refine codes. Coding differences were resolved to achieve consensus. The 
Ethics Committee of Basel (Chairperson Prof A Perruchoud) confirmed on 6 January 2012 
that the study did not require ethics approval. 
 
6.3. Results 
We present the results according to the themes of analysis. 
 
Frequency and Impact 
Informants felt that criminal cases in the context of harm causing medical errors were 
reasonably rare: 
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“Not really. Four years I have been here, one problem; it was a tragedy.” P6 
 
“…in practice you have such a limited number of cases in criminal liability.” P15 
 
Indeed, some informants thought that the criminal process was generally only used as an 
option of last resort for patients frustrated by their treatment following an error and that as 
long as clinicians were open and empathic with patients the issue of criminal liability would 
not likely arise: 
 
“…you don’t sue your doctor for criminal liability unless you really don’t have the 
choice…the doctor has to be really a nasty way to be sued for that. We teach medical 
students that if they accept their errors, if they are modest, if they are empathic with 
their patients then they will never be sued for criminal liability.” P15 
 
“It doesn’t make sense to go to court against somebody who has owned up. You might 
want to talk about money, if you have spent half a year longer on recovery there are 
costs involved, somebody has to carry those costs, but there is not much sense in 
getting somebody into severe difficulty with…the criminal law system.” P22 
 
Informants felt that there was a general reluctance to initiate criminal cases in the context of 
medical errors, reporting that defence lawyers were more focused on gaining compensation 
via civil proceedings, while many criminal prosecutors disliked such cases due to their 
complexity, duration and the likelihood of failure: 
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“Yes, but from what I hear from lawyers in the field, they, well not all of them, a 
number of them, try to avoid filing a criminal complaint against a doctor. Usually they 
look for compensation.” P12 
 
“The prosecutors are not really happy to be in the hospital because of an error. They 
have no idea what is what. They look into an operation theatre, or intensive care unit, 
it’s like looking into a cockpit of an aeroplane. They don’t know what is what, who 
makes what. And usually these claims last a lot of years. For the usual the prosecutor 
has no success. And therefore half of the prosecutors hate to go into hospitals.” P6 
 
While criminal cases were perceived to occur infrequently, informants noted the significant 
negative impact involvement in such a case can have on clinicians, often destroying their 
professional lives and reputations and having a significant impact on their personal lives and 
health: 
 
“…the problem is getting involved in criminal proceedings, that’s really stigmatic. It’s 
destroying your reputation. That’s the problem, just involvement.” P2 
 
“We had several colleagues here having gone through exactly this, and this is very 
hard. I mean, at this time when all the stories started I had problems to find my sleep, 
quality of life was really bad, I had to work days and weeks together with a lawyer just 
to bring the arguments into a correct light. And then finally it ended up that the court 
thought: well this has not been a crime.” P10 
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Low Threshold  
A key aspect of criminal liability in Switzerland that informants stressed was the low 
threshold required for criminal negligence. Informants noted that the ambit of criminal 
liability in Switzerland includes all types of harms, and that intention or gross negligence does 
not have to be demonstrated: 
 
“Yes, I think this is a further problem. You don’t need to show either intention or 
gross negligence to file a criminal complaint. As soon as a patient is injured he can file 
a criminal complaint and then there will be an investigation and usually it will not go 
further but…” P12 
 
It was felt that this situation can be exacerbated by the mandatory prosecution of such cases 
that officially exists. Informants reported, however, that informally, whether or not a case is 
prosecuted very much depends on the discretion of the criminal prosecutor involved. 
Nevertheless, a number of cases were discussed that have been very harmful for the clinicians 
involved but have not resulted in a conviction. However, it was also reported that since 2011, 
procedural codes have explicitly stated that if there is little chance of a conviction then the 
case should be stopped: 
 
“It’s negligence, yeah. And for that it’s not just serious negligence, grave negligence. 
It is also in principle petty cases could be picked up and what’s more there is no 
discretion picking up. Officially there is mandatory prosecution, which causes a big 
difficulty; informally of course there is a kind of discretion. They would not pick up a 
case they know from the beginning is not going to go anywhere. So it does depend 
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very much of the person in charge, but you are right, any kind of negligence would be 
sufficient.” P22 
 
Many informants felt, however, that is was inappropriate to consider clinicians, who are 
attempting to help patients but cause harm through unintentional slips or mistakes, as 
criminals. Nonetheless, the option of criminal liability was seen to be important by some 
informants, but given the time and resources involved and the significant impact on 
clinicians’ lives, they felt the criminal process should be limited to the most extreme cases:  
 
“No. You’re not a criminal because it’s not your intention to make a mistake in the 
patient…I have been in court, as a specialist, and that I had to explain to the judge that 
in contrast to a criminal situation it was not the intention of the medical doctor to do 
this. I will not harm the patient, I will help him. So it’s very different, and you have to 
explain that to the people because not every time they see the difference. It’s a crime 
to them.” P7 
 
“Well…of course my entry point as a criminal lawyer is what is the role of criminal 
law vis-a -vis errors and of course there is a role but it is a role for absolute extreme 
cases…Otherwise, criminal lawyers are very, very quickly out of their depth. I think 
one has to be very clear there. First of all, for practical reasons criminal lawyers, 
especially prosecutors, have no idea what it is all about, so they would have to get 
experts for everything…and that makes sense when, on the face of it, something very 
serious has happened. If it is a borderline case you end up tarnishing someone’s 
reputation. You have the case dragging on for years and in the end, usually the cases 
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are closed. So it is very wasteful, the whole process…and yet the option has to be 
there. That’s clear.” P22 
 
Individual vs. System 
Another fundamental aspect of Swiss criminal liability informants stressed was its focus on 
individual failure and blame. While it was noted that other industries and areas of laws have 
shifted to taking systematic failures into consideration, it was felt that the criminal law has 
not. The focus on individual failure and blame was seen by many as outdated and particularly 
unsuited in cases of medical errors: 
 
“…a general tendency over the last 20 years, to move away from personal wrong 
doing or let’s say, to imbed personal wrong doing in a systemic failure, and then to 
say, ok, let’s go against, for instance a corporation because they’ve allowed somebody 
to commit a mistake. So this approach is quite common. Unluckily I must say in the 
frame work of criminal law, and in the health sector, this hasn’t really taken hold. It 
does apply from a, let’s say, administrative legal point of view. So if something goes 
wrong or let’s say, work laws or within labour law…these areas, of course, the shift 
has been undertaken. With criminal law we’re kind of the last to understand the 
systems are the topic and not individual failure, because criminal law is about, it’s 
relatively crude, it is about individual failure…criminal law is really an archaic, crude 
instrument and was developed for serious misbehaviour of individuals, and it has to do 
with the attribution of blame and this doesn’t fit the situation.” P22 
 
Informants also discussed how the criminal law’s general difficulties in dealing with 
corporations were exacerbated when the hospital involved is a public entity, as the state 
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cannot go against the state in the courts. However, they noted that monetary damages were 
reasonably easy to obtain from the state via civil or administrative law: 
 
“With criminal law, we have difficulties because we already have difficulties in 
general with companies because they’re not people. So criminal law being this, you 
know, blaming individuals, how can you blame a company? That is already a big 
step…But taking it a step further, saying that this corporation here is not a private 
hospital, but it is a state owned hospital, then it is kind of strange, then you have the 
state punishing the state. That beats the system as far as it’s developed here.” P22 
 
Informants working in public hospitals spoke of efforts to circumvent the criminal process by 
trying to direct patients and their lawyers away from making criminal complaints against 
individual clinicians towards civil liability where the hospital, or the hospital’s liability 
insurer, could come into play: 
 
“The second one is the penal responsibility whereby you are aimed as an individual 
and so if you get condemned then you go to jail it’s not the hospital going to jail, or 
you are fined, and with the lawyer we always try to move the patient or his advocate of 
lawyer from this kind of affair to civil responsibility.” P5 
 
Fear of Criminal Cases 
Some informants did not perceive criminal cases as an issue of concern chiefly due to their 
infrequent occurrence. Indeed, one informant thought that given the low amount of criminal 
cases being prosecuted that any fears clinicians may hold about criminal liability were 
misplaced: 
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“Yes, the doctors may have a concern about that but the figures are very clear. This is 
a wrong fear, a misplaced fear.” P15 
 
However, a number of informants, particularly those who had previous personal experience 
with the criminal process, identified criminal liability as a significant area of concern. 
Criminal cases were often contrasted to civil liability cases in terms of significance and the 
nature of the proceedings. While civil liability was seen to be an adversarial system taking 
place between equals which carried no stigmatisation, criminal law occurred between the 
powerful state and a citizen and had wider implications than simply paying monetary 
damages:  
 
“The civil proceeding is competitive, an adversarial system. It’s not the powerful state 
against the small citizen. It’s on an equal level, and it’s fighting, and there’s no 
stigmatisation about that.” P2 
 
“Sure. And it’s the criminal side that is much more important than the civil side. 
Money is money, to pay the fee.” P13 
 
Informants felt that clinicians’ fears about criminal liability, and legal liability in general, 
were a major barrier to error communication and quality improvement, leading to defensive 
statements denying errors or general statements to avoid admissions of responsibility: 
 
“I would say that Switzerland is quite behind in that. Doctors are afraid of 
communicating errors because of the fear of liability, especially criminal liability more 
than civil liability. So what they do, the hospitals make general statements. There 
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could be an error happen, but they do not individualise the error and they do not say 
we are guilty, that there is negligence, they just say something went wrong. So they try 
and avoid self-accusation…criminal proceedings is really, it’s a big obstacles. For me 
that’s the major obstacle to disclosure practice in Switzerland and we should probably 
get rid of that.” P2 
 
“It’s certainly going to be a barrier, I mean, this is clear…I would say it’s pretty 
natural that people, in practice, will tend to defend themselves. As soon as the element 
of fault is in the air, no matter whether it’s treated by criminal law or by other means, 
people will in the first instance, try to say, oh I did it correctly, it’s not my fault, the 
patient just got up too early or it’s the configuration that’s not good, the wound didn’t 
heal well. It’s just, I mean, there’s would be tendency first to defend yourself.” P22 
 
However, some informants felt that the true reasons for non-disclosure were actually more 
complex and that arguments of criminalisation were often used to conceal clinician’s 
discomfort of speaking about their failures in general:  
 
“People who argue that they are criminalised if they speak to the patient, they don’t 
want to speak to the patient. They only use these arguments against speaking with the 
patient.” P14 
 
Misuse of Criminal Process 
Some informants also reported that some lawyers were using the criminal process to obtain 
information for free in order to then use it later in civil proceedings, in which plaintiffs would 
ordinarily run the risk of covering the costs of the case and uncovering evidence (table 5). 
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This practice was perceived to currently be occurring reasonably infrequently, but because of 
the negative impact criminal investigations can have on clinicians, it was seen to be very 
unfair: 
 
“I know of a few lawyers who on the contrary they first make a criminal complaint so 
there is an investigation they then get information they can then use in the civil 
proceedings. But so far it has been a minority of lawyers, so far as I know. But of 
course it could change, and the pressure would become even bigger for physicians.” 
P12  
 
“The problem if you run a civil case, a purely civil case, not administrative. I’m not 
talking of a case where a public hospital is in question. If it is a private doctor, if it’s a 
private hospital, the problem is that you actually have to make a down payment and 
you have to pay to carry the cost of the court case as a plaintiff and it can be very 
expensive. You have the full risk and you have to advance the whole thing and 
especially if you want to have evidence found then you have to pay everything. So 
what they would like to do is to use criminal law to dig up the evidence, that’s for free 
and then use it for civil litigation…And then at a certain point, you tell the criminal 
lawyers, we don’t insist on criminal law now and that is the kind of approach that’s 
taken. But it has very, very negative effects because criminal law because, I mean, 
they can raid your premises. Well they wouldn’t put you on remand probably, they 
wouldn’t lock you up, but there is publicity involved. So it’s kind of unfair.” P22 
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Issues with Changing Law 
While many informants felt that the ambit, focus and impact of the criminal law in the context 
of medical errors were problematic, they identified a number of barriers to changing the 
criminal law in Switzerland. 
 
First and foremost, informants stressed the equality of the law; the need of the law to treat 
cases of harm alike. The example of car accidents was used more than once by informants, 
who noted that car accidents which caused physical harm due to negligence would attract 
criminal liability, thus physical harm caused by negligence in healthcare needed to be treated 
comparably. It was therefore seen to be inappropriate to change the criminal law only for 
clinicians and not for others. Informants felt that the general public would also not accept 
such a change as they thought that the medical profession already received special protection. 
Informants also considered that removing criminal liability for non-fatal harms or simply 
negligence would be a major change to Switzerland’s current criminal law, which they did not 
see occurring in the near future and often did not support. A move away from traditional 
criminal law would raise a number of technical issues, some of which informants found 
problematic, such as how to draw a line between simple negligence and gross negligence, and 
how to attribute responsibility to a group for failure:  
 
“If you think about car accidents, there if you have a car accident and cause physical 
harm to a person by negligence, it’s no question you are criminally sued for that. So if 
you transfer that to hospitals you have to be coherent. So the same thing is done. If a 
doctor causes by negligence physical harm he gets sued, criminally sued. So if you 
cancel that for doctors you should cancel that in other areas too, on the street too for 
example, and that would cause major changes in the criminal liability system. That’s 
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obviously a European, or continental, or civil law thing, I don’t know. But that really 
would change the system. But now as you put the question, I think it doesn’t makes 
much sense to criminally sue doctors for causing bodily harm by negligence. By 
intention it’s a different thing, but that’s not the issue.” P2 
 
“Of course we could change the criminal system but it would be a really, really big 
change…I would not really favour changing the system only…for healthcare 
professionals and not for other people as well. So we would have to think it over.” P12 
 
Informants believed that a cultural change was also needed for a reform of professional 
liability to occur. Many sections of the medical profession itself were still seen to be 
intolerant of errors and often not sufficiently aware of issues surrounding medical errors. 
Furthermore, informants believed that wider society was not yet willing to accept not 
punishing people in such cases: 
 
“I could add that we have different worlds. We have the world of medical 
professionalism, where I feel in many domains as far as I’m told, there’s still the 
feeling that mistakes have no right to occur. It is not allowed to make a mistake. So I 
think we have a cultural change to make, some people in the medical profession would 
like to make it, some did make it, some did not yet. It depends on the personalities of 
the chief medical officers. That’s the medical profession. Then we have the society, 
and the society has not evolved. The big problem is that it is still a career killer that 
you’re still in the journals if you were the one who made the mistake…I think society 
does not yet want to pay the price of not penalising people…We have a problem that I 
think many people in the medical community would like to go ahead but the society 
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doesn’t follow politics. We have a politics problem I think and a medical cultural 
problem.” P11b 
 
“Well yeah, I know but the culture has to change because if you don’t change culture 
you will improve only in a very marginal way the situation. So you have to improve 
culture, to change culture. To change culture you have to improve teaching, sensitise 
health care professionals to these issues. And then I would welcome some reframing 
of the law on professional liability. But really if I look at things in a very reasonable 
and political way, I don’t see it coming in the next 10 years. I don’t see any change in 
the criminal law system that would be too big a change.” P12 
 
Finally, informants also felt there was simply a lack of interest in Switzerland for such a 
change in the law. More progressive attitudes towards medical errors were seen to be largely 
limited to small groups of clinicians or patient safety practitioners, and became problematic 
when discussed publically. One informant reported that their organisation had the feeling that 
the Federal Office of Public Health had previously used the Critical Incident Reporting 
System (CIRS) for ‘doctor bashing’ and were generally not interested in the issue. Indeed, 
informants considered that wider society and politicians were simply more concerned with 
other issues at present and that medical errors were not on the agenda: 
 
“I think there is not a big interest I feel for these discussions. The most parts of these 
attitudes are found in small groups of physicians, where you can discuss cases, where 
you can discuss problems, and then you do not fear a big publicity, you can discuss 
this in a certain privacy, but as soon as you go public in a congress or wherever, it 
becomes…” P11a 
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6.4. Discussion 
This was a qualitative study that does not claim to present representative data. In this paper, 
we will not question whether our interviewees have correctly described the reality and simply 
assume that their perceptions describe a significant part of the reality in Switzerland. Indeed, 
the fact that we interviewed experts from different fields that have experience with medical 
errors makes it likely that we captured at least some part of the reality viewed from different 
sides. We will use these findings as a basis to explore the appropriateness of the current 
system in Switzerland in light of international literature in this field. 
 
The international literature on criminal liability for medical errors suggests that it would be 
deeply imprudent to suggest that the criminal law has no place in the clinical setting. There 
will always be events that warranted a criminal response. A clinician who kills a patient by 
reckless acts or omissions clearly deserves punishment.[5,6] And as Runciman and colleagues 
argue, “[i]t is important to meet society’s needs to blame and exact retribution when 
appropriate.”[3] Where, however, is the appropriate place to set the bar for criminal liability 
in relation to patient harm that is morally meaningful and just? 
 
Many of the interviewed informants expressed concerns that Switzerland currently has the 
threshold for criminal liability set very low, with any negligent act that results in bodily injury 
a potential candidate for a criminal investigation. Indeed, while the current incidence of 
criminal cases regarding patient harm may be reasonably low, we think it would be a mistake 
to completely dismiss fears about criminal liability in relation to harm causing medical errors 
on these grounds. The fact remains that any negligent act which causes patient harm may be 
criminally prosecuted in Switzerland, and as informants noted, there has been a number of 
criminal prosecutions that have been extremely harmful to the clinicians involved but have 
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not resulted in a conviction. Although informants thought that the option of criminal liability 
needed to be there for ‘extreme cases’, many felt it was inappropriate to be treating clinicians 
as criminals for making unintentional slips or mistakes that result in harm. Indeed, there are a 
number of factors that arguably make the use of the criminal law for any medical error, 
regardless of its outcome, inappropriate and likely to do more harm than good.[6] 
 
One reason that may be advanced regarding the rationale of criminally punishing clinicians 
who have harmed patients through medical errors is that this deters other doctors from making 
the same mistakes in the future. However, as Merry has argued, “[t]his argument depends on 
the questionable prior premise that it is actually possible to deter error. Empirical and 
theoretical considerations suggest that this notion is unsustainable, and that to punish those in 
error is unjust.”[7] Merry notes that errors are unintentional, made by people trying to do the 
right thing but who end up doing the wrong thing. Deterrence is therefore useless in the 
prevention of errors and “[i]t is very unlikely that draconian punishment will reduce the 
incidence of medical errors.”[7] 
 
It also appears inappropriate to criminally punish an individual clinician for medical errors on 
the ground of causation. As McDonald has noted:  
 
“One of the most significant challenges associated with using the criminal law against 
health professionals for negligence in professional practice is that criminal law is ill-
equipped to address the complexities of the environment within which health 
professionals commonly operate – the modern healthcare system. The paradigm of the 
criminal law is based upon an acknowledgement of human agency an autonomous 
individual makes a decision to act (or not to act) in a manner that contravenes the law 
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and must accept the consequences of that action or omission – it is a simple world that 
recognises few relational factors.”[4] 
 
While focusing on establishing an individual clinician’s culpability may be attractive, 
particularly given the tradition of shaming and blaming individual clinicians who make errors 
with “accusations of incompetence, unprofessionalism, and unworthiness to treat patients,”[8] 
this contradicts what we now know about medical error causation. Research in recent decades 
has demonstrated that most errors are “not the outcome of individual incompetence, but of an 
entire system not adapting quickly enough to cope with the changing complexity of the world 
it is designed to manage and control.”[9] Typically, many events, all necessary and only 
jointly sufficient, are needed to align to result in a harm causing error that that might have 
been avoided if any one of the events had not occurred.[7] As James Reason’s ‘Swiss cheese’ 
model of error causation shows, most errors have their origins in wider organizational factors 
that may lay dormant within the system before combining with individual failures to breach 
the system’s defences.[10] Such latent conditions can create error provoking conditions (for 
instance, time pressure, understaffing, fatigue) and enduring weaknesses in defences (for 
instance, unworkable procedures and process design deficiencies). Most errors cannot, 
therefore, be causally attributed solely to the immediate activities of an individual.  
 
Given the normally prolonged and expensive nature of such legal proceedings, it is also 
important that the legal response to medical errors promotes future safety.[7] However, 
criminally prosecuting well-intentioned clinicians for making errors is unlikely to improve 
patient safety or promote the communication of errors. As reflected by many of the 
informants’ responses, there is a real danger it will do just the opposite. The use of the 
criminal law is almost always counterproductive to finding out why things went wrong and 
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what to do about it, with statements about events given during proceedings “almost of 
necessity defensive, limited, adversarial and self-preserving.”[9] Indeed, prosecuting “an 
individual can protect an unsafe system from scrutiny and therefore preclude that institution 
from learning and improving the systems for treatment and care - an outcome that is not in the 
public interest.”[4] Furthermore, Dekker has also argued that: 
 
“Another consequence of the accountability demanded by legal systems is that it is 
easily perceived as illegitimate, intrusive and ignorant. If you are held ‘accountable’ 
by somebody who really does not understand what it means to be a professional in a 
particular setting, such as an operating theatre, then you will likely see their calls for 
accountability as unfair, as coarse and uninformed. Indeed, as unjust. Social cognition 
research shows that this leads to excessive stress, less disclosure and a polarization of 
positions, rather than an openness and willingness to share and learn for the common 
good.”[9] 
 
All of this speaks against the use of criminal law for any medical errors, regardless of 
outcome. It is important to remember that “[t]he outcome, the death or grievous injury of the 
patient, should not be conflated into the equation that determines how morally blameworthy 
or how negligent an action or omission is, yet too often this can occur.”[4] For the criminal 
law to be morally meaningful and just in relation to patient harm, we support the growing 
international calls for the focus of the criminal law in the context of patient harm to be 
upgraded and narrowed to willful and reckless conduct.[5,6] As Berwick has recommended, 
“[r]ecourse to criminal sanctions should be extremely rare, and should function primarily as a 
deterrent to wilful or reckless neglect or mistreatment.”[11] In other words, the criminal law 
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should be pursuing clinicians who do not care, instead of those who try to care but make an 
error.[5]  
 
These considerations therefore suggest that Switzerland currently has the bar for criminal 
liability in relation to patient harm set too low. It is important to stress, however, that in 
arguing against the use of the criminal law in cases of medical error, we are not suggesting 
that medical errors should be tolerated or are not important. All reasonable steps should be 
taken to prevent such errors happening again. Systems, and individual clinicians, must also be 
appropriately held to account when patients are needlessly injured or killed. However, we do 
not believe that the criminal law is the appropriate mechanism to achieve this, and may even 
inhibit efforts to do so.  
 
While major changes to Swiss criminal law in the foreseeable future are perhaps unlikely, 
further discussion and research is clearly needed on this issue. For instance, the reported 
misuse of the criminal process by some lawyers to gain evidence at no cost is of concern. 
Further research is needed to establish how wide spread this problem is and what steps could 
be implemented to prevent such detrimental misuse. It will also need to be considered if the 
other accountability mechanisms currently available in Switzerland for harmed patients to 
seek redress are sufficient, or whether accountability mechanisms specifically designed for 
healthcare (such as those in place in New Zealand [6]), may offer a better way forward. 
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Summary 
Question under study: To examine medico-legal stakeholders’ views about the impact of 
professional liability insurance in Switzerland on medical error disclosure. 
Methods: Purposive sample of 23 key medico-legal stakeholders in Switzerland from a range 
of fields between October 2012 and February 2013. Data were collected via individual, face-
to-face interviews using a researcher-developed semi-structured interview guide. Interviews 
were transcribed and analysed using conventional content analysis. 
Results: Participants, particularly those with a legal or quality background, reported that 
concerns relating to professional liability insurance often inhibited communication with 
patients after a medical error. Healthcare providers were reported to be particularly concerned 
about losing their liability insurance cover for apologising to harmed patients. It was reported 
that the attempt to limit the exchange of information and communication could lead to a 
conflict with patient rights law. Participants reported that hospitals could, and in some case 
are, moving towards self-insurance approaches, which could increase flexibility regarding 
error communication  
Conclusion: The reported current practice of at least some liability insurance companies in 
Switzerland of inhibiting communication with harmed patients after an error is concerning 
and requires further investigation. With a new ethic of transparency regarding medical errors 
now prevailing internationally, this approach is increasingly being perceived to be misguided. 
A move away from hospitals relying solely on liability insurance may allow greater 
transparency after errors. Legalisation preventing the loss of liability insurance coverage for 
apologising to harmed patients should also be considered. 
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7.1. Introduction 
Despite clinicians being widely considered internationally to have an ethical, professional and 
legal obligation to disclose medical errors to patients,[1-4] there remains a large “disclosure 
gap” between expected practice and what is actually being done.[5] Clinicians’ legal fears 
have been identified internationally as the most pervasive barrier to disclosure.[6] One fear in 
particular is the risk of losing professional liability insurance coverage if too much or the 
wrong thing is said, due to the so-called “cooperation clauses” found in many insurance 
policies, which releases the insurance companies from their obligation to pay costs if liability 
is admitted without prior consent.[7-8] However, professional liability insurance can be 
critical to both parties in cases of harm causing errors; the most stringent liability rules do not 
help a claimant if the clinician is unable to pay damages. 
 
In Switzerland, liability law differentiates between self-employed and employed clinicians. 
Since 2007, it has been obligatory for self-employed clinicians to have professional liability 
insurance (Federal Law on Medical Professions, MedBG). However, the MedBG does not 
apply to employed clinicians. If employed clinicians are working for a public hospital, their 
liability for medical treatment complies with the liability law (LS 170.1, Zürich). In this case, 
it is not the hospital liability insurance which is liable to be sued (no direct legal claim), but - 
depending on the hospital’s funding body – the state, the independent public institute, the 
administration union or the municipality. During the damage assessment, which is carried out 
by the insurers in accordance with the liability law, certain formal responsibilities remain with 
the hospital’s funding body. Accordingly, their involvement in the resolution of the case is to 
a certain extent mandatory.  
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Every hospital is obligated to cover their third-party liability risk in the appropriate form, 
independently from their legal structure – whether they are run by the Canton, the 
municipality or by a private company, and whether they receive subsidies (see § 36 Abs. 2 in 
connection with § 12 Abs. 2 general health law for the canton Zurich [GesG, LS 810.1]). It is 
the hospital’s responsibility to cover this risk, whether they guarantee the coverage through 
liability insurance, by creating accruals or through a combination of accruals and liability 
insurance. 
 
As a part of a broader study into medical error communication in Switzerland, key medico-
legal stakeholders were interviewed to explore their general attitudes towards medical errors, 
perceived barriers to error communication and potential ways of improving the situation. One 
major theme to emerge from these discussions was the issue of liability insurance. The aim of 
this paper is to examine medico-legal stakeholders’ views about the impact of professional 
liability insurance on medical error disclosure in Switzerland. It will also evaluate this 
reported impact in light of international trends and ethical considerations.  
 
7.2. Methods 
The study was approved by Prof A Perruchoud, Chairperson of the Ethics Committee of 
Basel, on 6 January 2012. Informed consent was implied by returning the survey. The 
methods of the study are presented in accordance with the “Consolidated criteria for reporting 
qualitative research” (COREQ).[9] 
 
Research team and reflexivity 
Interviews were conducted by S.M., a male PhD student in biomedical ethics, who had 
previous training and experience in qualitative research.[10] No relationship was established 
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between S.M. and the participants prior to the study and participants received limited 
information about S.M. There was no hierarchical relationship between SM and the study 
participants and we are not aware of any particular biases of S.M. concerning the research 
topic. D.S. has been involved in several qualitative publications.[11-13] A.L. has several 
years of experience with qualitative studies.[14-16] B.E. has a longstanding experience with 
qualitative studies.[17-19] 
 
Study design 
The theoretical framework employed in this study was conventional content analysis.[20] We 
primarily selected participants through purposive sampling, in order to ensure that participants 
were from different backgrounds and to capture a variety of experiences. Possible interview 
partners were identified through discussions with collaborators and wider contacts. Key 
medico-legal stakeholders included the quality heads at large public teaching hospitals, a 
quality practitioner from a private federation, law professors specialising in medical law and 
criminal law, a university hospital lawyer, a chief of surgery, chiefs of anaesthesia, a 
university hospital medical director, a former Dean of Medicine, representatives of a liability 
insurer, a private sickness fund, a physician association, a patient safety organisation, and an 
academy of medical sciences. 
 
Stakeholders were contacted by email and suitable dates for an interview were found with 
those willing to participate. A total of 23 stakeholders agreed to participate in the study. One 
stakeholder declined to participate due to their workload. Interviews were held between 
October 2012 and February 2013. One interview was conducted via a Skype video call; all 
others were conducted in person at a venue of the participants’ choosing, typically his or hers 
private office. Only the participant and the researcher were present during the interview. As 
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the interviewer [S.M.] was a non-native German and French speaker, all interviewees were 
given the option to have a translator present. This offer was not taken up and all interviews 
were conducted in English. 
 
A semi-structured interview guide about nurses’ attitudes and experiences with error 
disclosure and perceived barriers was developed. Questions used to prompt discussion 
included: Are errors a serious problem in healthcare? What do you see as the main barriers to 
the communication of medical errors (to patients/colleagues/hospitals) in Switzerland? What 
measures could promote medical error communication in Switzerland? Based on the first 2 
interviews which did not show any problems, we decided that no further piloting or adaptation 
of the interview guide was necessary. No repeat interviews were carried out. Interviews were 
audio recorded, no field notes were taken. Interviews lasted an average of 52 minutes. After 
23 interviews the question about data saturation arose and was discussed by the research team. 
It was agreed that concerning the main themes saturation was reached and that no new major 
discrepancies were coming up during the interviews. In sum, the research team concluded that 
saturation was reached in the content and attitudes expressed by the participants on the main 
themes and no other major issues regarding error disclosure were not at least broached. 
Transcriptions of the interviews were not returned to the participants. 
 
Analysis and findings 
Using the interview transcriptions, S.M. performed conventional content analysis,[20] 
focusing on themes common across participants as well as those unique to individuals that 
may offer insight into differences in perspectives and discrepancies in practice. Initial themes 
discovered in the interviews were labelled using a process of open coding (i.e., no specific 
preconceived codes were identified or used; rather, codes emerged directly from the data). 
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The other investigators [S.M., D.S., A.L., B.E.] reviewed the initial analysis to clarify and 
refine codes, and conversations among the investigators continued until coding differences 
were resolved and consensus was achieved. 
 
7.3. Results 
 
Liability Insurance’s Impact on Error Communication 
While all 23 participants were asked about liability insurance, the most in-depth responses 
regarding this issue came from a minority of participants with a legal or quality background. 
While the other participants, particularly those who were clinicians, had generally not 
experienced or were not aware of any interference from liability insurers in terms of open 
communication with the patients after an error, the participants with a legal or quality 
background reported a significant negative impact on communication. 
 
In general, it was reported that liability insurance contracts generally prohibit hospitals and 
physicians from making statements concerning liability before discussing the matter with the 
insurance company. It is also the insurance company’s responsibility to handle the claim and 
communicate with the patient in relation to this process: 
 
“I think that is a general provision that not only in medical situations but in general 
that before giving any statements concerning the liability or even the coverage they 
need to register the case and talk with us and finally it’s our business to do the claims 
handling. Well, that’s in general.” P18 
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It was acknowledged, however, that communication with the patient regarding the case would 
often be put on hold while information and expert advice was gathered. In complex cases, this 
process could take many years.  
 
However, a number of participants reported that the impact of liability insurance contracts on 
communication between the hospital or doctor and the patient was often much greater in 
practice than simply not making statements concerning liability. Participants reported that all 
communication with the patient was often stopped once a claim was made due to instructions 
given by insurance companies’ lawyers, or hospitals and doctors being overly cautious:  
 
“As soon as a case is announced to the insurance company, usually a lawyer from the 
insurance company comes and says we take it over, don’t say anything to the patient 
to the patient’s lawyer, not even excuses. Now you have to shut your mouth.” P12 
 
Indeed, a number of participants reported that hospitals and doctors are particularly concerned 
about losing their liability insurance cover for apologising to harmed patients because of the 
fear that it will be seen as an admission of fault. There was general agreement among these 
participants that while liability insurers would not allow apologies that include an 
acknowledgement of responsibility to be given to patients, expressions of sympathy for what 
has occurred were not dangerous. However, due to the anxiety about losing liability insurance 
cover, healthcare providers are often unwilling to apologise to patients at all: 
 
 “There is no debate about the fact you should express regrets from the institution, 
regrets about what happened, but there is some consensus on the fact that third party 
liability insurers would not currently cover any hospitals that would plain and bluntly 
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say I’m sorry, and not that I’m sorry for what happened, but I’m sorry for my mistake 
for instance, there would be no coverage for a hospital where a professional would 
say something like that. So that’s where the caution comes into account.” P1 
 
However, some of these participants felt that inhibiting apologies, and communication in 
general, after a patient was harmed was unnecessary and has potentially negative outcomes 
for all involved. 
 
Liability law vs. patient rights law 
One participant felt that in terms of communication after an error there could be a meeting of 
“two different worlds” which often conflicted: liability law and patient rights law. To 
illustrate his point, the participant described a recent case where he was representing an 
injured patient and was confronted by a hospital’s liability insurance lawyer, who was trying 
to limit the exchange of information and communication. The participant reported that he 
bypassed this using patient rights and went directly to the physician, who was reluctant to 
speak about (and apologise for) what happened due to the instructions he had received: 
  
“He received a message from the hospital – you will not speak because there is the 
liability insurance lawyer taking care of the case. But the law gives my client the right 
to be in the room and ask to see the doctor. And the doctor received a message from 
their lawyer, don’t speak. So I had to twist the arm behind because the system was not 
built in a way that they could actually have an open discussion, and that was no good. 
You see, I think you can have a physiological or sociological analysis, but it’s true in a 
pure legal point of view we had two different worlds meeting, one coming from 
liability law and one coming from patient rights law.” P15  
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Increasing Flexibility Regarding Error Communication 
Participants identified two different self-insurance approaches that could be taken by hospitals 
to increase flexibility regarding error communication. Firstly, participants suggested that 
hospitals could raise their current self-insured retained limits, under which liability insurance 
does not cover and must be paid for by the insured. This would provide hospitals with more 
freedom to communicate with harmed patients and resolve the matter directly with them. 
Participants reported that some hospitals have implemented this approach and are 
experimenting with how much they can cover themselves. 
 
Second, participants reported that some large public hospitals have decided to move to full 
self-insurance and not have liability insurance at all.  
 
“I know of a few hospitals who now have decided not to keep the insurance but to be 
their own insurer, and to save money every year and to create a fund, and then they 
pay damages out of their own money. Because they had the feeling that they had more 
control over the whole process. What they could say to the patient, what they could 
really discuss…So I know that in a number of public hospitals there is a big discussion 
now, should we keep civil liability insurance or should we move to another system 
where we insure ourselves.” P12 
 
Representatives of one of these hospitals reported that this was done primarily for financial 
considerations. However, they also noted that this approach also gives them more flexibility 
in de-escalating patients’ demands in the context of civil claims.  
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7.4. Discussion 
The results of this qualitative study suggest that a conflict exists in Swiss hospitals between 
the requirements of liability insurance and communication with patients following medical 
errors. Legal concerns about insurance may be preventing doctors from communicating 
transparently with patients, which in turn implies that patient rights legislation is not being 
followed. 
 
With a new ethic of transparency regarding medical errors now prevailing internationally, the 
nondisclosure of errors is increasingly being perceived to be misguided, being more 
concerned “about our liability than our humanity.”[21] As Lucian Leape has noted: “We have 
long known that a serious medical mishap is devastating for the patient, imposing an immense 
emotional burden on top of the physical suffering and fracturing the trust that is the 
cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship. And we know that honesty, transparency and 
apology are essential to ease that burden and rebuild that trust…”[21] It is also known that 
medical errors can have a significant impact on clinicians and it is thought that their distress 
can be exacerbated by nondisclosure.[21] 
 
However, the advice to avoid open communication and apology has not always been 
completely unwelcomed by clinicians: “It fed into their fears of shame and disgrace and 
provided cover for avoiding the painful discussion with the patient and the revelation of 
fallibility.”[21] Indeed, it would be mistaken to think that clinicians’ legal fears are the only 
reason for errors not being disclosed. While legal fears may surely be a factor in clinicians’ 
reluctance to disclose and apologise for errors, the true reasons are usually more complex, 
including a professional and organizational culture of secrecy and blame, clinicians lacking 
confidence in their communication skills, and the shame and humiliation associated with 
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acknowledging a harm causing mistake — to oneself, one’s patient, and one’s peers.[6] 
Indeed, research published in 2006 involving US and Canadian physicians suggest that the 
legal environment may have a more limited impact on physicians’ communication attitudes 
and practices regarding adverse events than often believed, and that the culture of medicine 
itself may be a more important barrier.[22]  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that communication after an error is often inhibited by liability 
insurance companies due to fears that it will increase litigation and costs. However, the 
experience of a number of organisations internationally indicates that adoption of disclosure 
and apology practices may in fact markedly reduce litigation and legal costs.[23-24] 
However, it is difficult to know how much of the success achieved at these organisations “is 
related to the practice of open disclosure and how much might be related to their proactive 
approach of offering early compensation.”[21] Indeed, it remains unclear what the overall 
impact of wide-spread disclosure and apology practices would be on malpractice litigation. 
Some researchers have referred to “the great unlitigated reservoir” and have warned that such 
practices may actually significantly increase lawsuits and costs.[25] 
 
It is widely agreed, however, that disclosing medical errors and apologising to harmed 
patients is the ethical thing to do, regardless of whether it decreases or increases the incidence 
of litigation.[3] Indeed, the disclosure of errors has evolved over the past two decades 
internationally from a strategic response to rising legal costs focusing on organisational risk 
minimisation, to an ethical practice seeking to re-establish trust by meeting patients’ needs 
and expectations following an error.  
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While disclosure cannot be done in isolation and has to be integrated into risk management 
and liability insurance programs,[21] the reported current practice of at least some liability 
insurance companies in Switzerland of inhibiting hospitals and clinicians from 
communicating with harmed patients after an error is concerning and requires further 
investigation.  
 
Participants identified two different self-insurance approaches that could be taken by hospitals 
to increase flexibility regarding error communication: 1) hospitals could raise their current 
self-insured retained limits, or, 2) hospitals could move to full self-insurance and not have 
liability insurance at all. The fact that some large public hospitals have decided to not have 
liability insurance, and others are currently considering this option, may suggest that there is 
dissatisfaction among some Swiss hospitals with the service liability insurance companies are 
currently providing. Indeed, an article in the May 2011 issue of Gesundheitstipp entitled 
“Hospital liability: Little benefit - despite high premiums” noted that “the satisfaction of the 
hospitals [regarding liability insurance] is crumbling. The Lausanne Universitätsspital Chuv 
terminated its liability insurance three years ago.”[26] Furthermore, it was reported that as 
insurance companies usually only pay when there is no alternative, patients are often forced to 
go to court, though few can afford this. Margrit Kessler, President of the Stiftung SPO 
Patientenschutz, therefore felt that the move away from liability insurance was not only better 
for hospitals as it saved them money, but also for patients: “Although the Canton of Vaud no 
longer has liability insurance, the compensation of patients works better there than in other 
Cantons. In case of an error, the Chuv pays for follow ups as well as compensation without 
any grumbling.”[26] Both of the options identified by participants may therefore not only 
save hospitals money on insurance premiums, but also improve the situation for patients by 
allowing hospitals to pursue disclosure and apology programs, and early compensation 
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programs. It remains to be seen, however, if the majority of Swiss hospitals have the desire, 
and courage, to pursue such programs. However, it should be noted that even if hospitals 
move away from liability insurance, physicians in the private sector will still be under an 
obligation on to have their own liability insurance, due to Article 40h of the Swiss Medical 
Professions Law.  
 
It is therefore interesting to note that internationally, legislation has been widely enacted in 
the United States (36 states and the District of Columbia), Australia (all 8 states and 
territories), and Canada (8 out of 10 provinces and 2 out of 3 territories) to prevent 
“apologies” given after an “incident” from being used in various legal processes.[26-29] A 
number of these apology laws also specifically address the issue of liability insurance. For 
instance, legislation in Canada states that an apology “does not, despite any wording to the 
contrary in any contract of insurance and despite any other enactment, void, impair or 
otherwise affect any insurance coverage that is available, or that would, but for the apology, 
be available, to the person in connection with that matter.”[30] While some international legal 
scholars have questioned the need for apology laws in general, they have acknowledged that 
these particular provisions regarding liability insurance may be a good idea if these fears are 
found to be justified.[31]  
 
An example that may be more relevant for Switzerland is the 2008 addition in Germany of 
section 105 of the Insurance Contract Law Act (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz), which provides 
that insurance agreements that include “cooperation clauses” are now invalid. In principle, 
German clinicians are now free to speak to patients about the incident, give them a report of 
the facts, and express regret, and may also accept liability without losing their insurance 
cover.[32] Further research is needed in Switzerland to establish whether the loss of liability 
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insurance coverage for apologising to harmed patients is a significant enough issue to warrant 
the implementation of such legal protection. 
 
Limitations 
This was a qualitative study that did not aim at collecting statistically representative data. It 
was carried out in one European Country. However, given the international network of 
liability insurances, it is likely that a similar influence on medical error communication exists 
in other European countries. Although we have no proof that our interviewees have correctly 
described the reality there is no particular reason to doubt that their perceptions describe a 
significant part of the reality in Switzerland. Indeed, the fact that we interviewed experts from 
different fields that have experience with medical errors makes it likely that we captured at 
least some part of the reality viewed from different sides. A bias might exist towards the 
reporting of socially desirable attitudes. Given our results that are rather critical of current 
practice, we believe that such a bias is unlikely to be of significant size. The fact that many 
medical interviewees were not aware of any influence of liability insurance on the 
communication of medical errors can be interpreted as a limitation. At the same time, this is 
an important finding and should motivate further studies in this field. 
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Abstract 
Background: There is often a mismatch between patients’ desire to be informed about errors 
and clinical reality. In closing the “disclosure gap” an understanding of the views of all 
members of the healthcare team regarding errors and their disclosure to patients is needed. 
However, international research on nurses’ views regarding this issue is currently limited. 
Objectives: Explore nurses’ attitudes and experiences concerning disclosing errors to patients 
and perceived barriers to disclosure. 
Design: Inductive, exploratory study employing semi-structured interviews with participants, 
followed by conventional content analysis in which investigators read and discussed 
transcribed data to identify important themes.  
Settings: Nursing departments from hospitals in two German-speaking cantons in 
Switzerland. 
Participants: Purposive sample of 18 nurses from a range of fields, positions in 
organisational hierarchy, work experience, hospitals, and religious perspectives.  
Methods: Data were collected via individual, face-to-face interviews using a researcher-
developed semi-structured interview guide. Interviews were transcribed in German and 
analysed using the qualitative data analysis software package Atlas-Ti (Berlin) and 
conventional content analysis. The most illustrative quotes were translated into English. 
Results: Nurses generally thought that patients should be informed about every error, but 
only a very few nurses actually reported disclosing errors in practice. Indeed, many nurses 
reported that most errors are not disclosed to the patient. Nurses identified a number of 
barriers to error disclosure that have already been reported in the literature among all 
clinicians, such as legal consequences and the fear of losing patients’ trust. However, nurses 
in this study more frequently reported personal characteristics and a lack of guidance from the 
organisation as barriers to disclosure. Both issues suggest the need for a systematic 
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institutional approach to error disclosure in which the decision to inform the patient stems 
from within the organisation and is not shouldered by individual nurses alone. 
Conclusions: Our study suggests that hospitals need to do more to support and train nurses in 
relation to error disclosure. Such measures as hospitals establishing a disclosure support 
system, providing background disclosure education, ensuring that disclosure coaching is 
available at all times, and providing emotional support for all parties involved, would likely 
go a long way to address the barriers identified by nurses. 
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8.1. Introduction 
While there has been a dramatic change in the approach to medical errors internationally over 
the last decade, with a new ethic of transparency replacing the traditional customs of secrecy 
and denial, there remains a large “disclosure gap” between patients’ preferences to be told 
about errors and current practice (Gallagher and Lucus, 2005). International studies 
examining clinicians’ views regarding error disclosure have consistently found a number of 
barriers that contribute to nondisclosure, including legal fears, a professional and 
organisational culture of secrecy and blame, clinicians lacking confidence in their 
communication skills, clinicians fearing that patients will experience distress, and doubt about 
the efficacy and effectiveness of disclosure (Iedema et al., 2011; O’Connor et al., 2010). 
 
The disclosure of errors to patients has tended to have been conceptualised as occurring 
primarily in the physician-patient dyad, and previous international research on the issue has 
mainly focused on physicians’ and patients’ attitudes and experiences (Shannon et al., 2009). 
Healthcare, however, “is delivered by interprofessional teams, in which nurses share in the 
culpability for errors, and hence, in responsibility for disclosure” (Shannon et al., 2009, 5). 
Indeed, there is growing evidence that patients and families actually prefer to have an 
interprofessional approach to disclosure (Iedema et al., 2008). In addressing the “disclosure 
gap” an understanding of the views of all members of the healthcare team is needed. 
International research on nurses’ views regarding errors and disclosing errors to patients, 
however, is currently limited (O’Connor et al., 2010; Shannon et al., 2009). 
 
Shannon and colleagues’ 2009 focus group study conducted in the United States was one of 
the first to systematically explore nurses’ attitudes and experiences regarding error disclosure 
to patients (Shannon et al., 2009). The study indicated that nurses routinely independently 
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disclose nursing errors that did not involve serious harm, but believed that the disclosure of 
serious harm was the responsibility of the attending physician. While nurses wanted to be 
involved in the disclosure process, both as a professional courtesy and to enable them to 
communicate more honestly with patients about the error that had occurred, nurses were 
usually not involved in the discussion among the team to plan for the disclosure or in the 
actual disclosure, which could place them in ethically compromising situations (Shannon et 
al., 2009).  
 
Similarly, Hobgood and colleagues’ 2006 survey of U.S. emergency medicine providers 
(physicians, nurses and out of hospital providers) found that nurses were less likely to disclose 
errors to patients than physicians (59% versus 71%) (Hobgood et al., 2006). Jeffs and 
colleagues’ qualitative study in 2011 also found that Canadian nurses perceived their role in 
team-based error disclosure as secondary and as balancing professional boundaries, but also 
reported frustration and distress when not fully involved (Jeffs et al., 2011). However, in 
2010, Jeffs and colleagues explored Canadian nurses’ (as well as physicians’ and surgeons’) 
perceptions of team-based error disclosure using an educational simulation intervention 
through qualitative interviews (Jeffs et al., 2010). Participants’ views revealed a tension 
between team-based error disclosure as an unrealistic, forced practice and as a realistic, 
beneficial endeavour. The authors concluded that “a team-based approach to disclosure is not 
realistic or necessary for all error situations…[h]owever, when the error involves a variety of 
health care professionals interacting with the patient, a team-based approach is beneficial to 
them and the patient” (Jeffs et al., 2010, i57). Additionally, Brazilian nurses’ perceptions and 
general attitudes towards adverse events were examined through qualitative interviews by 
Freitas and colleagues in 2011. Nurses thought that decisions regarding the communication of 
adverse events were determined by the severity of the error (Freitas et al., 2011). 
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Research on this issue in Continental Europe, however, is particularly limited. In a 2004 
survey study in Denmark, Andersen and colleagues found significant differences between 
what patients want after an adverse event and what nurses and doctors believe that patients 
want (Andersen et al., 2004). For instance, both professional groups underestimated the extent 
to which patients desire an admission of error from the staff involved. While 60% of patients 
thought it was exceptionally important that they are informed about errors, only 32% of 
nurses and 28% of doctors believed that patients would think it is exceptionally important 
(Andersen et al., 2004). 
 
Nurses’ views concerning disclosing errors to patients remain poorly understood, particularly 
in Continental Europe. This represents a potential obstacle to efforts to improve error 
communication. This study therefore seeks to advance our understanding regarding nurses’ 
attitudes and experiences concerning disclosing errors to patients and perceived barriers to 
disclosure. 
 
8.2. Methods 
The methods of the study are presented in accordance with the “Consolidated criteria for 
reporting qualitative research” (COREQ) (Tong et al., 2007).  
 
Research team and reflexivity 
Interviews were conducted by M.D., a male medical student, who had limited previous 
experience in qualitative research. He had received the usual training offered for medical 
students to prepare their medical master’s thesis. No relationship was established between 
M.D. and the participants prior to the study, and participants received limited information 
about M.D. There was no hierarchical relationship between MD and the study participants and 
169 
 
we are not aware of any particular biases of M.D. concerning the research topic. S.M. has 
previous training and experience in qualitative research (McLennan and Elger, 2014), L.E.R. 
is experienced in computer-aided qualitative data analysis, and B.E. has a longstanding 
experience with qualitative studies (Ritter and Elger, 2013: Wangmo, T., Handtke, V., Elger, 
B.S., 2014; Wangmo et al., 2014).   
 
Study design 
The theoretical framework employed in this study was conventional content analysis (Hsieh 
and Shannon, 2005). We primarily selected participants through purposive sampling, in order 
to ensure that participants were from different backgrounds and to capture a variety of 
experiences. We sought nurses from a range of fields, positions in organisational hierarchy, 
work experience, hospitals, and religious perspectives. We also identified additional 
participants using a snowball approach, particularly through well-connected interviewees.  
 
We approached the heads of several nursing departments from hospitals of various sizes and 
types in two German-speaking cantons in Switzerland in February 2012 via email or 
telephone. We then asked those willing to participate to name possible interviewees. 
Suggested participants were contacted via email with information regarding the interviews, 
anonymity and our institute. A total of 18 nurses agreed to participate in the study. One 
nursing department refused to participate; no reasons were provided other than they were not 
interested. No participants dropped out of the study. Interviews were held between February 
and May 2012. We offered to all participants that the interview be held in a private office of a 
university library close to the hospitals. Approximately half of the participants chose this 
option, while the other half chose to be interviewed in their respective hospitals, typically on 
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their own ward, in a private room. Only the participant and the researcher were present during 
the interview. 
 
A semi-structured interview guide about nurses’ attitudes and experiences with error 
disclosure and perceived barriers was developed. At the beginning of the interview, we 
provided nurses with definitions of errors that are well-established in the literature (Gallagher 
et al., 2006). Questions used to prompt discussion in the semi-structured conversations 
included: Are errors a serious problem in nursing? Are errors usually caused by failures of the 
health care delivery system or by failures of individuals? Have you received training 
regarding error disclosure? Should errors (near misses, minor errors and serious errors) be 
disclosed to the patient? What barriers do you see for error disclosure? Based on the first 2 
interviews which did not show any problems, we decided that no further piloting or adaptation 
of the interview guide was necessary. No repeat interviews were carried out. Interviews were 
audio recorded and M.D. made written field notes of key issues that arose during the 
interview. Interviews lasted an average of 35 minutes. After 18 interviews the question about 
data saturation arose and was discussed by the research team. It was agreed that concerning 
the main themes saturation was reached and that no new major discrepancies were coming up 
during the interviews. In sum, the research team concluded that saturation was reached in the 
content and attitudes expressed by the participants on the main themes and no other major 
issues regarding error disclosure were not at least broached. Transcriptions of the interviews 
were not returned to the participants.  
 
Interviews were conducted in Alemannic German or High German, depending on the 
participant’s preference. We transcribed all recordings verbatim using High German diction to 
make texts consistent as dialects are diverse and there is no standard diction with adequate 
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comprehension. Language barriers between researchers and participants can present 
significant methodological challenges, and Squires (2009) has identified a number of 
recommendations for cross-language qualitative research. Our approach largely fulfilled these 
recommendations. Conceptual Equivalence: Participants were able to talk in their native 
language and common terms were provided at the beginning of the interviews. Translations 
were not validated externally. Translator Credentials: M.D., the interviewer and translator, is 
a German native speaker and has worked as a German language teacher in Switzerland 
(specialising in the particular differences in German dialects) and, as a medical student, also 
shared to a large extent the professional language of participants. Translator’s Role: M.D. 
conducted and transcribed the interviews, translating from Alemannic German into High 
German where necessary. Analysis was done on the High German transcription. Methods: All 
participants came from a linguistically homogeneous area, in which both Alemannic and High 
German are omnipresent in their professional environment, and were able to discuss their 
thoughts in their preferred idiom.  
 
Analysis and findings 
Using the interview transcriptions and the qualitative data analysis software package Atlas-Ti 
(Berlin), M.D. performed conventional content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), focusing 
on themes common across participants as well as those unique to individuals that may offer 
insight into differences in perspectives and discrepancies in practice. Initial themes discovered 
in the interviews were labelled using a process of open coding (i.e., no specific preconceived 
codes were identified or used; rather, codes emerged directly from the data). The other 
investigators [S.M., L.E.R., B.E.] reviewed the initial analysis to clarify and refine codes, and 
conversations among the investigators continued until coding differences were resolved and 
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consensus was achieved. The completed master’s thesis was provided to the participants. A 
number of participants replied with only positive and supportive feedback. 
 
8.3. Results 
 
Characteristics of Respondents  
.Of the 18 nurses interviewed, 17 were female. Participants’ work experience ranged from 4 
to 35 years (mean 20.7), and they had been employed by their current hospital for 2 to 35 
years (mean 17.5). They worked in nine different specialties (internal medicine, surgery, 
intensive care, oncology, haematology, obstetrics and gynaecology, neurology, paediatrics 
and geriatrics) and held various hierarchical positions. For this reason, only ten of the nurses 
spent more than half of their working time with patients directly. Two interviewees reported 
that they only worked administratively (Table 1). 
 
Attitudes and Experiences Concerning Disclosing Errors to Patients 
With regards to whether errors should be disclosed to the patient, most nurses made a 
distinction between the ideal and the actual situation. In general, nurses stated that patients 
should be informed about every error, a position grounded on a principle of transparency or 
trust. However, only a very few nurses actually reported disclosing errors in practice. Indeed, 
many nurses reported that most errors are not disclosed to the patient: “Honestly, no, I don’t 
think so. Most errors are not communicated to the patient” N6 
 
However, among those nurses who had experienced disclosing errors, a substantial number of 
them on reflection reported, often with some surprise, that this had actually increased the 
patients’ trust. As one nurse explained: “That is why we always go back and inform the 
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patient. And we also always tell them exactly what we do next, so that the error does not 
happen again. The same applies also for the relatives. So far this has always gone well. And 
when people lose confidence because of an error: this is not even happening to me now. On 
the contrary, when…we notice something and we go and tell them, this is rather considered a 
mark of confidence” N9 
 
Nurses often implicitly perceived error disclosure as being primarily the physician’s duty due 
to team hierarchies. . However, it was reported that errors could be “camouflaged” by both 
doctors and nurses. Moreover this behaviour was said to concern both minor and serious 
errors: “If I think it could have been a serious error that might have caused this damage to the 
patient, it will be explained differently or in a way the patient cannot realise” N6 
 
While nurses thought that near misses should be reported to the team so processes could be 
analysed to identify opportunities to improve the quality of care, none of the nurses 
interviewed advocated disclosing near misses to patients. It was often thought that the need 
for communication starts when the patient is affected. For others, the threshold for disclosure 
was dependent on how the severity of damage caused by the error was perceived by staff: “In 
general, the patient clearly has the right [to be informed], whether it is a small or a big error. 
But when errors happen that have no effect on the patient, when nothing happens - small 
errors that have no effect, or the patient would not see the error as an error - then we would 
not tell” P7 
 
Nurses stated they would inevitably disclose errors which significantly impaired the patient, 
but that there was often disagreement within the team at how to evaluate this significance. 
Nurses also reported that decisions regarding disclosure can also be affected by the type of 
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patient involved. Nurses felt that disclosure should ideally be accordance with the patient’s 
will and often perceived signals not to inform particular patients in detail: “You perceive this 
when dealing with patients; there are people who prefer not to know. And you need to 
somehow develop a sure instinct not to burden them” N8 
 
Most nurses reported that they had not received specific training explicitly in relation to the 
disclosure of errors to patients. However, many nurses reported having completed general 
courses on communication in difficult situations at various stages of their education. While 
some of these courses were said to cover disclosure techniques, they did so only 
subordinately. Most nurses, however, expressed a distinct need for more education on this 
issue: “Communication is already a major focus in our training. But how do you do that when 
you have committed an error? This is not precise I believe. It has never been substantiated. I 
think that's strange and uncomfortable for everybody” N7 
 
Barriers to Disclosure 
Nurses reported a range of barriers to error disclosure which related to difficulties in defining 
errors, individual personality and fears, organisational considerations and patient 
characteristics. 
 
A number of nurses reported that a barrier to disclosure was that it is sometimes difficult to 
even know if an error has occurred. As one nurse explained: “Moreover, it is often hard to tell 
what really is an error. There are also many complications that you might have foreseen – 
maybe not. It is difficult to define. You cannot say: there is something happening that is 
wrong” N1 
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It was also often called a matter of personal character whether or not someone would disclose 
an error. Various traits were seen to inhibit disclosure, including shame, a focus on self-
protection, and a lack of self-awareness and self-confidence: “A matter of character. How 
does one approach this incident and come to terms with it. I think this is the first decisive 
point: will one disclose it at all or not…The person concerned will always think of themselves 
first” N7 
 
Many nurses named various personal fears as potential barriers. Some were afraid of losing 
the patients’ trust or causing patients distress when they are already in a complex situation. 
Fears of punishment or legal consequences were seen by some nurses as a barrier to error 
disclosure, while others explicitly said that they did not to consider the legal consequences 
when dealing with errors: “The common working culture can be beneficial or also hindering. 
For example if you have to fear reprisal once you disclose an error, that this falls back on a 
person who is then ostracised or even loses their job” N13 
 
A number of organisational considerations were identified by nurses as obstacles to being 
open about errors to patients. Most often mentioned as a barrier was a missing open culture in 
the organisation concerning errors as well as a lack of guidance from policies or heads of 
department. Nurses reported that their clinical schedule could mean a lack of time for 
extensive disclosure and that if errors have to be explained by staff in a different shift or 
department this could lead to denials. The risk of discrediting their hospital or department was 
named as another reason by nurses to cover up cases. Nurses saw penalties and sanctions as 
clearly counterproductive in identifying and responding to errors, but a number had witnessed 
such consequences in relation to colleagues. 
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Finally, certain patients were reported to evoke concealment of errors. Nurses reported that if 
the patient was post-narcotic, mildly confused or had other forms of cognitive impairment 
then they would hesitate to disclose an error to him or her. Furthermore, nurses reported that 
other factors such as aggressive or demanding behaviour from patients and language barriers 
could cause insufficient information being provided after an error: “Persons who speak 
clearly and German and have a confident appearance and always know what they want will 
be treated completely different from families who do not speak German or ask, but just wait” 
N18   
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1 Data are given as mean (year range). 
 
  
Table 1. Characteristics of the Respondents 
Characteristic N (%) 
Female 17 (94) 
Years in practice1 20.7 (4-35) 
Years at hospital1 17.5 (2-35) 
Position  
Nursing expert 
Director of nursing department 
Head of ward 
Ward nurse 
2 (11) 
3 (17) 
5 (28) 
8 (44) 
% Of time in direct patient contact  
0 
1-25 
26-50 
51-75 
76-100 
2 (11) 
2 (11) 
4 (22) 
5 (28) 
5 (28) 
178 
 
8.4. Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first time that qualitative interviews have been used in Europe to 
explore nurses’ attitudes and experiences concerning disclosing errors to patients. Nurses 
generally thought that patients should be informed about every error, but only a very few 
nurses actually reported disclosing errors in practice. Indeed, many nurses reported that most 
errors are not disclosed to the patient. Nurses identified a number of barriers to error 
disclosure that have already been reported in the literature among all clinicians, such as legal 
consequences and the fear of losing patients’ trust. However, nurses in this study more 
frequently reported personal characteristics and a lack of guidance from the organisation as 
barriers to disclosure. 
 
It is well known that there is a mismatch between patients’ desire for disclosure of errors and 
clinical reality; with clinicians typically endorsing disclosure in principle but often do not 
share information in practice (Gallagher and Lucus, 2005). This applied to our sample as well. 
While it is encouraging that nurses recognised patients’ right to be informed about errors that 
occur in their care, a majority thought that many errors were concealed from patients. This is 
concerning as there is an ethical responsibility to maintain honest communication with 
patients and their families even in cases of errors, and studies conducted internationally have 
indicated that patients are virtually unanimous in wanting all harmful errors disclosed 
(Gallagher et al., 2003; Iedema et al., 2008). 
 
Nurses identified a number of barriers to error disclosure that have already been reported in 
the literature (Iedema et al., 2011; O’Connor et al., 2010). However, while some nurses did 
report legal consequences and the fear of losing patients’ trust as a barrier, many reported just 
the opposite. Many nurses explicitly said they were not concerned about legal consequences 
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and most of those who had previously disclosed an error reported that it had enhanced the 
patient’s trust. Nurses have a key role in creating trustful environments in healthcare and 
previous studies have reported an “error-trust” relation among nurses. Schwappach and 
colleagues, for instance, examined oncology nurses’ perceptions about involving patients in 
the prevention of chemotherapy administration errors in 2010 (Schwappach et al., 2010). It 
was found that nurses were very positive about involving patients in safety and this was seen 
to be compatible with trustful relationships. 
 
Nurses in this study, however, were more likely to report that personal characteristics and a 
lack of guidance from the organisation as barriers to disclosure. Both issues suggest the need 
for a systematic institutional approach to error disclosure in which the decision to inform the 
patient stems from within the organisation and is not shouldered by individual nurses alone. 
Disclosing an error to a patient is one of the most complex and difficult conversations that 
occurs in healthcare and the need to support and train clinicians in relation to this process has 
been widely recognised internationally (Gallagher et al., 2007; Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute, 2008; Truog et al., 2010; Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2013).  
 
While hospitals in a number of countries are known to have developed comprehensive 
disclosure support systems and are often required to have an error disclosure policy as a part 
of accreditation (Truog et al., 2010), little is known about the situation in Continental Europe. 
However, it appears that many European hospitals are under no obligation to have disclosure 
policies and policies and support systems are often lacking. For instance, a recent Swiss 
survey found that only 46% of responding hospitals currently have a disclosure policy 
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(McLennan et al., 2013), while a German survey found that only 22% of responding hospitals 
currently have a policy (Lauterberg et al., 2012).  
 
This shortage of guidance and support in relation to error disclosure is likely to be 
exacerbated by nurses’ lack of disclosure training. Indeed, Jeffs and colleagues have 
previously suggested that nurses minimal involvement in the disclosure process “may be a 
result of limited disclosure training, which renders them unprepared for engaging in difficult 
conversations with each other and with patients” (Jeffs et al., 2011, 321).  However, given the 
large number of clinicians who could be involved in a serious medical error at any time, there 
are difficulties involved in training all of them to be able to hold these discussions well and 
any moment. In light of this challenge, the Harvard hospitals decided “to endorse an approach 
that would assure the “just-in-time” availability of expertise and help by concentrating our 
educational efforts on a small number of disclosure “coaches” who would be available to all 
clinicians within the institution on a 24/7 basis” (Truog et al., 2010, 59). In nursing, Shannon 
and colleagues have previously proposed a similar approach in suggesting that nurse 
managers could be trained to coach disclosure in their team (Shannon et al., 2009). 
 
Limitations 
This study has some limitations. Participating nurses came from hospitals situated in just two 
German speaking Swiss cantons. However, the percentage of nurses who come from adjacent 
European countries is known to be considerable in the two cantons. We therefore have 
reasons to believe that our sample represents a variety of views that go beyond a typical 
“Swiss” culture. We cannot exclude that results might vary from those in other parts of the 
country with different regional culture. Coding, however, showed a reasonable variety 
compared to findings from the United States and Canada. The translation of all interviews into 
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High German dictation may have affected results by causing a loss of meaning. However, as 
participants were able to talk in their native language and idiomatic phrasing was kept 
wherever possible, with only minor grammatical adaptations being made, we think any affect 
will be minor. As sampling was done purposefully and by recommendations from the nursing 
administration our study might be biased towards the opinions of explicitly committed nurses. 
No interviewee reported having personally committed a serious error however a few said they 
had witnessed a serious error by a colleague. Additionally, only one male nurse was included. 
Although this mirrors the female dominance in the profession and the fact that serious errors 
remain infrequent, limitations of our study could be that perceptions triggered by a 
specifically masculine socialization and drastic individual experiences, respectively, may be 
underrepresented. As is in all interview studies, there is a bias towards the reporting of 
socially desirable attitudes. Many of our results, however, do not reflect socially desirable 
attitudes, such as the findings that patients are often not informed. This is a sign that we were 
able to ensure confidentiality, generate trust, and obtain authentic responses that should be 
taken seriously. 
 
Conclusion  
In closing the “disclosure gap” efforts are required to address barriers to disclosure. Our study 
suggests that Swiss hospitals need to do more to support nurses in relation to error disclosure 
and that training regarding this process is also necessary and desired by nurses. More research 
is needed in Switzerland (and Continental Europe in general) on what exactly is needed in 
relation to these issues. However, European organisation may be able to use the experiences 
of countries more advanced on these issues as a guide to developing and implementing their 
own systems. For instance, the National Quality Forum (NQF) in the United States has 
recommended that hospitals should: establish a disclosure support system, provide 
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background disclosure education, ensure that disclosure coaching is available at all times, and 
provide emotional support for all parties involved (Gallagher et al., 2007). Such measures 
would likely go a long way to address the barriers identified by nurses in this study. Nurses in 
this study often implicitly perceived disclosure as being the duty of the doctor. Further 
research, however, is needed in relation to the role of nurses in the disclosure process vis-à-vis 
physicians. Previous research in the United States and Canada has found that nurses generally 
lack involvement in the disclosure process (Shannon et al., 2009; Jeffs et al., 2011). Jeffs and 
colleagues (2011) note that this subject relates to well-understood issues of power and 
hierarchy within healthcare teams. However, when errors occur in which nurses have been 
involved in some way, it will likely be beneficial to all parties if nurses are involved in the 
disclosure process. An understanding of how this can best be achieved in European countries 
would be helpful. 
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Abstract 
The issue of open disclosure has received growing attention from policy makers, legal experts 
and academic researchers, predominantly in a number of English speaking countries. While 
implementing open disclosure in practice is still an on-going process, open disclosure now 
forms an integral part of health policy in various American states, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with a number of measures having been put in place to 
encourage open disclosure and to mitigate some of the barriers to such open communication. 
In contrast, this issue has received little attention in non-English speaking countries and there 
is currently no empirical data relating to actual practice or practitioners’ attitudes and views in 
most countries in continental Europe. This article critically examines Germany’s current 
approach to open disclosure. It finds that the issue plays no significant role in German health 
policy with very limited measures explicitly concerning such communication currently in 
place. While a number of aspects of the wider regulatory framework appear to be supportive, 
Germany is still in the early stages of a systematic approach and additional measures are 
required to further promote open disclosure within the self-governing German healthcare 
system. This exploration provides an example of a non-English speaking country’s approach 
to open disclosure and may be of particular interest to neighbouring German-speaking and 
civil law countries such as Switzerland and Austria. 
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Open disclosure is the prompt, compassionate, and honest communication with patients and 
families following a healthcare incident that has resulted in harm. [1-3] While the open 
disclosure process can vary, it typically includes: an acknowledgment; an expression of regret 
or an apology; an investigation into the incident; providing a factual explanation of what 
happened; and explaining the steps being taken to manage the incident and prevent 
recurrence.[1, 2] The issue has received growing attention from policy makers, legal experts 
and academic researchers, predominantly in a number of English speaking countries.  
 
9.1. The development of open disclosure 
The practice of maintaining “a humanistic, care-giving attitude with those who had been 
harmed, rather than respond[ing] in a defensive and adversarial manner” was first articulated 
at Montreal Hospital.[4] Soon after this in 1989, Dr Steve Kraman, faced with a highly 
litigious environment and rising legal costs, began openly sharing incident information at the 
Veteran Affairs Hospital in Lexington. This approach not only led to a significant reduction in 
complaints and legal costs, but has improved collaboration within the healthcare relationship. 
[5,6] Similarly, Rick Boothman has achieved impressive results with disclosure in a very 
challenging legal environment at the Michigan Health Centre. [7]  
 
The disclosure of healthcare incidents, however, has evolved over the past two decades from a 
strategic response to rising legal costs focusing on organisational risk minimisation, to an 
ethical practice seeking to re-establish trust by meeting patients’ needs and expectations 
following an incident and to improve the quality of care. The Massachusetts Coalition for the 
Prevention of Medical Errors’ 2006 document ‘When Things Go Wrong’, for instance, was 
explicit in privileging ethical considerations over legal, financial and reputational issues.[3]  
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9.2. Barriers to open disclosure 
There is, however, currently a large divergence between patients’ preferences to be told about 
healthcare errors and current practice. While health practitioners typically endorse disclosure 
in principle, they often do not share information in practice, with studies suggesting that as 
few as 30% of harmful errors are disclosed to patients.[8] 
 
The most often cited barrier to open and honest communication following an incident is the 
fear of legal liability – that communication may lead to a lawsuit against them, a lack of legal 
protection when providing information and apologies, and the potential loss of liability 
insurance if they say too much or the wrong thing.[8,9] 
 
Legal concerns, however, are not the only factor that may lead practitioners not to disclose 
incidents. Indeed, such concerns can often disguise deeper emotional fears. John Banja, for 
instance, has argued that a harm-causing error can be such an assault to the practitioner’s 
sense of competency and adequacy that various protective, self-regarding, and defensive 
psychological responses can be triggered which can often lead to open communication being 
avoided altogether or conducted inadequately.[9]  
 
9.3. Regulating open disclosure 
Open disclosure now forms an integral part of health legislation and policy in a number of 
English speaking countries, with various measures having been put in place to encourage 
disclosure and mitigate some of the barriers to such communication – a reflection also of the 
increasing focus on the systems approach to errors in healthcare.[10]  
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Governmental and organisational standards and policies have been developed to promote a 
clear and consistent approach to open disclosure in various American states,[11] the United 
Kingdom,[1] Canada,[12] Australia,[2] and New Zealand.[13] A number of American states 
have also implemented specific “disclosure laws” which mandate disclosure in certain 
circumstances, and “apology laws” to protect the communication from being used in a legal 
action as proof of the practitioner’s negligence.[14] In addition, professional organisations’ 
ethics standards in these countries often explicitly endorse open disclosure.[9] 
 
Such measures are, of course, no panacea; there remains a challenge of translating statements 
of principle into practice, which is an on-going process in these countries. However, such 
interventions can play an important role in influencing professional, national and 
organisational cultures, which have a significant effect on the practice, values and individual 
attitudes in a workplace. While these cultures are dynamic, they also have considerable inertia 
which requires both strong interventions and time to change. [15] 
 
Indeed, research in these English speaking countries suggests that these measures are making 
a difference. Rick Iedema and his team in Australia, for instance, have found that the 
disclosure of incidents is becoming more frequent and that one of the driving forces behind 
this change has been state and health provider policies, along with the increase of specially 
trained staff.[16] 
 
9.4. Open disclosure in Germany 
In contrast to the English speaking countries described above, the issue of open disclosure 
currently plays no significant role in German health policy. While the importance of reporting 
incidents as part of quality improvement programmes has been recognised, lacking from the 
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ongoing discussion has been the emphasis of the needs of patients in such situations. 
Although there was a factorial survey of the general public regarding medical errors in 
2004,[17] there is currently no empirical data relating to patients’ or practitioners’ attitudes 
and views regarding open disclosure, and very little is known about current practice. Indeed, 
open disclosure has not yet received a lot of attention in non-English speaking countries in 
general. There is, for instance, currently no empirical data relating to actual practice or 
patients’ and practitioners’ attitudes and views in most countries in continental Europe. 
 
Wider Context 
Before examining open disclosure in Germany it is helpful to have an understanding of the 
wider context in which this discussion is situated. 
 
While commentators agree that a US-style malpractice crisis has not occurred in Germany, 
and is unlikely to do so, the increase in malpractice litigation is an issue of concern. [18] The 
increase of litigation began reasonably early in Germany, with approximately 6000 claims a 
year already being made by the end of the 1970s (compared to the 500 claims a year in 
England estimated by the Pearson report in the mid-1970s). The current figure is estimated to 
be around 20,000 to 35,000 (a recent study suggests around 6000 claims a year are made in 
England). The average cost of claims in Germany, including those settled or abandoned, also 
trebled between 1981 and 2001, and in some specialities like gynaecology the increase has 
been six-fold. [18] The associated increase in liability insurance premiums for health 
professionals has received growing attention [19] 
 
It was in response to the increase in malpractice cases and a growing climate of distrust 
between doctors and patients that had emerged, that led to the Expert Commissions and 
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Arbitration Boards (Gutachterkommissionen und Schlichtungsstellen) being established in 
1975 by the State Medical Associations (Landesärztekammern). This process provides free 
expert appraisal and extrajudicial conciliation where all parties consent to proceedings The 
use of this mechanism has steadily increased over time, with a quarter of all suspected cases 
of medical liability now being assessed by the Expert Commissions and Arbitration Boards, 
and their non-binding decisions enjoy high acceptance rates (approximately 90% of all cases 
settled).[20] While data from the Expert Commissions and Arbitration Boards is pooled in the 
national Medical Error Reporting System (MERS) for systematic learning, the adversarial 
proceedings themselves are focused on establishing whether or not there is a medical error for 
which the practitioner is liable to pay compensation. 
 
It also appears that many German hospitals are currently not taking a systematic approach to 
medical errors. In 2010, the University of Bonn’s Institute for Patient Safety conducted the 
first detailed national survey concerning the implementation status of clinical risk 
management in German hospitals. The survey was sent to all 1820 German hospitals with 50 
beds or more and had a total of 484 respondents. The results showed that clinical risk 
management and issues of patient safety were an integral part of the agendas for the meetings 
of the hospital management in only 39% of respondents, and staff were regularly offered 
training in clinical risk management in only 25% of respondents.[21] 
 
Current Measures 
There are currently very limited measures explicitly concerning open disclosure in place in 
Germany. There are no governmental (federal or state) laws or policies relating to open 
disclosure. It also appears that the majority of German healthcare organisations do not have 
any internal standards concerning communication with patients and families following an 
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error. The survey conducted by the University of Bonn included a question asking whether 
there is an internal hospital standard which ensures that patients or their relatives are informed 
of serious medical errors resulting in damage promptly and receive an offer of support. Only 
22% of respondents currently have such a standard; 21% have no standard but plan to develop 
one; the remaining 57% have no standard and have no plans to develop one.[21]  
There is also currently no mention of open disclosure in the Federal Medical Association’s 
(Bundesärztekammer) (Model) Professional Code of Conduct, nor in the derived Professional 
Codes of Conduct of the State Medical Associations (Landesärztekammern). 
 
Thomeczek et al. have argued,[22] however, that the wider legal framework that exists in 
Germany is generally supportive of communication with the patient after an incident. Indeed, 
unlike the situation in most English speaking countries, the healthcare relationship under 
German law is almost invariably a contractual one,[18] and the treatment contract places 
obligations on healthcare providers to inform patients of incidents and complications during 
the course of treatment. However, the predominant view is that there is no legal obligation on 
the doctor to inform the patient that they were at fault for the incident or complication.[22]  
 
In 2008, section 105 of the Insurance Contract Law Act (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz), was 
added to provide that insurance agreements that include “non-cooperation” clauses, which 
releases the insurance company from its obligation to pay costs if liability is admitted without 
prior consent, are now invalid. 
 
In principle, practitioners are now free to speak to patients about the incident, give them a 
report of the facts, and express regret, and may also accept liability without losing their 
insurance cover.[22] However, if the practitioner accepts liability for an incident, they may 
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have to prove to their liability insurer that this claim was valid to be covered. Legal 
commentaries therefore recommend that practitioners do not rely on section 105 without 
speaking to their insurance company prior to disclosing incidents to patients.[23] 
Unfortunately, it appears there is currently no consistent approach to this dilemma by the 
liability insurers, therefore denying practitioners legal security.  
 
The legal dilemma is exemplified in a brochure for practitioners by the German Medical 
Insurance (Deutsche Ärzteversicherung) that is entitled “Tips for proper behaviour in a 
liability claim”.[24] While the publication encourages practitioners to speak to the patient as 
soon as possible following an incident, to take the patient’s concerns seriously, and to be 
empathic and compassionate, it also cautions the practitioner not to accept any liability, as this 
could risk their insurance cover. 
 
A positive step forward, however, has been the recent publication by the German Coalition 
for Patient Safety of a brochure entitled ‘Reden ist Gold’, a play on the German saying ‘Talk 
is silver, silence is golden’ (Reden ist Silber, Schweigen ist Gold). The Coalition for Patient 
Safety (Aktionsbündnis Patientensicherheit) (www.aktionsbuendnis-patientensicherheit.de/), 
is a non-profit organisation formed in April 2005 by health professionals, their associations 
and patient organisations to build a common platform to improve patient safety in Germany.  
 
Rather than following its counterparts in Switzerland and Austria, which have translated the 
Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors’ ‘When Things Go Wrong’ into 
German, the Coalition for Patient Safety wanted a more practical guide for practitioners in the 
German context, which includes an outline of the legal situation surrounding such 
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communication. This is intended to provide practitioners with greater clarification and will 
hopefully lead to this issue receiving more attention in the German health system.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the Swiss Patient Safety Foundation (Stiftung für 
Patientensicherheit) (www.patientensicherheit.ch) offers interactive and practical oriented 
workshops concerning communication with patients and families after an incident, something 
that is not currently available in Germany. 
 
Further Possible Measures 
While a number of aspects of the wider legal framework currently in place in Germany are 
supportive of open disclosure and the Coalition for Patient Safety’s brochure is a positive step 
forward, Germany is still in the early stages of a systematic approach and additional measures 
are required to further promote open disclosure.  
 
The need for strong interventions is arguably more important in Germany as it is (just like its 
German-speaking neighbours) seen to be a high ‘Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)’ country. As 
Helmreich and Merritt note, the need for rules in a high UA country is seen as an emotional 
need to resolve ambiguity quickly and leave as little as possible to chance, and that discomfort 
over uncertainty can lead to either “strict adherence to ineffectual rules (rules for rules’ sake) 
or hasty, unreasoned action aimed at alleviating the emotional discomfort associated with the 
uncertainty.”[15] Thus, in the absence of clear guidance and more legal certainty in relation to 
the communication of healthcare incidents to patients in Germany, it appears very unlikely 
that the attitudes and behaviours of practitioners will change towards more transparency and 
openness. 
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It is, however, helpful to put any possible measures in the context of the wider theoretical 
framework for quality assurance that exists in Germany, which is consistent with the logic of 
the German social market economy. While health policy set by the Federal Ministry of Health 
establishes the legal regulatory framework in Germany, the regulatory details are generally set 
by corporatist bodies in the self-governing German healthcare system.[25] It is, therefore, 
very improbable that we will see in Germany the kind of national and state standards and laws 
introduced in some English speaking countries.  
 
Federal Medical Association: The Federal Medical Association (Bundesärztekammer) 
(www.bundesaerztekammer.de/) is the umbrella organisation of medical self-government in 
Germany and represents the professional interests of German doctors. As a working group of 
the 17 State Medical Associations (Landesärztekammern) the Federal Medical Association is 
not a public body itself, but an unincorporated association. The German Medical Assembly 
(Deutscher Ärztetag) is the annual general meeting of the Federal Medical Association and 
acts as the ‘parliament of the medical profession’, including delegates from all the State 
Medical Associations. The German Medical Assembly’s tasks include setting nationwide 
regulations and articulating and adopting positions of health policy. Given the important role 
medical self-government has in Germany, the German Medical Assembly adopting a position 
in support of open disclosure would be highly influential. Such a position could be supported 
by the inclusion of open disclosure in the Federal (Model) Professional Code of Conduct, and 
the respective Codes of Conduct at the State level. 
 
Statutory Health Insurance: Statutory Health Insurance (gesetzliche Krankenversicherung) is 
one of the five pillars of the German social security system under which approximately 90 
percent of the population is insured. The National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
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Funds, together with the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians, the 
National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Dentists and the German Hospital 
Federation forms the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss) (www.g-
ba.de/). The Federal Joint Committee was established on 1 January 2004 by the Statutory 
Health Insurance Modernisation Act and in addition to deciding which benefits are to be 
included in the statutory health insurance catalogue, it has the duty to ensure quality in 
statutory health insurance accredited facilities and decides quality assurance measures for 
outpatient and inpatient healthcare. Since 1 July 2008 following health reforms, the Federal 
Joint Committee has made all decisions in a single cross-sectoral decision-making body 
capacity. By developing directives or guidelines that specifically include open disclosure as 
part of quality assurance, the Federal Joint Committee could set the framework for a broader 
implementation of open disclosure in the German health system. 
 
Federal Ministry of Health: The Federal Ministry of Health is responsible not only for 
maintaining and enhancing the quality of the healthcare system in Germany, but for also 
strengthening the interests of patients. Situated within the Federal Ministry of Health, is the 
Patient Commissioner of the Federal Government (Patientenbeauftragter der 
Bundesregierung), currently Wolfgang Zöller. The Office of the Commissioner 
(www.patientenbeauftragter.de/) was established on 1 January 2004 by the Statutory Health 
Insurance Modernisation Act to support the development of patient rights and publically 
advocate for patients’ interests; particularly in relation to the right to information. Given the 
potential important role of open disclosure in quality improvement, respecting patient rights, 
and reducing errors from escalating into formal complaints or lawsuits, the Patient 
Commissioner should be advocating open disclosure. A first step would be to explicitly 
recognise the patients’ right to be informed about incidents and errors that occur in their 
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treatment. A new patients’ rights law currently being drafted by the Patient Commissioner 
could potentially provide an appropriate framework for this. An additional measure would be 
for the Patient Commissioner to lobby for legislative changes that would address the current 
legal dilemma for health practitioners in relation to accepting responsibility for healthcare 
errors. 
 
9.5. Summary 
Although the ethical, financial and quality improvement benefits of open disclosure have been 
shown in the English speaking world, Germany still needs to provide a more supportive and 
consistent framework that allows practitioner to safely disclose incidents to patients. Without 
clear guidance and a consistent framework that is supportive of open disclosure, it seems 
unlikely that the attitudes and behaviours of practitioners will change towards more 
transparency and openness.  
 
How this could be achieved within the unique structure of the German health system has been 
outlined in this article. Given the important role of medical self-government has in Germany, 
it is important that the Federal Medical Association show leadership on this issue. The 
adoption of a position in support of open disclosure by the German Medical Assembly would 
be highly influential. The Federal Joint Committee could also help set the framework for a 
broader implementation by developing directives or guidelines. Finally, explicitly recognising 
the patients’ rights to be informed about incidents and errors that occur in their treatment in 
the new patients’ right law currently being developed by the Patient Commissioner of the 
Federal Government may help open disclosure receive more attention. 
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Laws protecting open disclosure conversations are unnecessary and a misguided strategy to 
encourage error disclosure. 
 
There has been a dramatic change in the approach to medical errors internationally, with a 
new ethic of transparency replacing the traditional customs of secrecy and denial. Australia 
has been at the forefront of this shift towards openness with Australian health ministers 
endorsing a national Open Disclosure Standard in 2003, which made it clear that there is an 
ethical responsibility to maintain honest communication with patients and their families even 
when things go wrong.1 However, while it is widely agreed that medical errors should be 
disclosed to patients, there is a large “disclosure gap” between expected practice and what is 
actually being done.2 Most research internationally suggests that a primary barrier to 
disclosure is health professionals’ fears regarding legal ramifications.3 Recent studies suggest 
that this is also the case in Australia.3,4 
 
The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care decided to review the 
Standard in 2011, to consider it in light of current research and evidence and to recommend 
changes to it. This resulted in the 2012 publication of the Open Disclosure Standard review 
report5 and a new Australian Open Disclosure Framework consultation draft6 which will 
replace the Standard. With recent research suggesting that saying sorry is a key element of 
successful disclosure practice, the Australian Open Disclosure Framework consultation draft 
specifies that the words “I am sorry” or “we are sorry” should be included in an apology or 
expression of regret. However, it makes clear that speculative statements, admission of 
liability or apportioning of blame must be avoided. It defines apology as “An expression of 
sorrow, sympathy and (where applicable) remorse” and states that “Apology may also include 
an acknowledgment of responsibility, which is not an admission of liability”.6 
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Health professionals and indemnity insurers are often concerned, however, about saying sorry 
because of the fear that it will be seen as an admission of liability.5 Indeed, it was in response 
to an alleged “insurance crisis” in Australia during the period 1999–2002 that a raft of reforms 
were made to tort law.7 Apology laws were part of this package. All Australian states and 
territories have apology laws that protect apologies given after an incident from being used in 
various legal processes, most of which have a broader application than just the medical 
context. These laws generally protect only expressions of regret but not admissions of fault, 
with five laws explicitly excluding admissions of fault, and a sixth doing so implicitly.8 
 
In a review of Australian law, it was concluded that the limited legal protection that existing 
laws provide does little to reduce professionals’ fear that open disclosure increases their 
medicolegal risks — “a perception that likely inhibits the uptake of [open disclosure]”.8 The 
authors argued that this situation presents a strong case for law reform that would provide 
stronger protections directed specifically at the contents of open disclosure conversations, 
concluding: 
 
“in a perfect world, medical ethics should be sufficient to drive health professionals’ 
commitment to [open disclosure], but the reality is that comfort on the medicolegal 
front is likely to prove a useful carrot…”8 
 
In our view, the assumption that such legal protections can narrow the disclosure gap is 
misguided. While medicolegal risk may surely be a factor in professionals’ reluctance to 
disclose errors, we believe that the true reasons are more complex. A range of factors that 
contribute to errors not being disclosed have been identified, including a professional and 
organisational culture of secrecy and blame, professionals lacking confidence in their 
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communication skills and the shame and humiliation associated with acknowledging an error 
— to oneself, one’s patient, and one’s peers.3,9 Making the contents of open disclosure 
conversations legally inadmissible in legal proceedings is therefore unlikely to significantly 
change practice. 
 
Current apology laws are also quite unnecessary. While it remains to be seen what exactly is 
the relationship between open disclosure and professionals’ exposure to legal action,8 apology 
laws do not prevent patients from taking legal action following the disclosure of an error. 
What apology laws do is protect apologies given after an incident from being used in legal 
proceedings. However, the fear that apologies may be used against health professionals in 
legal proceedings to prove negligence is not well founded and does not provide a sound basis 
for implementing such legal protections. As noted in the Open Disclosure Standard review 
report, “Case law in Australia and overseas indicates that courts do not find expressions of 
regret, apologies or admissions of duty of care failures as evidence of liability”.5 
 
Expressions of compassion and solidarity are always appropriate after a patient has 
experienced a tragic outcome. Professionals do not need legal protection for expressing 
sympathy or regret in such circumstances; this simply reflects the professional’s feelings and 
does not prove any of the elements of negligence.10 Indeed, making such expressions 
inadmissible may paradoxically make matters worse — professionals who offer a sincere 
apology generally receive more positive outcomes than those who do not.11 
 
Furthermore, even when a professional has admitted making an error, this alone will be 
insufficient to prove negligence. As the Open Disclosure Standard review report notes: “the 
“determination [of fault] is for the court, not for the parties to make”. In other words, an 
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admission of fault (whether contained within an apology or not) is, in the eyes of the law, 
merely the defendant’s opinion. Whether this opinion is correct must be established by the 
facts, not by what is said…”5 
 
Although laws that make compassion inadmissible in court or protect truthful expressions of 
responsibility are unnecessary, they operate on ethically shaky grounds and risk diminishing 
the value of apologies and fuelling public cynicism towards the medical profession. 
 
Principle 5 of the Australian Open Disclosure Framework consultation draft guiding 
principles, entitled “Supporting clinicians”, states: 
Health service organisations should create an environment in which all staff are: 
• encouraged and able to recognise and report adverse events 
• prepared through training and education to participate in open disclosure 
• supported through the open disclosure process.6 
 
In our view, these measures would have a far greater impact on closing the disclosure gap 
than law reform strengthening already unnecessary legal protections. 
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11.1. Introduction  
There has been an important shift towards openness regarding adverse events and their 
communication to patients. Recent research suggests that saying sorry is a key element of 
successful disclosure practice. However, fear of legal action has been identified as a major 
barrier to issuing an apology in the case of error. With the enforcement of the Northwest 
Territories’ Apology Act on 1 November 2013, apologies are prevented by law from being 
taken into account in any determination of fault or liability, and from voiding, impairing or 
otherwise affecting liability insurance coverage, in 8 out of 10 provinces and 2 out of 3 
territories in Canada. It remains to be seen whether these laws will achieve their goals of 
encouraging apologies and open communication and reducing litigation. We are skeptical that 
apology legislation will lead to substantial improvements in patients’ experiences following 
an adverse event. Disclosing, and apologizing for, an adverse event is one of the most 
complex and difficult conversations to have in healthcare. Therefore, without good training 
and support in this process, apology legislation is unlikely to have much of an impact on the 
behaviour of health care staff.  
 
11.2. The Disclosure of Adverse Events   
Although unfortunate, the reality of healthcare is that clinical outcomes are not always 
optimal, which can lead to patients being harmed. While the most common source of harm is 
the patient’s underlying medical condition,[1] harm can also result from an adverse event: “an 
event which results in unintended harm to the patient, and is related to the care and/or services 
provided to the patient, rather than to the patient’s underlying medical condition.”[2] 
 
In recent decades, the traditional customs of secrecy and denial regarding adverse events have 
been replaced with a new ethic of transparency, particularly concerning disclosing adverse 
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events to patients. Canada has been one of the leaders in an international shift towards 
openness. Indeed, one of the first places that articulated the practice of maintaining “a 
humanistic, care-giving attitude with those who had been harmed, rather than respond[ing] in 
a defensive and adversarial manner” was Montreal Hospital.[3] 
 
Healthcare providers in Canada are now considered to have an ethical, professional and legal 
obligation to disclose adverse events.[1] Since 2004, the Canadian Medical Association’s 
Code of Ethics has specified that physicians should “[t]ake all reasonable steps to prevent 
harm to patients; should harm occur, disclose it to the patient.”[4] The majority of provincial 
medical colleges have incorporated this provision into their codes of ethics, or have 
implemented specific disclosure policies.[5] Legislation mandating disclosure has also been 
enacted in Quebec (in 2002) and Manitoba (in 2005).[6-7] However, disclosure will likely be 
seen as a legal professional obligation even in provinces or territories without such 
legislation,[1] as physicians are seen to be under a common law duty to disclose adverse 
events to patients.[8] Guidance for Canadian healthcare organisations and professionals 
regarding disclosure was also published in two 2008 documents, the Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute’s Canadian Disclosure Guidelines [2] and the Canadian Medical Protective 
Association’s (CMPA) Communicating with your patient about harm: Disclosure of adverse 
events.[1]  
 
11.3. Apologies and the Disclosure Process  
The act of apologizing carries great meaning in wider society as a means of “responding to 
harmed persons’ need for recognition, offering the individual or organisation the opportunity 
to make amends, [and] laying the foundation for a better relationship between both 
parties.”[9] A full apology is typically considered in the literature to include an 
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acknowledgement of the harm caused, an expression of remorse or regret, and an acceptance 
of responsibility.[10] 
 
Recent research has indicated that a full and sincere apology following an adverse event is a 
key element of successful disclosure practice.[9] In Canada, the CMPA recommends that: “At 
the post-analysis disclosure stage, after the analysis of the adverse event is complete and it is 
clear that a health care provider or health care organization is responsible for or has 
contributed to the harm from an adverse event, it is appropriate to acknowledge that 
responsibility and to apologize.”[1]  
 
A recent Australian report stated that, for patients, an apology is the most valued part of open 
disclosure and fundamental in the post-incident reconciliation process,[9] and many believe  
that a full apology can assist the recovery of harmed patients, promote forgiveness and the 
early resolution of disputes, and reduce litigation and legal costs.[9,11] However, it remains 
unclear what the overall impact of wide-spread disclosure and apology practices would be on 
malpractice litigation. While the experiences of isolated hospitals, such as the well-known 
examples of the VA Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, and the University of Michigan, 
suggest that disclosure and apology initiatives may in fact markedly reduce litigation,[12-13] 
some researchers have referred to “the great unlitigated reservoir” and have warned that such 
practices may actually increase lawsuits and costs substantially.[14] Traditionally, individuals 
and organisations have been reluctant to offer apologies in healthcare settings after things go 
wrong and, in many cases lawyers advise against making  an apology.[5] In Canada, 
apologies have been considered risky for two main reasons. First, the risk that an apology 
would be seen as an admission of fault or liability, and second, the risk that an apology would 
void liability insurance coverage.[16] Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that disclosing adverse 
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events and apologizing to harmed patients is the ethical thing to do, regardless of whether it 
decreases or increases rates of litigation.[15] 
 
11.4. Apology Legalisation in Canada  
Apology legislation in Canada, either as a stand‐alone Apology Act or an amendment to other 
legislation, has its origins in a discussion paper published by the Ministry of the Attorney 
General of British Columbia in January 2006.[17] The discussion paper proposed legislation 
that would prevent liability being based on an apology and identified three factors in support 
of such reform: 
 
1. To avoid litigation and encourage the early and cost-effective resolution of disputes.  
2. To encourage natural, open and direct dialogue between people after injuries. 
3. To encourage people to engage in the moral and humane act of apologizing after they 
have injured another and to take responsibility for their actions.[17] 
 
This proposal received wide support and the Apology Act was quickly introduced and passed, 
receiving Royal Assent on 18 May 2006. 
 
British Columbia Apology Act 2006 
Definitions  
1. In this Act: 
“apology” means an expression of sympathy or regret, a statement that one is sorry or any 
other words or actions indicating contrition or commiseration, whether or not the words or 
actions admit or imply an admission of fault in connection with the matter to which the 
words or actions relate. 
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"court" includes a tribunal, an arbitrator and any other person who is acting in a judicial or 
quasi-judicial capacity. 
 
Effect of apology on liability  
2 (1) An apology made by or on behalf of a person in connection with any matter 
(a) does not constitute an express or implied admission of fault or liability by the person in 
connection with that matter, 
(b) does not constitute an acknowledgment of liability in relation to that matter for the 
purposes of section 24 of the Limitation Act, 
(c) does not, despite any wording to the contrary in any contract of insurance and despite any 
other enactment, void, impair or otherwise affect any insurance coverage that is available, or 
that would, but for the apology, be available, to the person in connection with that matter, 
and 
(d) must not be taken into account in any determination of fault or liability in connection 
with that matter. 
(2) Despite any other enactment, evidence of an apology made by or on behalf of a person in 
connection with any matter is not admissible in any court as evidence of the fault or liability 
of the person in connection with that matter. 
 
When applied in the clinical setting, the Act prevents apologies provided to patients and 
families by clinicians following an adverse event from being taken into account in any 
determination of fault or liability, and from voiding, impairing or otherwise affecting liability 
insurance coverage. As the definition of “apology” includes “words or actions admit or imply 
an admission of fault”, the Act not only protects clinicians’ statements of sympathy or regret, 
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“I am sorry this happy to you”, but also statements of fault, “We made a mistake, and we 
regret the suffering it has caused you. We are sorry.” 
 
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) 
have both encouraged all provinces and territories to enact apology legislation.[18] Using 
essentially the same terminology and structure as the British Columbia Act, apology 
legislation has since been enacted in Saskatchewan (amendment to the Evidence Act 2007) 
Manitoba (Apology Act 2007), Alberta (amendment to the Evidence Act 2008), Nova Scotia 
(Apology Act 2008), Ontario (Apology Act 2009) Newfoundland and Labrador (Apology Act 
2009), Nunavut (Apology Act 2010), Prince Edward Island (amendment to the Health Services 
Act 2009, and thus limited to the health sector), and most recently, the Northwest Territories 
(Apology Act 2013). The protection provided extends “both to legal proceedings before courts 
and proceedings before tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies, such as regulatory authority 
(College) disciplinary committees or coroners’ inquests.”[18] Only the provinces of Québec 
and New Brunswick, and the territory of Yukon, do not have apology legislation. 
 
While British Columbia’s legislation took the Australian state of New South Wales’ Civil 
Liability Act 2002 as a model in protecting both expressions of sympathy or regret and 
admissions of fault,[17] most apology legislation that has been enacted internationally – in the 
United States (29 out of the 36 laws) and Australia (6 out of the 8 laws) – only protects 
expressions of sympathy or regret.[19-20].  
 
11.5. Will the legislation achieve its aims? 
We know that honesty, transparency, and apology are essential to rebuild broken trust in the 
doctor patient relationship.[21] Yet, while apology legislation has been proposed as a means 
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of improving patient care after an adverse event, these laws have been in place in Canada for 
too short a time to make a fair or accurate assessment of what effect they will have and if they 
will achieve their goals of encouraging apologies and open communication and reducing 
litigation. Indeed, while legislation protecting post-accident apologies from being used as 
evidence of negligence has been in place in some U.S. states since 1986,[22] it also remains 
unclear there what impact these laws are having as key data are seldom systematically 
collected.[23] 
 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that these laws are not yet having the desired effect in 
Canada. In an article in The Lawyers Weekly on 9 March 2012, it was reported that even with 
the enactment of apology legislation, most counsel were still reluctant to encourage their 
clients to makes apologies. One was quoted as stating “…[i]f I’m not sure that my client can 
avoid a lawsuit by apologizing, I will have trouble recommending an apology as a litigation 
strategy.” Indeed, it was noted that “the legislation is almost incognito. Most counsel have 
never heard of it or have never peeked into it.”[24]  
 
Although apology legislation has been politically attractive in Canada, there is also some 
reason to believe that the legislation, from a legal standpoint, is actually unnecessary. While it 
is true that in the absence of such legislation, an apology can be admitted as evidence in court, 
Canadian legal scholars have noted that this is not as dangerous as widely assumed, 
particularly in the medical context.[25-26] As Tracey Bailey and colleagues noted in their 
2007 critique of Canadian apology laws:  
 
…it appears unlikely that a Canadian court would find a defendant negligent merely 
on the basis of an apology, even where the apology was an admission of fault…[A] 
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doctor may admit to having made an error but whether that error was negligent will be 
determined by whether the physician “exercised the skill, knowledge and judgment of 
the normal prudent practitioner of the same experience and standing”. This 
determination is made in large part on the basis of expert evidence. As a result, we 
would argue that the fear of an apology being used to establish liability is largely 
unfounded. As far as the authors are aware, apologies on their own even where 
accompanied by an admission of fault, have not led to a finding of legal liability in 
Canada.[25]  
 
While apology legislation may be well intentioned and here to stay, we are skeptical that these 
laws will lead to much improvement of the way patients and families experience medical 
error, as we believe that they falsely assume that this is primarily a legal matter rather than 
one grounded in human relationships. Disclosing, and apologizing for, an adverse event is one 
of the most complex and difficult conversations that occur in healthcare.[21] While legal fears 
may surely be a factor in clinicians’ reluctance to apologize, and disclose adverse events in 
general, the true reasons are usually more complex, including a professional and 
organizational culture of secrecy and blame, professionals lacking confidence in their 
communication skills, and the shame and humiliation associated with acknowledging a harm 
causing mistake — to oneself, one’s patient, and one’s peers.[27] Indeed, research published 
in 2006 involving US and Canadian physicians suggest that the legal environment may have a 
more limited impact on physicians’ communication attitudes and practices regarding adverse 
events than often believed, and that the culture of medicine itself may be a more important 
barrier.[28] 
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11.6. What’s the solution? 
For apology legislation to make a difference to the manner and the frequency with which 
apologies are delivered after an adverse event, we believe that health care providers must 
improve the training and support that staff receive in relation to this process. In the United 
States the National Quality Forum (NQF) has endorsed a “safe-practice guideline” for 
disclosure, which recommends, among other things, that hospitals establish a disclosure 
support system, provide background disclosure education, ensure that disclosure coaching is 
available at all times, and provide emotional support for healthcare workers, administrators, 
patients, and families as part of the process.[29] While the CPSI has recognized the 
importance of disclosure education and training,[2] the focus moving forward should be on 
ensuring that all Canadian hospitals are adequately training and supporting staff in relation to 
these difficult conversations. We believe that this would make a bigger difference than 
legislation on the way in which apologies are delivered. 
 
Key Messages 
 Recent research suggests that saying sorry is a key element of successful disclosure 
practice, but that there is often reluctance to apologize after an adverse event due to 
legal fears. 
 Apology legislation has been widely enacted in Canada that prevents an apology from 
being taken into account in any determination of fault or liability, and from voiding, 
impairing or otherwise affecting liability insurance coverage. 
 It remains to be seen whether these laws will achieve their goals of encouraging 
apologies and open communication and reducing litigation, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the laws are not yet having the desired effect.  
 Since disclosing, and apologizing for, an adverse event is one of the most complex 
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and difficult conversations to occur in healthcare, ensuring that health care staff 
receive good training and support in relation to this process is likely to be more 
important than legislation in improving the delivery of apologies. 
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Abstract 
The issue of apologising to patients harmed by adverse events has been a subject of interest 
and debate within medicine, politics, and the law since the early 1980s. Although apology 
serves several important social roles, including recognising the victims of harm, providing an 
opportunity for redress, and repairing relationships, compelled apologies ring hollow and 
ultimately undermine these goals. Apologies that stem from external authorities’ edicts rather 
than an offender’s own self-criticism and moral reflection are inauthentic and contribute to a 
“moral flabbiness” that stunts the moral development of both individual providers and the 
medical profession. Following a discussion of a recent case from New Zealand in which a 
midwife was required to apologise not only to the parents but also to the baby, it is argued that 
rather than requiring health care providers to apologise, authorities should instead train, foster, 
and support the capacity of providers to apologise voluntarily.  
 
12.1. Case Study: Midwife Forced to Apologise to Baby 
In a recently published investigation by New Zealand’s Health and Disability Commissioner 
(HDC), a midwife was required to provide a written apology following an error to both the 
parents and the baby.  
 
The case examined the standard of care provided by a midwife who failed to discuss with the 
parents vitamin K administration during the antenatal period and also failed to perform a PKU 
test within an appropriate period after birth. The baby was admitted to hospital with neonatal 
jaundice and later required an urgent craniotomy and evacuation of a subdural haematoma. 
The HDC found the midwife in breach of the Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers’ Rights (Code of Rights). The Commissioner recommended that the midwife  
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provide a written apology to Mr and Mrs B and a separate apology to Baby B, suitable 
for her to read when she is sufficiently mature to do so, apologising for Ms A’s 
breaches of the Code. The apology is to be provided to HDC for forwarding by 24 
June 2013 (Health and Disability Commissioner 2013a, 12). 
 
Recommendations to provide an apology to a complainant are common in HDC 
investigations. For instance, in the 41 investigations published on the HDC’s website in 2013, 
it appears that 38 investigations recommended that an apology be provided (Health and 
Disability Commissioner 2013b). HDC “recommendations” are more than simple suggestions 
that health and disability providers can freely choose not to follow. Such recommendations 
effectively amount to a requirement, given the HDC’s policy of publicly naming providers 
who fail to comply with the Commissioner’s recommendations, and in practice 98 percent of 
providers comply with HDC recommendations (Health and Disability Commissioner 2008). 
Indeed, the HDC’s naming policy explicitly addresses apologies:  
 
Providers have argued that naming for refusal to comply with minor 
recommendations, such as an apology, is not warranted. However, complainants and 
consumers do not consider an apology to be a “minor recommendation”. If a provider 
refuses to apologise, it is generally because he or she is unwilling to accept that the 
care he or she provided was substandard. Such behaviour is itself evidence of a lack of 
professionalism (Health and Disability Commissioner 2008, 5). 
 
However, the recommendation in this case to provide an apology to a baby “for her to read 
when she is sufficiently mature to do so” is rather strange. The midwife had already faced a 
competence review and an HDC investigation and has been referred by the Commissioner for 
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potential disciplinary proceedings. She also has stopped practising as a self-employed 
midwife and now only works as a hospital staff midwife. The midwife states that the case has 
“profoundly” affected her and that she has continued to reflect daily in her practice “on the 
need for good communication and documentation” (Health and Disability Commissioner 
2013a, 7). What words should the midwife find to say sorry in a way that a previously harmed 
(but now well recovered) child can read at some future date? On top of everything else, the 
recommended apology to the baby seems excessive and hollow. Even with regard to the 
recommended apology to the parents, one could question why the midwife was not trusted to 
make a judgement about the matter.  
 
While this particular case is rather unusual, it raises a general question about the 
appropriateness of coercing health care providers to apologise. Even though other 
jurisdictions may not have an authority like the HDC that requires apologies, coercion may be 
exerted by many parties and it is important to reflect on how apologies can be ethically 
promoted after things go wrong in health care. 
  
12.2. The Role of Apologies 
The act of apologising carries great meaning in wider society as a means of “responding to the 
harmed person’s need for recognition, offering the individual or organisation the opportunity 
to make amends, [and] laying the foundation for a better relationship between both parties” 
(ACSQHC 2012, 42). While an apology can be defined in various ways, certain key elements 
have been identified in the literature. These include acknowledging that harm has occurred, 
accepting responsibility for causing the harm, expressing regret, and taking action to remedy 
the harm and prevent future occurrences (ACSQHC 2012; Allan and McKillop 2010). 
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Providing an apology also may bestow a number of positive psycho-physiological effects for 
those harmed. Alfred Allan and Dianne McKillop (2010) note that those harmed by adverse 
events can experience a range of psychological and physiological stress responses similar to 
any other stressor and suggest that a full apology can promote forgiveness, reduce negative 
effects and assist in recovery by “redressing a power imbalance, restoring dignity, achieving 
closure and stopping the search for an explanation or information, [and] reducing the impulse 
for redress by making them feel that they have been treated respectfully and fairly” 
(ACSQHC 2012, 44).  
 
With the development of open disclosure in health care internationally, the role of apologies 
to patients harmed by adverse events has become an increasingly important consideration, 
with research indicating that a full and sincere apology following an adverse event is a key 
element of successful disclosure practice (ACSQHC 2012). Apologising to harmed patients is 
now widely endorsed, including in the United States (Massachusetts Coalition for the 
Prevention of Medical Errors 2006), Canada (Canadian Medical Protective Association 2008), 
the United Kingdom (National Patient Safety Agency 2009), Australia (ACSQHC 2013), and 
New Zealand (Health and Disability Commissioner 2009). In Australia, for instance, the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care reviewed the Open Disclosure 
Standard in 2011 to consider it in light of current research and evidence and to recommend 
changes to it (ACSQHC 2012). This resulted in the new Australian Open Disclosure 
Framework that specifies that the words “I am sorry” or “we are sorry” should be included in 
an apology or expression of regret (ACSQHC 2013). 
 
Unfortunately, there has traditionally been a reluctance to offer apologies in health care after 
things go wrong. As Marie Bismark has noted:  
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Health practitioners have high expectations of themselves and, not surprisingly, many 
find it difficult to discuss adverse events openly with patients. Some are afraid of 
losing patients’ trust, some shy away from difficult conversations, while for others the 
fear of medicolegal consequences and professional sanctions is cited as an impediment 
to apologising (Bismark 2009, 96-97).  
 
Nonetheless, research has found that patients often consider that disclosure “would enhance 
their trust in their physicians’ honesty and would reassure them that they were receiving 
complete information about their overall care” (Gallagher et al 2003, 1003) and that an 
apology “is the most valued part of open disclosure and fundamental in the post-incident 
reconciliation process” (ACSQHC 2012, 43). Furthermore, while clinicians’ legal fears have 
been identified even in very different legal settings as a key barrier to apologising (Gallagher 
et al. 2006), it is generally held that expressions of sympathy, and even acknowledgements of 
responsibility, are not an admission of liability, as this is a matter for a court to decide on the 
basis of facts and not by what is said (McLennan and Truog 2013). More importantly, 
“without a meaningful and unequivocal expression of wrongdoing, apology cannot be an 
authentic moral act” (Taft 2000, 1154; see also Lazare 2004). This applies even in health care 
where harmful errors have complex causes often not attributable to an individual person or 
act. 
 
Few would quarrel with the notion that an apology is owed to patients who are harmed by 
substandard care and that the act of apology occurs too infrequently. The fact that an apology 
in these circumstances is ethically the right thing to do, and may potentially have a number of 
positive benefits, appears to be what is motivating New Zealand’s HDC to consistently 
recommend health providers apologise after they have been found in breach of the Code of 
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Rights. The problem with this approach, however, is that if an apology is offered primarily 
from fear of punishment it has little value and is likely to end up doing more harm than good. 
 
12.3. The Importance of Agency 
Genuine regret, responsibility, and intention to change can only be generated by the person 
concerned. Like love, courage, or determination, these are virtues of character and as such 
must arise from the person’s own agency. Such moral reflection cannot be, one might say, 
“outsourced.” Yet, by disregarding any judgements a health care provider may have about the 
value of apologising to a particular patient, this appears to be precisely what the HDC is 
attempting to do in requiring apologies. The consequence can only be a denigration of the 
underlying moral value. As Jack Simmons and Erik Nordenhaug note, “[t]he 
institutionalization of ... a kind of artificial conscience” alters how an individual relates to 
ethics by suggesting that “being moral means following the professionally approved rules” 
(2012, under “Abstract” for a recent lecture and a forthcoming paper). 
 
If an apology is primarily motivated by some kind of threat, it will lack the essential elements 
and take on the form of a charade, becoming little more than a self-interested performance. 
Lee Taft (2000, 2005) has passionately argued for more than a decade that apologies need to 
be authentic, and yet he fears we have slipped into “moral flabbiness,” readily dishing out and 
accepting pathetic apologies: “Apologies are being conflated. We don’t know the distinction 
between an apology that seeks to repair and an apology that is just a social grace or damage 
control” (Hall 2010, ¶5). 
 
In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to compel a moral action (such as apologising) 
for the purposes of moral development. In these situations, it is hoped that the individual is 
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changed by performing the activity in a way that he or she develops the relevant virtue. The 
person comes to understand, for instance, that apologising is good. When this happens, the 
performance of the mandated apology is an act of positive self-formation, an internalising of a 
previously external value. However, the coercion involved in these cases is justified only 
insofar as it serves the desired moral end, namely, the development of a morally mature agent, 
and is only appropriate in the context of certain relationships, the parent–child being the most 
obvious. If, in such relationships, the “child” is not allowed to “grow up,” that is, if he or she 
is not released at some stage to make his or her own decisions, then the purpose of the moral 
training is negated. Similarly, when adult professionals are ordered to apologise, it seems that 
they are effectively recast as moral minors and thus not merely humbled but demeaned. This 
is likely to cause them to resent the regulatory body and to undermine their confidence in their 
ability to make moral judgements and so perform their professional role. 
 
Forced apologies can be similarly damaging for the patients receiving them. Although an 
apology is often desired by harmed or otherwise aggrieved patients, the written apologies that 
are provided to patients to fulfil regulatory bodies’ requirements are all too often full of words 
but devoid of meaning. Because the moral dimension of the apology is subverted, there is no 
sense of genuine acknowledgement and, hence, little chance of reconciliation. Like the 
professional, the patient is left feeling disempowered and disrespected and at odds with the 
institution upon which he or she is dependent.  
 
This problem is reminiscent of what Nancy Berlinger has called “cheap grace.” Berlinger 
suggests that too often in the hospital setting forgiveness is assumed to be automatic once an 
apology is given, which she argues is “a way of formulating forgiveness so that its relational 
character—the actions that various actors undertake in relation to one another so forgiveness 
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can take place—is forgotten” (Berlinger 2003, 29). Jeffrey Helmreich also has emphasised 
that “[t]he moral agent’s reasons to be self-critical stem from his own investment in not 
harming others ... [and] mere apologies, with no self-criticism at all, seem to have a less 
positive effect on victims than the absence of apology” (Helmreich 2012, 594 and 602). Thus, 
a full apology, when it is authentic, stems from a self-examination that benefits all: the 
offender’s own moral development and practice, the original victim, and the anonymous 
others who come after. Apologies that are institutionalised in health care as means to an end at 
best only reward the provider (and the provider’s insurer or employer) and at worst stunt the 
advancement of both the individual and the profession as well as harm the patient. A 
recommended apology may be appropriate as a recommendation, but not as a masked edict. 
As Taft argues, “[a]uthentic apology is reserved for the morally courageous who seek for 
themselves and their patients the deep healing authentic apology inspires” (2005, 79).  
 
The HDC should thus reconsider its practice of requiring health and disability providers to 
apologise. Apologising to harmed patients is important, and it doesn’t happen enough. 
However, the promotion of apologies after adverse events, in any jurisdiction, would be more 
appropriately achieved via strategies that nurture the development of the moral maturity 
required for authentic apology. This is most likely to be accomplished through education and 
institutional reform, but may also be supported by authorities like the HDC. Indeed, part of 
the HDC’s role in New Zealand is to educate consumers and providers about their rights and 
responsibilities. This means that instead of formally recommending apologies in 
investigations (recommendations that are enforced), the HDC should be trying to educate 
providers regarding the importance of apologising after things go wrong. A consequence of 
not coercing apologies will be that in some situations patients who deserve an apology will 
not receive one because the provider involved lacks the required character. However, in our 
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view, this is preferable to the general erosion of moral integrity that forcing apologies 
generates. 
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CHAPTER 13: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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13.1. Importance of Research Project 
This research project attempted to address a number of important research gaps concerning 
medical error communication, particularly regarding the disclosure of errors to patients, in 
Switzerland and internationally. 
 
With a shortage of empirical data regarding error communication existing in Switzerland, the 
primary aim of this research project was to empirically examine current policy and practice in 
Switzerland regarding error communication, with a particular focus on the disclosure of 
medical errors to patients. The empirical research conducted in Switzerland for this project 
has resulted in important insights which will need to be taken into consideration in relation to 
future research and efforts to improve patient safety in Switzerland. It has also made 
important contributions to current international knowledge regarding error communication 
and the impact of errors.  
 
The empirical studies were unique in a number of ways. The quantitative survey of Swiss 
hospitals was the first study to publish data on the implementation status of error disclosure 
policies and found that less than half of responding hospitals reported currently have such a 
policy. The quantitative survey of Swiss anaesthesiologists was the first study internationally 
to comprehensively examine anaesthesiologists’ attitudes and experiences regarding 
disclosing errors to patients and the impact of errors on anaesthesiologists. It was also the first 
study to examine Swiss clinicians’ attitudes and experiences regarding error communication 
in-depth and the first quantitative study in Switzerland to examine the impact of errors on 
clinicians, and one of the few studies on this issue outside of North America. It found 
significant differences in attitudes between departments regarding error communication, and 
that respondents commonly experienced distress following an error, even after a minor error 
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or near miss, but virtually all disagreed that hospitals adequately support after an error. The 
qualitative interviews with key stakeholders in Switzerland were the first time such 
individuals have been interviewed in Switzerland to explore their attitudes about medical 
errors and error communication and their views about what measures could lead to 
improvements in Switzerland. Participants raised concerns about the impact criminal liability 
and liability insurance was having on error communication in Switzerland. Finally, the 
qualitative interviews with Swiss nurses were the first time that nurses’ attitudes and 
experiences concerning disclosing errors to patients have been explored in Switzerland. While 
nurses recognised patients’ right to be informed errors, the majority thought that many errors 
were concealed from patients in practice. 
 
The theoretical research conducted internationally for this project has also resulted in 
important analysis of the appropriate role of the law in relation to promoting apologies after a 
medical error which will need to be taken into consideration concerning future research and 
initiatives. It has also made an important contribution to international knowledge regarding 
current error disclosure policies in Continental Europe.  
 
The theoretical papers were unique in a number of ways. The examination of error disclosure 
in Germany was the first time that the regulation of error disclosure in Germany has been 
examined, and one of the few examinations of this issue in Continental Europe. It was found 
that error disclosure currently plays no significant role in German health policy but there have 
been some positive developments. The examination of apology laws in Australia was the first 
time recent developments regarding errors disclosure and the appropriateness of apology laws 
in Australia have been examined. It was argued that these laws are unnecessary and that 
hospitals supporting clinicians through the disclosure process is likely to have a far greater 
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impact. Similarly, the examination of apology laws in Canada was the first time that recent 
developments in Canada in relation to apology laws and what other measures might be more 
helpful in promoting apologies, have been examined. It was argued that without good training 
and support in this process, apology legislation is unlikely to have much of an impact on the 
behaviour of health care staff. Finally, the examination of forced apologies in New Zealand 
was the first time the Health and Disability Commissioner’s practice of requiring clinicians to 
apologise has been questioned and one of the first examinations internationally of the ethical 
appropriateness of coercing apologies. It was argued that instead of requiring clinicians to 
apologise, authorities should instead train, foster, and support the capacity of providers to 
apologise voluntarily. 
 
Two important themes that emerged in this research project, the relationship between error 
communication and the law and the relationship between error communication and culture, 
require further discussion. 
 
13.2. Error Communication and the Law 
The relationship between error communication and law has been an important aspect of this 
research project. While some of these legal issues are important and need to be addressed, in 
this author’s view, far too much focus has been put on the role of the law in relation to error 
communication, both as a barrier to, and as a means of promoting, such communication. It is 
hoped that this research, both empirical and theoretical, will make a contribution, however 
small, to efforts to take a more balanced view of this issue.  
 
Internationally, organisations’ and clinicians’ legal fears are consistently identified as one of 
the most important barriers to error communication (Iedema et al., 2011; Hartnell et al., 
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2012). A number of the key Swiss stakeholders interviewed for this project also identified 
legal fears to be a major barrier to such communication in Switzerland. Although, it should be 
noted this was a perception held primarily by informants with a legal or quality background, 
not by those who were actually clinicians. Be that as it may, these informants raised important 
concerns about two areas of the law in Switzerland, criminal liability and liability insurance, 
which require further research and consideration. 
 
Regarding the use of criminal law concerning patient harm, it was argued that it would be 
misguided to think that the criminal law has no place in the clinical setting. There will always 
be events that warranted a criminal response. However, this author shares the concerns of 
many of the key Swiss stakeholders who felt that Switzerland currently has the threshold for 
criminal liability set too low and reported a number of undesirable consequences on clinicians 
and error communication and quality improvement. Further research, however, is required in 
Switzerland to establish in more detail the impact these criminal investigations are having on 
clinicians and wider quality improvement initiatives. 
 
However, it has been argued that there are a number of theoretical and ethical considerations 
that arguably make the use of the criminal law for any medical error, regardless of its 
outcome, inappropriate and likely to do more harm than good. For the criminal law to be 
morally meaningful and just in relation to patient harm, the growing international calls for the 
focus of the criminal law in the context of patient harm to be upgraded and narrowed to wilful 
and reckless conduct were endorsed. It should be noted that in most English common law 
jurisdictions, criminal liability is already generally limited to instances of death caused by 
gross negligence, and the United Kingdom is also currently considering criminalising 
healthcare professionals for wilful neglect (Bibby & Tomkins, 2014).  
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A clinician who kills a patient by wilful or reckless acts or omissions clearly deserves to be 
criminal punished. However, outside of these instances, it questionable whether the criminal 
law should be involved in most instances of harm causing medical errors given what we know 
about the causes of medical errors. There are (or, at least, should be) more appropriate forms 
of accountability to address these cases. Ron Paterson, the former Health and Disability 
Commissioner of New Zealand, initially resisted changes to the criminal law in New Zealand 
in the 1990s which limited criminal liability to instances of death caused by gross negligence. 
However, after 10 years as Commissioner, he now thinks that even a manslaughter conviction 
is an unhelpful form of accountability for a careless clinician whose acts or omissions cause a 
patient’s death (Paterson, 2013). Paterson writes (2013, p. 246):  
 
“If the purpose is to recognise the value of a human life, and the tragedy of 
preventable death, that is better achieved through coronial mechanisms designed for 
that very purpose. If the aim is deterrence (to prevent the deaths of other patients in 
similar situations), manslaughter prosecutions are an ill-conceived intervention, as 
shown by the continuing deaths from administration of the anti-cancer drug 
vincristine, notwithstanding highly publicised English prosecutions of doctors who 
mistakenly administered it. If the goal is to provide answers for grieving families, 
mediations or investigations by independent public officials such as a Commissioner 
or coroner are more effective to that end.” 
 
While Paterson is writing about instances of patient death, and about an environment that 
already limits criminal liability to gross negligence causing death, these thoughts point to 
other, arguably more appropriate, forms of accountability. These thoughts are surely equally 
applicable in Switzerland, particularly in relation to cases of non-fatal bodily injury. However, 
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it will need to be considered if the other accountability mechanisms currently available in 
Switzerland for harmed patients to seek redress are sufficient to achieve such aims.  
 
However, this author acknowledges that the removal of criminal liability for medical errors 
causing non-fatal bodily injury (let alone those that led to death) may be unlikely given the 
legal system in Switzerland and the way criminal law has been developed here. Nevertheless, 
focusing primarily on individual failure and blame is outdated and particularly unsuited in 
cases of medical errors. If the criminal law is going to continue to be used in Switzerland for 
cases of medical errors, then it needs to at least take into account the systematic causes of 
errors better. It is outside the focus on this thesis, and this author’s expertise, to examine how 
this could be achieved in any meaningful way. However, it would likely involve some use of 
corporate criminal liability. Prof. Pieth and his colleague Radha Ivory edited a 2011 book 
entitled “Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence, and Risk” (Pieth & Radha, 
2011). In the introductory chapter to the book, Pieth and Radha set out the analytical 
framework and discuss the theories that have given rise to the different models of corporate 
criminal liability. It would appear that the models arising out of the “reality theory”, which 
“recognizes the corporation as possessing a distinct personality in its own right, as well as a 
being a person under the law” (2011, p. 6), offers the best possibility of taking into account 
the systematic causes of medical errors. This author is already familiar with corporations 
being held vicariously liability for the civil wrongs of their servants, as that is the case in New 
Zealand. Indeed, the Health and Disability Commissioner’s Office sends all complaints about 
individual clinicians working in public hospitals to the CEO of the relevant District Health 
Board, as the Board could be held vicariously liable. However, Pieth and Radha also noted the 
development of the increasingly popular holistic models, which “regard corporations as 
themselves capable of committing crimes through established internal patterns of decisions-
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making (corporate culture or corporate (dis)organisation)” (pp. 6-7), and aggregative 
approaches, which “also treat the corporation as the principal offender but they do so by 
adding together the different acts, omissions, and states of mind of individual stakeholders…” 
(p. 7). Such models could possibly be used to shift the focus away from individual guilt and 
more appropriately capture the complexity of medical error causation. However, there exist a 
number of challenges with the use of corporate criminal liability (which entities can be 
criminally liable, what offenses can corporations be liable for etc.) that often depend on local 
traditions and laws (Pieth & Radha, 2011), which would require further consideration 
regarding the use of such laws in relation to harm causing medical errors.  
 
Concerning liability insurance, consistent with international literature, key Swiss 
stakeholders’ reported that some liability insurance companies in Switzerland are inhibiting 
communication with harmed patients after an error. This is concerning and requires further 
investigation. However, it is important to note that key stakeholders also felt that 
organisations and clinicians could be over cautious. In the first instance, further research is 
needed to ascertain whether organisations’ and clinicians’ reported fear over the loss of 
liability insurance coverage for communicating and apologising to harmed patients is one 
based in reality. There has been some research internationally that suggests that this fear is not 
always well founded (Burch Barr, 2009) and it will be important to establish whether the loss 
of liability coverage is a real problem or simply a misperception. Either finding would be 
important and require an appropriate response.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that communication after an error is often inhibited by liability 
insurance companies due to fears that it will increase litigation and costs. At this point in time, 
there is simply insufficient data to know whether this fear is well founded, it is a complex 
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issue and there are “compelling arguments on both sides of the debate” (Wu et al., 2014, p. 3). 
More research is needed on this issue both internationally and in Switzerland. However, it 
should be considered whether the type of system used to compensate harmed patients may 
itself be part of the problem. Even if an error is disclosed and the matter is not litigated, the 
patient harmed by the error may still have financial needs to be addressed (Wu et al., 2014). 
As Wu and colleagues have noted (2014, p. 3):  
 
“The imperative to compensate patients for harm they have sustained from negligent 
patient safety incidents is a universal challenge, with considerable international 
diversity in approaches. This diversity reflects variables such as the presence or 
absence of a centralized health authority, the way in which health care is funded, and 
litigation laws and culture in different settings.” 
 
Switzerland, like most jurisdictions internationally, use a “fault” based model, with errors of 
individual clinicians being identified as the grounds for compensation. However, as Charles 
Vincent (2003, p. 240) has argued in relation to the English tort approach, but equally 
applicable to malpractice litigation generally:  
 
“With the rise of patient safety and systems thinking about the causes of adverse 
events, the tort system is looking increasingly anachronistic and an obstacle to 
progress on patient safety. The system has been criticised as costly, slow, inequitable 
in various respects, and blame orientated. It can be traumatic for those involved—
patients and professionals alike—inducing much bitterness on both sides. The system 
is inherently adversarial and, although much of the trauma can be reduced by 
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sympathetic and effective lawyers on both sides, patients still have to fight for 
compensation at a time when they really need to be looked after.” 
 
Vincent (2003, p. 241) ends by suggesting that: 
 
“The most important criterion for assessment of any compensation system should be 
its impact on injured patients and their families, not just in providing appropriate 
financial recompense where necessary but in ensuring that explanations, apologies, 
and long term support and care are regarded as the expectation rather than the 
exception. Compensation would ideally be a gesture of reconciliation and an 
acknowledgement that a healthcare organisation has a special duty of care to those it 
has harmed.” 
 
A number of commentators, including Vincent (2003) and Studdert and Brennan (2001), have 
argued that no-fault systems of compensation such as those used in New Zealand and the 
Nordic countries, offer a better way forward. However, various countries have rejected the 
idea of implementing a no-fault compensation system (Stauch, 2008). While no-fault systems 
have a number of positive aspects to them, as New Zealand has seen, there are challenges 
involved in keeping such a system fully funded and deciding what is to be covered, and, as we 
will see below, such a system does not solves the problems regarding communication and 
apologies.  
 
As noted earlier, early compensation systems have been introduced in some organisations in 
the United States, such as the University of Michigan, which have been attached to error 
disclosure programs (Kachalia, 2010). While these organisations are still in “fault” based 
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legal systems, these institutionally based compensation systems appears to achieve many of 
the criteria Vincent sets out above. While this author has suggested that such systems could 
potentially be implemented in Swiss hospitals if they move towards self-insurance 
approaches, it should be acknowledged that there may be difficulties in this. In the United 
States, the usefulness of early compensation programs appears to be highly contingent upon 
the laws and regulations of different states and even health networks. Legal action is taken far 
more frequently in the United States after such events, and early offer programs there are 
principally seen as a way to reduce transactional costs (although there can of course be other 
benefits). The fairness of these programs to adequately compensate patients is also sometimes 
in question. Many hospitals in the United States have already significantly invested in their 
legal departments and infrastructure to run these early offer programs. The good ones obtain 
independent peer expert opinion to comment on the care provided except in the most obvious 
cases. It is questionable whether hospitals in most other jurisdictions, including Switzerland, 
are resourced sufficiently to assess claims and determine adequate compensation, as such 
legal and monetary determinations are so complex. It should also be noted that other English 
speaking countries that have been at the forefront of error disclosure, including the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Canada, have not adopted this early compensation approach. 
 
What a number of these countries have adopted, however, is apology laws, which are one of 
the best examples of the law being used to promote error communication and apologies. 
While these laws have been politically attractive, this author has argued that they are legally 
unnecessary and unlikely to be effective. Indeed, while apology laws have been in place in 
some U.S. states since 1986 (Taft, 2005), there has been no sign that they are having the 
desired effect. Although, it should be acknowledged that part of the reason why it remains 
unclear what impact these laws are having is that key data are seldom systematically collected 
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(Mastroianni, 2010). This author has discussed this issue with two prominent advocates of 
apology laws, and they agree that apologies (either full or partial) will unlikely lead to a 
finding of negligence as widely feared. However, they note that there is this perception out 
there that apologies are dangerous and that these laws may help address this. This author 
simply does not agree that it is appropriate for governments to be enacting legislation to 
address fundamental misunderstandings of the law, which would be better addressed via other 
means, or that they will be effective. Efforts need to be focused on reforming areas of the law 
that are actually problematic. Disclosing a medical error to a patient will always require a 
certain amount of courage on behalf of the clinicians, but they should not face unnecessary 
barriers to ethical practice. While this author may be proved wrong about the effectiveness of 
these apology laws, he currently remains convinced that they are a misguided strategy to 
promote apologies and error communication. Similarly misguided is the practice of coercing 
clinicians to apologise to harmed patients. While the practice may result in clinicians writing 
an “apology” to patients, it has been argued that these apologies are often inauthentic and 
likely to do more harm than good. While it would be preferable to see practice stopped in 
New Zealand, it is highly unlikely to occur. The practice has become ingrained and it is 
something the Commissioner can point to as having achieved for the complainant.  
 
While law reform may be desirable for other reasons, it seems unlikely that it would lead to 
major changes in error communication practice. While legal fears are undoubtedly a factor in 
some clinicians’ reluctance to communicate errors, as noted previously, research published in 
2006 involving US and Canadian physicians suggest that the legal environment may have a 
more limited impact on physicians’ communication attitudes and practices regarding medical 
errors than often believed (Gallagher et al., 2006b). Similarly, the survey conducted in 
Switzerland for this project found no correlation between anaesthesiologists’ attitudes about 
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malpractice and willingness to communicate serious errors. Indeed, similar to the North 
American study, 71% of respondents in the Swiss survey thought that disclosing a serious 
error to a patient would make it less likely that a patient would complain about them.  
 
The assumption that law reform will increase error communication falsely assumes that we 
are primarily dealing with a legal matter rather than one grounded in human relationships. It is 
important to address unnecessary legal barriers to such open communication, but changing the 
law to removed real or perceived barriers is not a magic bullet. To see this one only needs to 
look at New Zealand. Even though New Zealand has had a no-fault system since the 1970s, 
and thus virtually all legal barriers have been removed, it has been noted that:  
 
“Nevertheless, cultural barriers to openness and honesty persist—the availability of 
no-fault compensation removes the risk for litigation, but providers remain fearful of 
the potential for adverse publicity, disciplinary processes, and reputational damage 
after disclosure.” (Wu et al., 2014, p. 3) 
 
While it may be argued that such law reform is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
significant changes in practice, the evidence suggests otherwise. Some of the most successful 
disclosure and apology programs, such as those at the VA Medical Center and the University 
of Michigan, have occurred in very challenging legal environments and did not require law 
reform to achieve these results.  
 
In summary, a great deal of focus how been given internationally to the role of the law in 
relation to error communication, both as a barrier to, and as a means of promoting, such 
communication. While legal fears are undoubtedly a factor in some clinicians’ reluctance to 
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communicate errors, the results of the survey conducted in Switzerland for this project 
supports international research that suggests that the legal environment may have a more 
limited impact on physicians’ communication attitudes and practices regarding medical errors 
than often believed. Indeed, most respondents in the Swiss survey thought that disclosing a 
serious error to a patient would actually reduce the chances of legal action. While it is 
important to address unnecessary barriers to ethical practice, and law reform may be desirable 
for other reasons, it seems unlikely that changes in the law would lead to major changes in 
error communication practice. 
 
13.3. Error Communication and Organisational / Professional Culture 
What seems to be a more important determinant of error communication practice than legal 
issues is the culture of organisations and the medical profession. The relationship between 
error communication and culture arose most clearly in this project during the survey of Swiss 
anaesthesiologists. It was also an important theme that emerged in the interviews with the key 
stakeholders in Switzerland; however, this data has not yet been published. 
 
It has already been noted that research published in 2006 involving US and Canadian 
physicians suggested that the culture of medicine itself may be a more important barrier. 
Gallagher and colleagues (2006b) surveyed 2637 physicians in the United States and Canada, 
partly with the aim of examining the malpractice environment’s actual effect on physicians’ 
error disclosure attitudes and experiences. The study found that United States and Canadian 
physicians’ error disclosure attitudes and experiences are similar despite very different 
malpractice environments. As Gallagher and colleagues (2006b, p. 1609) argued:  
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“The fact that US and Canadian physicians’ attitudes transcend country boundaries 
suggests that these beliefs may relate to the norms, values, and practices that constitute 
the culture of medicine. The medical education system, a potent force for professional 
socialization, is remarkably similar in both countries. While acculturation begins in 
medical school, the most critical cultural norms are inculcated within specialties. The 
finding that physician attitudes generally varied more by specialty than by country 
further supports the role of medical culture in shaping these views.” 
 
The results of the survey of Swiss anaesthesiologist have given more weight to the view that 
medical culture may be the more important determinant regarding error communication. 
However, they go further in suggesting at which level these cultural norms may be being 
instilled. Gallagher and colleagues suggested that this may occur most critically within 
specialities, however, partly due to their sampling technique, these studies did not report on 
subgroup analysis such as department. While attempts to survey more than one specialty in 
Switzerland for this project were not successful, the study was able to survey all of the 
university hospitals’ anaesthesia departments in Switzerland. As reported earlier, significant 
differences in attitudes between departments regarding error communication were found. 
These findings were remarkable given the study only included one specialty in one country, 
and suggest that the individual departments/hospitals culture may be the more important 
factor. Further research is needed to examine whether significant differences in error 
communication attitudes between departments exist in other specialties and countries, and to 
understand the factors that influence local culture and thus the actions required. 
 
International research on general patient safety culture has also found that organisational 
culture significantly varies between hospitals (Speroff et al., 2010). Speroff and colleagues 
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(2010), for instance, found that a healthcare organisation’s culture is a critical factor in the 
development of its patient safety climate and in the successful implementation of quality 
improvement initiatives, with group culture hospitals having significantly higher safety 
climate scores than hierarchical culture hospitals. These findings may well be applicable in 
relation to error communication practice. Indeed, it has been suggested in this project that the 
need for clear guidance is arguable more important in high “uncertainty avoidance” countries, 
which are usually characterised by hierarchical cultures.  
 
Indeed, the implementation of an error disclosure policy may be an important indication of 
organisational culture concerning error communication. Thus the fact that the survey of Swiss 
hospital conducted for this project found that less than half of responding hospitals reported 
currently having an error disclosure standard, and more than a third have no plans to do so, is 
potentially very concerning. However, the survey simply asked whether hospitals whether 
there exist an internal hospital standard which provides that patients or their relatives are to be 
promptly informed about medical errors that result in harm, offering the following answering 
options: “yes; no; implementation planned within the next 12 months”. Further research is 
needed in Switzerland to examine the contents of the existing policies, how they differ 
between hospitals, the relationship between these policies and the practice of error disclosure, 
and the factors that lead a hospital to develop or not develop such a policy.  
 
As noted earlier, international research has found that state and health organisations error 
disclosure policies, along with the increase of specially trained staff, has been one of the 
driving forces behind the increased disclosure of errors (Iedema et al., 2008a). However, it is 
clear that an institutional policy in itself is no magic bullet. Internationally there has been a 
challenge of turning policy into practice, particularly on a large scale. Wu and colleagues 
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(2014, p. 2) described the experience of the United Kingdom in implementing the 2005 
national policy, Being Open:  
 
“…although the policy achieved endorsement and alignment at the highest levels of 
the health service, the engagement and support needed to implement Being Open were 
not adequately transmitted to those on the front line. Despite guidelines in place on 
how to create a patient safety culture, an eLearning tool, and Being Open training 
workshops (the most extensive of which included opportunities to practice disclosure 
skills with actors), uptake was slow—perhaps because insufficient numbers received 
the training and perhaps because of the lack of enforcement and potential sanctions for 
noncompliance.” 
 
The importance of training and support in relation error disclosure has been highlighted 
repeatedly in this project, both in the empirical and the theoretical research. The survey of 
Swiss anaesthesiologists found that only 12% of respondents had received any education or 
training on how to disclose errors to patients, although, 93% were interested in receiving such 
education or training. It was suggested that increasing anaesthesiologists’ training may be an 
important step in increasing error disclosure. However, it needs to be acknowledged that there 
are challenges involved in this. These are nicely described by Truog and colleagues (2010, p. 
59): 
 
“Another dilemma was created by the fact that all the Harvard hospitals have 
hundreds, even thousands, of clinicians who at any time could become involved in a 
serious medical error. On the one hand, any effective educational strategy must 
involve a broad-based learning initiative designed to provide all these clinicians with a 
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general understanding of the hospital’s approach to disclosure, particularly in view of 
the fact that most of these clinicians were trained to withhold any information from 
patients that might convey wrongdoing or liability. On the other hand, we realized that 
it would be unrealistic to think that any educational program could enable this huge 
number of clinicians to learn and retain the knowledge needed to have these 
conversations well at any moment in time. Therefore we decided to endorse an 
approach that would assure the “just-in-time” availability of expertise and help by 
concentrating our educational efforts on a small number of disclosure “coaches” who 
would be available to all clinicians within the institution on a 24/7 basis.” 
 
While the best model for providing such coaching expertise has not yet been fully resolved, 
Truog and colleagues (2010, p. 61) argued that: 
 
“Whatever approach is taken…a common principle is that patients and families want 
to have the primary conversations with their clinicians, not with coaches, risk 
managers, or other institutional representatives. The primary role of the coach is to 
assist these clinicians in how to have this conversation well, not to insert themselves 
directly into the disclosure process.” 
 
It should be noted that 95% of respondents in the survey of Swiss anaesthesiologists were 
interested in receiving support from an expert on patient communication after a serious error. 
While increasing general disclosure training in Swiss medical school and postgraduate 
training may be an important step in increasing error disclosure in Switzerland, consideration 
should also be given to the creation of “just-in-time” disclosure coaches.  
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Finally regarding the relationship between error communication and culture, is the issue of 
blame. The medical profession has “traditionally relied upon that method found most 
unhelpful in reducing errors and improving quality—namely, shame and blame of individuals 
with accusations of incompetence, unprofessionalism, and unworthiness to treat patients…” 
(Liang, 2002, p. 64). Wu and colleague (2014, p. 2) have suggested that “Perhaps part of the 
reason that many are drawn to this simplistic punitive paradigm is that it implies that the 
organization has taken the incident seriously and has been held accountable. However, this 
“blame culture” is at odds with the contemporary “systems” conception of error causation, 
and is unlikely to foster an environment where clinicians feel they can safely discuss medical 
errors openly. A number of Swiss key stakeholders, however, reported that a culture of blame 
was still prominent in Swiss hospitals. Further research is needed to establish this.  
 
Advocates of the “systems” approach to errors initially promoted a “blame-free” environment. 
However, as Sharpe (2004) has noted, this approach raised a number of concerns about 
accountability for harmful errors, including that the approach may diffuse accountability too 
widely and that it may minimises the role of individual agency so much as to affect 
professionalism. Indeed, it has become clear that a “blame-free” culture is not appropriate. As 
James Reason, the “father” of the systems approach, has stated (cited in Banja, 2005, p. 134):  
 
“A no-blame” culture is neither feasible nor desirable. A small proportion of human 
unsafe acts are egregious (for example, substance abuse, reckless non-compliance, 
sabotage and so on) and warrant sanctions, severe ones in some cases. A blanket 
amnesty on all unsafe acts would lack credibility in the eyes of the workforce. More 
importantly, it would be seen to oppose natural justice.” 
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Instead, Reason suggests that an organisation should (cited in Banja, 2005, p. 143):  
 
“Substitute the (erring) individual … for someone else coming from the same domain 
of activity and possessing comparable qualifications and experience. Then ask the 
following question: “In light of how events unfolded and were perceived by those 
involved in real time, is it likely that this new individual would have behaved an 
differently?” If the answer is “probably not” then … apportioning blame has no 
material role to play other than to obscure systemic deficiencies…” 
 
Indeed, Wu and colleagues (2014, p. 2) have noted that over the past decade healthcare 
organisations have “…moved away from the anachronistic “blame culture” first toward a 
“blame-free culture” and subsequently to a more practical and necessary “fair blame culture” 
or “just culture”…” However, there remains a challenge internationally of achieving such a 
“just culture”, of balancing the responsibilities of individual clinicians and organisations, and 
also the rights of harmed patients to achieve suitable redress. In Switzerland, further research 
is needed to examine the current culture that exists in Swiss healthcare organisations in 
relation to blame for patient harm, and how a “just culture” can best be achieved given 
prevailing norms and the current legal system with its focus on individual accountability for 
patient harm.  
 
A step that is likely required in every country regarding this issue is to open a dialogue with 
the wider public about the complex nature of patient harm and quality improvement (Wu et 
al., 2014). Previous studies have found that patients often endorse punishing individual 
clinicians for harmful errors (Blendon et al., 2002). This supports this author’s experiences at 
the Health and Disability Commissioner’s Office. Complainants would often want very strong 
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punishment for individual clinicians and not understand the need to improve systems. 
Opening a dialogue with the public on these issues may help aid understanding and increase 
the role of patient involvement in quality improvement (Wu et al., 2014). 
 
In summary, the culture of organisations and the medical profession appears to be a more 
important determinant of error communication practice than legal issues, and addressing 
culturally based barriers to error communication may do most to change practice. The 
implementation of an error disclosure policy may be an important indication of organisational 
culture concerning error communication. The fact that less than half of responding Swiss 
hospitals reported currently having an error disclosure standard, and more than a third have no 
plans to do so, is thus concerning. While international research has found that error disclosure 
policies has been one of the driving forces behind the increased disclosure of errors, there has 
been a challenge internationally of turning policy into practice, and policy needs to be 
supported by disclosure training. Achieving a “fair blame culture” in relation to patient harm 
may also be an essential step to promoting ethical practice regarding to error communication. 
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2. Glasgow, J., McLennan, S., High, K. & Celi, L.A. (2007). Metrics and Quality 
Improvement in a New Zealand ICU. (Presented by Leo Anthony Celi). The Quality 
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1. Glasgow, J., McLennan, S., High, K. & Celi, L.A. (2007). Quality of Death in a New 
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5. McLennan, S. (2013). “Apology Laws”: Do they promote open disclosure of medical 
errors? Harvard Medical School’s Division of Medical Ethics, Harvard University, 
Boston, 26 November 2013. 1.5 hours. 
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University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 14 May 2007. 1.5 hours. 
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Switzerland. 8 hours.  
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